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Resumen y conclusiones
El paradigma de m-Salud (salud mo´vil) aboga por la integracio´n masiva de las ma´s
avanzadas tecnolog´ıas de comunicacio´n, red mo´vil y sensores en aplicaciones y sistemas de
salud, para fomentar el despliegue de un nuevo modelo de atencio´n cl´ınico centrado en el
usuario/paciente. Este modelo tiene por objetivos el empoderamiento de los usuarios en
la gestio´n de su propia salud (p.ej. aumentando sus conocimientos, promocionando estilos
de vida saludable y previniendo enfermedades), la prestacio´n de una mejor tele-asistencia
sanitaria en el hogar para ancianos y pacientes cro´nicos y una notable disminucio´n del
gasto de los Sistemas de Salud gracias a la reduccio´n del nu´mero y la duracio´n de las
hospitalizaciones. No obstante, estas ventajas, atribuidas a las aplicaciones de m-Salud,
suelen venir acompan˜adas del requisito de un alto grado de disponibilidad de la informacio´n
biome´dica de sus usuarios para garantizar una alta calidad de servicio, p.ej. fusionar varias
sen˜ales de un usuario para obtener un diagno´stico ma´s preciso. La consecuencia negativa de
cumplir esta demanda es el aumento directo de las superficies potencialmente vulnerables
a ataques, lo que situ´a a la seguridad (y a la privacidad) del modelo de m-Salud como
factor cr´ıtico para su e´xito.
Como requisito no funcional de las aplicaciones de m-Salud, la seguridad ha recibido
menos atencio´n que otros requisitos te´cnicos que eran ma´s urgentes en etapas de desarrollo
previas, tales como la robustez, la eficiencia, la interoperabilidad o la usabilidad. Otro
factor importante que ha contribuido a retrasar la implementacio´n de pol´ıticas de seguridad
so´lidas es que garantizar un determinado nivel de seguridad implica unos costes que
pueden ser muy relevantes en varias dimensiones, como la econo´mica (p.ej. sobrecostes
por la inclusio´n de hardware extra para la autenticacio´n de usuarios), el rendimiento
(p.ej. reduccio´n de la eficiencia y de la interoperabilidad debido a la integracio´n de
elementos de seguridad) y la usabilidad (p.ej. configuracio´n ma´s complicada de dispositivos
y aplicaciones de salud debido a las nuevas opciones de seguridad). Por tanto, las soluciones
de seguridad que persigan satisfacer a todos los actores del contexto de m-Salud (usuarios,
pacientes, personal me´dico, personal te´cnico, legisladores, fabricantes de dispositivos y
equipos, etc.) deben ser robustas y al mismo tiempo minimizar sus costes asociados.
Esta Tesis detalla una propuesta de seguridad, compuesta por cuatro grandes bloques
interconectados, para dotar de seguridad a las arquitecturas de m-Salud con unos costes
reducidos. El primer bloque define un esquema global que proporciona unos niveles de
seguridad e interoperabilidad acordes con las caracter´ısticas de las distintas aplicaciones
de m-Salud. Este esquema esta´ compuesta por tres capas diferenciadas, disen˜adas a
la medidas de los dominios de m-Salud y de sus restricciones, incluyendo medidas de
seguridad adecuadas para la defensa contra las amenazas asociadas a sus aplicaciones de
m-Salud. El segundo bloque establece la extensio´n de seguridad de aquellos protocolos
esta´ndar que permiten la adquisicio´n, el intercambio y/o la administracio´n de informacio´n
biome´dica — por tanto, usados por muchas aplicaciones de m-Salud — pero no reu´nen los
niveles de seguridad detallados en el esquema previo. Estas extensiones se concretan
para los esta´ndares biome´dicos ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD y SCP-ECG. El tercer bloque
propone nuevas formas de fortalecer la seguridad de los tests biome´dicos, que constituyen
el elemento esencial de muchas aplicaciones de m-Salud de cara´cter cl´ınico, mediante
codificaciones novedosas. Finalmente el cuarto bloque, que se situ´a en paralelo a los
anteriores, selecciona herramientas de seguridad gene´ricas (elementos de autenticacio´n y
criptogra´ficos) cuya integracio´n en los otros bloques resulta ido´nea, y desarrolla nuevas
herramientas de seguridad, basadas en sen˜al — embedding y keytagging —, para reforzar
la proteccio´n de los test biome´dicos.
Las extensiones de los esta´ndares ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD y SCP-ECG, basadas en el
modelo de capas, pueden considerarse robustas, eficientes y respetuosas con sus contenidos
y caracter´ısticas originales. La primera no an˜ade ningu´n nuevo atributo a su modelo de
datos, cuatro tramas a su modelo de servicios —otras cuatro son extendidas con nuevas
subtramas—, y so´lo un nuevo sub-estado al modelo de comunicaciones. Adema´s, una
arquitectura sencilla compuesta por un dispositivo de salud personal equipado con un
simple procesador de 9 MHz y un agregador equipado con un procesador de 1 GHz es capaz
de transmitir un electrocardiograma de 3 derivaciones en tiempo real utilizando la capa de
seguridad ma´xima. Los otros requisitos asociados a esta extensio´n son una configuracio´n
inicial del dispositivo de salud y del agregador, la instalacio´n de identificadores/autentica-
dores de usuarios en estos dispositivos si van a compartirse y la implemenatacio´n de ciertos
perfiles IHE en el agregador para que los datos recogidos puedan integrarse en sistemas
de salud. Respecto a la extensio´n del SCP-ECG, e´sta so´lo an˜ade una nueva seccio´n con
elementos de seguridad y sintaxis para proteger el resto del fichero e implementar un control
de acceso basado en roles. El overhead introducido en un fichero SCP-ECG protegido es
t´ıpicamente el 2–13% del taman˜o original, y los retardos extra para generar un fichero
SCP-ECG protegido y acceder a e´l para su interpretacio´n suponen respectivamente un
2–10% y un 5% de los retardos originales.
Respecto a las te´cnicas de proteccio´n basadas en sen˜al, el me´todo de embedding que
se ha desarrollado es la base para la propuesta de una codificacio´n gene´rica para tests
compuestos de sen˜ales biome´dicas, medidas perio´dicas e informacio´n contextual. Esta
codificacio´n ha sido evaluada y espec´ıficamente refinada para tests basados en electrocar-
diogramas y electroencefalogramas, demostrando que el test codificado mantiene su calidad
cl´ınica, que el sistema de codificacio´n-acceso es capaz de funcionar en tiempo real (con
retardos totales de 2 s para electrocardiogramas y 3.3 s para electroencefalogramas)
y que su interfaz tiene una gran usabilidad. Pese a la introduccio´n de elementos de
seguridad y metadatos dentro de la sen˜al, para habilitar servicios de m-Salud, se han
logrado ratios de compresio´n que van desde ' 3 para transmisio´n en tiempo real hasta
' 5 cuando se funciona offline. Complementariamente, el me´todo de keytagging permite
asociar informacio´n a ima´genes (y otras sen˜ales) por medio de llaves, de una manera
segura y sin distorsio´n. Estas caracter´ısticas ventajosas han sido aprovechadas para la
implementacio´n de varias medidas de seguridad: autenticacio´n de ima´genes, control de
integridad y localizacio´n de zonas modificadas sin permiso, asociacio´n de informacio´n con
control de roles, trazabilidad y proteccio´n de copyright. La evaluacio´n realizada demuestra
el notable compromiso robustez-capacidad ofrecido por esta te´cnica, que permite implemen-
tar todas las medidas anteriores simulta´neamente, y su compatibilidad con el sistema de
compresio´n JPEG2000, ya que se mantiene el compromiso anterior a la vez que se establece
un retardo global de keytagging de so´lo ' 120ms para cualquier taman˜o de imagen — lo
que evidencia su escalabilidad.
Como conclusio´n general, se ha demostrado e ilustrado con ejemplos que hay varias
formas, complementarias y estructuradas, de contribuir a la implementacio´n de unos
niveles de seguridad adecuados para las arquitecturas de m-Salud, con un coste moderado
en lo que respecta a economı´a, rendimiento, interoperabilidad y usabilidad. El panorama
de m-Salud evoluciona constantemente a lo largo de todas sus dimensiones, y esta Tesis
pretende hacer lo propio con sus seguridad. Adema´s, las lecciones aqu´ı aprendidas pueden
servir de gu´ıa para la elaboracio´n de esquemas de seguridad ma´s exhaustivos y actualizados,
para la extensio´n de otros esta´ndares biome´dicos con niveles bajos de seguridad o privacidad,
y para el avance del estado del arte de sistemas de proteccio´n basados en sen˜al y sus
aplicaciones.

Abstract
The paradigm of m-Health (mobile health) advocates for the massive integration of ad-
vanced mobile communications, network and sensor technologies in healthcare applications
and systems to foster the deployment of a new, user/patient-centered healthcare model
enabling the empowerment of users in the management of their health (e.g. by increasing
their health literacy, promoting healthy lifestyles and the prevention of diseases), a better
home-based healthcare delivery for elderly and chronic patients and important savings for
healthcare systems due to the reduction of hospitalizations in number and duration. It is
a fact that many m-Health applications demand high availability of biomedical informa-
tion from their users (for further accurate analysis, e.g. by fusion of various signals) to
guarantee high quality of service, which on the other hand entails increasing the potential
surfaces for attacks. Therefore, it is not surprising that security (and privacy) is commonly
included among the most important barriers for the success of m-Health.
As a non-functional requirement for m-Health applications, security has received less at-
tention than other technical issues that were more pressing at earlier development stages,
such as reliability, efficiency, interoperability or usability. Another fact that has con-
tributed to delaying the enforcement of robust security policies is that guaranteeing a
certain security level implies costs that can be very relevant and that span along different
dimensions. These include budgeting (e.g. the demand of extra hardware for user au-
thentication), performance (e.g. lower efficiency and interoperability due to the addition
of security elements) and usability (e.g. cumbersome configuration of devices and appli-
cations due to security options). Therefore, security solutions that aim to satisfy all the
stakeholders in the m-Health context (users/patients, medical staff, technical staff, sys-
tems and devices manufacturers, regulators, etc.) shall be robust and, at the same time,
minimize their associated costs.
This Thesis details a proposal, composed of four interrelated blocks, to integrate ap-
propriate levels of security in m-Health architectures in a cost-efficient manner. The first
block defines a global scheme that provides different security and interoperability levels ac-
cording to how critical are the m-Health applications to be implemented. This consists of
three layers tailored to the m-Health domains and their constraints, whose security coun-
termeasures defend against the threats of their associated m-Health applications. Next,
the second block addresses the security extension of those standard protocols that enable
the acquisition, exchange and/or management of biomedical information — thus, used by
many m-Health applications — but do not meet the security levels described in the former
scheme. These extensions are materialized for the biomedical standards ISO/IEEE 11073
PHD and SCP-ECG. Then, the third block proposes new ways of enhancing the security
of biomedical standards, which are the centerpiece of many clinical m-Health applications,
by means of novel codings. Finally the fourth block, with is parallel to the others, selects
generic security methods (for user authentication and cryptographic protection) whose in-
tegration in the other blocks results optimal, and also develops novel signal-based methods
—embedding and keytagging— for strengthening the security of biomedical tests.
The layer-based extensions of the standards ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD and SCP-ECG
can be considered as robust, cost-efficient and respectful with their original features and
contents. The former adds no attributes to its data information model, four new frames to
the service model —and extends four with new sub-frames—, and only one new sub-state to
the communication model. Furthermore, a lightweight architecture consisting of a personal
health device mounting a 9 MHz processor and an aggregator mounting a 1 GHz processor
is enough to transmit a 3-lead electrocardiogram in real-time implementing the top security
layer. The extra requirements associated to this extension are an initial configuration of
the health device and the aggregator, tokens for identification/authentication of users
if these devices are to be shared and the implementation of certain IHE profiles in the
aggregator to enable the integration of measurements in healthcare systems. As regards to
the extension of SCP-ECG, it only adds a new section with selected security elements and
syntax in order to protect the rest of file contents and provide proper role-based access
control. The overhead introduced in the protected SCP-ECG is typically 2–13 % of the
regular file size, and the extra delays to protect a newly generated SCP-ECG file and to
access it for interpretation are respectively a 2–10 % and a 5 % of the regular delays.
As regards to the signal-based security techniques developed, the embedding method
is the basis for the proposal of a generic coding for tests composed of biomedical signals,
periodic measurements and contextual information. This has been adjusted and evalu-
ated with electrocardiogram and electroencephalogram-based tests, proving the objective
clinical quality of the coded tests, the capacity of the coding-access system to operate
in real-time (overall delays of 2 s for electrocardiograms and 3.3 s for electroencephalo-
grams) and its high usability. Despite of the embedding of security and metadata to
enable m-Health services, the compression ratios obtained by this coding range from ' 3
in real-time transmission to ' 5 in offline operation. Complementarily, keytagging permits
associating information to images (and other signals) by means of keys in a secure and
non-distorting fashion, which has been availed to implement security measures such as
image authentication, integrity control and location of tampered areas, private captioning
with role-based access control, traceability and copyright protection. The tests conducted
indicate a remarkable robustness-capacity tradeoff that permits implementing all this mea-
sures simultaneously, and the compatibility of keytagging with JPEG2000 compression,
maintaining this tradeoff while setting the overall keytagging delay in only ' 120 ms for
any image size — evidencing the scalability of this technique.
As a general conclusion, it has been demonstrated and illustrated with examples that
there are various, complementary and structured manners to contribute in the imple-
mentation of suitable security levels for m-Health architectures with a moderate cost in
budget, performance, interoperability and usability. The m-Health landscape is evolving
permanently along all their dimensions, and this Thesis aims to do so with its security.
Furthermore, the lessons learned herein may offer further guidance for the elaboration of
more comprehensive and updated security schemes, for the extension of other biomedical
standards featuring low emphasis on security or privacy, and for the improvement of the
state of the art regarding signal-based protection methods and applications.
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“You see, Momo, it’s like this. Sometimes, when you’ve a
very long street ahead of you, you think how terribly long
it is and feel sure you’ll never get it swept. And then you
start to hurry. You work faster and faster and every time
you look up there seems to be just as much left to sweep
as before, and you try even harder, and you panic, and in
the end you’re out of breath and have to stop–and still the
street stretches away in front of you. That’s not the way
to do it.
You must never think of the whole street at once, under-
stand? You must only concentrate on the next step, the
next breath, the next stroke of the broom, and the next,
and the next. Nothing else.
That way you enjoy your work, which is important, because
then you make a good job of it. And that’s how it ought
to be.
And all at once, before you know it, you find you’ve swept
the whole street clean, bit by bit. what’s more, you aren’t
out of breath.”
Michael Ende – Momo
1
Introduction
1.1 The m-Health scenario and its security issues
The term e-Health (electronic health) began to spread by 1999 to describe what Prof. Ey-
senbach defines as [1] “An emerging field in the intersection of medical informatics, public
health and business, referring to health services and information delivered or enhanced
through the Internet and related technologies. In a broader sense, the term characterizes
not only a technical development, but also a state-of-mind, a way of thinking, an atti-
tude, and a commitment for networked, global thinking, to improve health care locally,
regionally, and worldwide by using information and communication technology.” This
definition can also be portrayed as succinct as mathematical: “e-Health = Medicine
+ Communication + Information + Society”. This new medical paradigm sup-
plements existing forms of care, create favorable circumstances for strengthening patient
engagement [2] and yields clinical improvement [3, 4]. This progress is primarily based on
the digitization of health records, biomedical measurements (e.g. blood pressure, glucose
level, body temperature), signals (e.g. pulse-oximetry, electrocardiograms) and tests (e.g.
coronary angiographies, echocardiograms, complemented with contextual data such as the
conditions of acquisition, personal data of the patient and relevant parts of his/her clinical
history) and the deployment of reliable protocols for its storage and transmission. On top
of these pillars, novel ICT-based services, such as telemonitoring [5, 6], telediagnosis [7, 8],
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teleassistance [9, 10] or e-Prescribing [11], foster an ubiquitous and pervasive access to
the users of this medical information: physicians who interpret this information, clinicians
caring for the patient, patients, researchers, medical teachers and students, etc.
The paradigm of e-Health evolved to m-Health (mobile health) [12, 13, 14] by 2004,
to advocate for the integration of emerging mobile communications, network and
sensor technologies in healthcare systems and applications. In addition to this, m-
Health proposes shifting the healthcare model from a hospital-centered care to a user/patient-
centered paradigm [15, 16], enabling the empowerment of users [17, 18, 19, 20] in the
management of their health, the prevention of diseases, a better home-based healthcare
delivery for elderly and chronic patients (e.g. providing personalized and dynamic treat-
ments, connection with adequate medical systems) and important savings for healthcare
systems due to the reduction of hospitalizations in number and duration. Health and fit-
ness monitoring, independent living and disease management are some examples
of innovative user/patient-centered mobile health applications [13], belonging to m-Health.
These applications use personal health devices (e.g. weighting scales, blood pressure mon-
itors, pulse-oximeters, medication monitors, fall detectors) and/or wearable sensors (e.g.
for body temperature, electrocardiography, skin response, etc.) to gather biomedical mea-
surements and signals of the user in different locations (e.g. at home, in hospital, in daily
journey), which sometimes are accessed only by the user (to consult his/her health status)
but often also by healthcare systems (e.g. to trigger alarms at abnormal values) and by
some expert in charge of his/her follow-up. Certainly, these applications help to improve
the health management of people, and the parallel spread of powerful mobile devices and
networks foster their fast deployment [12]. In fact, the phrase 4G Health [21] encourages
the progress of m-Health towards targeted personalized medical systems with adaptable
functionalities and compatibility with 4G networks. Furthermore, the combination of In-
ternet of Things (IoT) [22, 23] and m-Health has amalgamated the new concept of Internet
of m-health Things (m-IoT) [24, 25, 26], intended for the development of a new, advanced
generation of smart, always-connected applications that go beyond machine-to-machine
communications.
Although the feasibility and usefulness of pioneer m-Health services has been thor-
oughly proved, their fixed structure sometimes leads to levels of engagement [27], motiva-
tion [28], or connections among their users [29] lower than required. These shortcomings
have even resulted in the creation of groups of unsatisfied patients who decide to self-
organize, out of the traditional healthcare system, for a higher empowerment and better
management of their medical conditions, such is the case of the Nightscouts. Experiences
in the literature suggest that creating living networks of users and formal and informal
caregivers by means of social media (e.g. social networks such as Facebook or Twitter)
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can alleviate these issues. It is worth noting that besides the predominantly ludic char-
acter of social media, new uses in different domains are being investigated and developed
nowadays, driven by the attracting features of social media and their remarkable mass of
users. A variety of projects using social media in m-Health environments have already
been reported [30], for instance including scenarios such as dementia [31], tobacco addic-
tion [32], influenza [33] or control of dietary behavior [34]. Up to 140 health use cases
for Twitter are compiled in [35]. Indeed, there are sound reasons to integrate social
media with m-Health, since the former provides a wide variety of tools [36] — e.g.
social networking sites, content communities, collaborative projects, etc. — that enable
users to build communities around them — e.g. including other users, formal and infor-
mal caregivers — where they can create, share and exchange information — e.g. their
biomedical data — in different formats — e.g. plain text, pictures, videos, etc. Therefore,
the development of social-media-based m-Health services has the potential to promote
the recruitment and reinforce the engagement of users and their communities.
Considering all above, a fair first approximation to an integrative system was conducted
by [37], who implemented a pervasive health system that integrated patient monitoring
and social sharing via Twitter.
Many m-Health applications demand high availability of biomedical information to op-
erate. As regards to security, this requirement increases the potential surfaces for cyber-
attacks [38] and conflicts with the rising awareness of users, patients and govern-
ments about the sensitive character of this information [39, 40]. In fact, privacy
and security are commonly included among the most important barriers for the success
of m-Health [41]. These concerns are fully justified since biomedical information usually
attach personal data that permits the identification of the user/patient it belongs to. To
shed light on how critic security has become in m-Health, according to Ponemon Institute
— a privacy research firm— 90% of healthcare institutions said their organizations have
been victims of one or two data breaches in the last two years, being cyber-attacks the
number one cause – followed by employee negligence and lost or stolen devices. Cyber
criminals are increasingly targeting and exploiting healthcare data — there has
been a 125% growth in these attacks over the last five years — because they recognize
two critical facts about the healthcare industry: 1) healthcare organizations manage a
treasure trove of financially lucrative personal information and 2) they usually do not
have the resources to adequately protect these data (e.g. means to prevent attacks) due
to an inadequate budget [42]. This situation makes healthcare institutions potentially
face high liability costs, including reduction of the turnover of costumers due to damage
in reputation, class action lawsuits and costly downtime. It is estimated in [43] that the
average global cost of data breach per lost or stolen health record is 363 dollars and that
24.5% of the times it involves more than 10,000 records. As regards to users/patients,
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the undue disclosure (e.g. caused by eavesdropping, malicious leaking or revelation) of
their biomedical information can cause them social, professional and economical damage
(embarrassment, the loss of his/her job or the rise of his/her health insurance policy)
[44]. In addition to this, the undue manipulation (tampering, forgery) of this information
can cause misdiagnosis and poor treatments, which may endanger the health and life of
the patient; and also produce erroneous medical research outcomes, which may adversely
affect the patients under consideration. Nonetheless, the primary aim of cyber criminals
is economical, so this set of threats are mainly oriented towards extortion. In addition to
this, breaches of personal health information [45, 46] fuel financial identity theft, medical
fraud and medical identity theft. The first refers to using certain leaked patient infor-
mation (e.g. his/her social security number and other identity information) to apply for
fraudulent loans, charge purchases to credit cards or take-over bank accounts; the second
usually involves billing payers for treatments never rendered and the third, a intersection
of the previous ones, involves a medical identity (patient identification, insurance infor-
mation, medical histories, prescriptions, test results) that may be used to fraudulently
obtain medical services or the prescription of drugs [47]. Beyond the financial losses, such
theft modality implies that relevant information of the patient affected (e.g. his/her blood
type) may be changed or mixed with that of a usurper, with a direct impact in his/her
care quality and in the obtaining of further medical, life, or disability insurance.
To minimize risks, an adequate protection policy against the aforementioned threats
shall be implemented. The protection of users’ confidentiality and safety in the m-Health
context is addressed by the Health IT directives of major regulations such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [48] (HIPAA, enacted in United States), the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [49] (PIPEDA, enacted
in Canada), the European General Data Protection Regulation [50] (GDPR, enacted in
Europe) or the Personal Data Protection Act [51] (LOPD, enacted in Spain); and also in
communications from major healthcare agencies, such as the FDA safety communication
regarding cybersecurity for medical devices and hospital networks [52]. The most common
objectives of these regulations are (a) guaranteeing information security, which include re-
quirements to guarantee major security goals [53], including confidentiality, integrity,
availability, accountability, auditability, authenticity, non-repudiation and pri-
vacy in the management of biomedical information, mainly by the implementation of
security frameworks integrating cryptographic tools and security profiles, data backups
and audit records; (b) patient control over their biomedical data, based on an ade-
quate management and enforcement of his/her informed consent and on guaranteeing high
transparency towards him/her — i.e. not only does the system say that all is safe and
good, but the user also gets an idea about where and how his/her data are being consulted;
(c) closing the gap between medical device manufacturers and hospital facilities to mini-
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mize cybersecurity vulnerabilities (e.g. avoiding hard-coded passwords, providing security
updates regularly); (d) prevention and reaction to data breaches, by means of manda-
tory, periodic risk assessments and audits conducted by experts, and (e) responsibility
and substantial sanctions to those that do not thoroughly address the aforementioned
measures.
1.2 The m-Health architecture
As explained in Section 1.1, a generic m-Health architecture shall facilitate the imple-
mentation of m-Health applications, usually grouped in three major (and interrelated)
fields: Health and Fitness, Independent Living and Disease Management. Such applica-
tions demand a reliable and efficient acquisition of personal biomedical information (e.g.
biomedical measurements, signals and/or tests); its adequate storage (which may include
a previous or subsequent processing) and a pervasive, ubiquitous and controlled access
to the users that need to consult this information (e.g. the patient and his/her formal
caregivers). As discussed in [54], the information that is gathered in these applications
has the potential to enable three essential feedback loops for improving health outcomes:
regarding patient’s self care (e.g. how does a certain treatment impacts my health mea-
surements?), clinician-directed summary data to assist decision-making (e.g. how do the
side effects and therapeutic benefits of a certain treatment balance out for my patient?)
and research evidence (of the treatment tested) to enhance clinical care for groups of pa-
tients with similar conditions (populations). Therefore, these information loops may be
used to promote health literacy and empowerment among patients (and regular users)
and also to feed health researchers with fresh and abundant data sources. To summa-
rize, it can be concluded that the m-Health architecture shall promote the participation
of a) users/patients, b) formal and informal caregivers (e.g. physicians who interpret the
tests, clinicians caring for the patient, nurses, social workers, relatives) and c) researches,
medical teachers and students.
A generic end-to-end m-Health architecture [12, 55] is illustrated in Figure 1.1. At a
technical level, the most basic architecture is comprised by two elements, a Personal Health
Device or sensor (PHD) that collects and sends the user’s/patient’s biomedical information
and a Host System (HS) that stores the collected information — for example a Hospital
Information System (HIS) or a Personal Health Record (PHR). However, since there are
usually several PHDs in the personal area network (around the patient/user), and they
seldom have the connectivity to reach the HS, most m-Health architectures include a third
element, namely the Concentrator Device (CD), a mobile device (e.g. cell phone, PDA,
tablet) which gathers the information from the different PHDs and forwards it to the HS.
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Furthermore, depending on the intended m-Health application, various other elements
can be incorporated into the end-to-end architecture. For example, Service Providers
(SP) and medical systems — e.g. alarm systems, Electronic Health Records (EHR),
Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS), respectively placed before and after the HS,
which would perform operations of management, monitoring, processing or follow-up of
the patient’s biomedical information. Finally, other elements can connect with the HS to
either share medical information, such as Third-Party Host Systems (TPHS), or access that
information, such as a Consultation Systems (CS) interfacing the user and the authorized
caregivers and researchers with the HS.
Figure 1.1: Generic m-Health architecture.
Although the initial blueprint of the m-Health architecture has remained valid, the
list of devices and platforms which can act as PHDs, CDs and HS has evolved within
the last years. As regards to PHDs [56], the initial offer of generic medical devices (e.g.
thermometers, pulse oximeters, blood pressure monitors, glucose meters, ECG sensors)
and devices to support independent aging (e.g. medication monitors) has been enlarged
with more specific devices (e.g. urine analysis, insulin pumps, sleep apnoea monitors,
fall detectors, gas detectors) and also with new devices for the promotion of wellness
and fitness (e.g. pulsometers, strength monitors, smartbands, etc.). Furthermore, these
devices will progressively become wearable [57, 58] to enable unobtrusive sensing [59],
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e.g. by means of smart textile technology and flexible-stretchable-printable electronics.
Nonetheless, the most important evolution is yet to come with the development and mer-
chandising of Internet-ready PHDs, which will release the potential of m-IoT architectures
[25, 60, 26]. With respect to legacy HS, typically hosted in dedicated servers at healthcare
facilities, they are being steadily migrated to cloud-based solutions [61, 62] (e.g. based
on Amazon Web Services, Windows Azure or Joyent), which offer an outsourced, reli-
able, economic and scalable hosting of data and operational apps. According to the 2014
Healthcare Information and Management Systems (HIMSS) Analytics Cloud Survey [63],
83% of IT executives claim to be using cloud services, pointing out Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS)-based applications as being the most popular (66.9%). These survey states that
IT executives perceived noticeable benefits after this migration, such as the augment of
technological capabilities, the positive contribution to financial metrics and the reduction
of time to deploy solutions. Finally, the shifting of PHDs (towards wearable and internet-
ready connected) and HS (to cloud-based solutions) will also affect CDs: their function
as relay devices may lose importance in future years, but they will still be relevant as
monitoring and consultation devices [64]. Furthermore, the initial list of CDs is being
enlarged with new smart devices, such as TVs [65], watches [66] and glasses [67]; which
will permit the flourishing of health apps with augmented reality [68] and smart services
[69].
1.2.1 Biomedical data flows and interoperability
Interoperability is both a prerequisite and an enabler for versatile, integrated, efficient and
useful communication between PHDs and HS in the context of thorough and high quality
m-Health services [70, 71]. Standardization of these biomedical data flows — involving
signals, periodic measurements, medical histories and/or contextual information, often
grouped in biomedical tests — is a crucial factor in achieving high interoperability levels
[72] (see Figure 1.2.1), in order to increase the safety to patients, the efficiency in the use of
healthcare resources and the development of medical knowledge [73]. Several standards,
protocols and integration initiatives promoting the deployment of end-to-end standard-
based interoperable m-Health services furnish today’s panorama, including standards for
medical device interoperability (i.e. PHD-CD interface), standards for the interoperable
exchange of EHRs (i.e. HS-TPHS interface) and integration initiatives for the coordinated
use of these standards (i.e. CD-HS, HS-medical systems, PHD-HS interfaces interfaces).
Regarding medical devices interoperability (PHD-CD interface), the foremost solution
to ensure the syntactic and (to some extent) semantic interoperability among personal
health devices is addressed within the ISO/IEEE 11073 (X73PHD) family of standards
[74], initially driven by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE and
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Figure 1.2: Turnita’s interoperability model.
then adopted by the European Committee for Standardization CEN and the Interna-
tional Standards Organization ISO. They define the landscape of transport-independent
m-Health applications and information profiles, which specify data exchange, data repre-
sentation, and terminology for communication between personal health devices and ag-
gregators. In second place, there are several protocols [75] for the storage and exchange
of waveforms, mainly focused on electrocardiograms (ECGs). The most widespread be-
ing the Standard Communications Protocol for computer assisted ElectroCardioGraphy
(SCP [76], ISO/IEEE 11073-91064:200 standard), the Health Level Seven (HL7 aECG
[77], American standard ANSI), the Medical waveform Format Encoding Rules (MFER
[78], Japanese standard partially approved by ISO) and the Digital Imaging and COm-
munication in Medicine (DICOM Supplement 30 [79], American standard NEMA). They
specialize in different use cases (diagnostic examinations, home care, emergency care, etc.)
and use different storage formats (binary encoded, XML-based [80]). In third place, there
are simple non-standard protocols designed for open-source platforms, e.g. based on Ar-
duino [81] or Raspberry Pi [82], which can gather biomedical measurements and signals
from a variety of inexpensive sensors.
For the exchange of biomedical information between healthcare entities (intra-HS,
HS-medical systems, HS-TPHS interfaces), there are four major alternatives. First, the
ISO/EN13606 standard [83], driven by CEN and ISO/IEEE, is able to represent the in-
formation included in an EHR in order to achieve the interoperable exchange of EHRs
between HS in a semantic interoperable way. Second, Health Level 7 (HL7) [77], founded
by American vendors of medical devices and recognized by the American National Stan-
dards Institute (ANSI), is an international standard for medical messaging. Its name
refers to the fact that it specifies a uniform syntax in the seventh level of the protocol
stack. This standard enables information representation in a simple structure of segments,
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data types’ flags, and mapped fields. It is worth highlighting that HL7 works well as a
supplement for the Digital Imaging and COmunication in Medicine (DICOM) [79] stan-
dard, used by most Picture Archiving and Communications Systems (PACS) for handling,
storing, printing, and transmitting information in medical imaging. Third, openEHR [84]
is a proposal related with HL7, but based on an open standard specification, which de-
scribes the management and storage, retrieval and exchange of data in EHRs. The key
feature of openEHR is that all a person’s health data is stored in a “one lifetime”, vendor-
independent, person-centered EHR. Last, Personal Health Records (PHRs) are tools whose
popularity is growing steadily. PHR systems have been defined [85] as patient/user-centric,
longitudinal collections of PHRs administrated primarily by patients/users [86] with in-
terfaces to EHR systems and with capabilities to exchange health-related data between
other PHR systems and EHR systems. As the PHR system may be standalone software
for PC or mobile platforms, the capacity to store PHRs locally is not excluded. One rele-
vant distinction between PHRs and EHRs is that the former presents the information to
the person with a vocabulary that he/she can understand. Among other options, Apple
enables PHRs through its HealthKit [87] and Microsoft does by means of HealthVault [88].
Several other initiatives, such as Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) or the
Continua Health Alliance, have been promoted by various healthcare professionals and
technology companies to encourage the coordinated use of the aforementioned standards
in m-Health architectures (CD-HS, HS-medical systems, PHD-HS interfaces). These two
entities focus mainly on different (albeit related) environments. Integrating the Health-
care Enterprise (IHE) [89] is an organization made up of worldwide manufacturers whose
main objective, rather than develop new standards, is to identify specific clinical needs
and develop technical guidelines (IHE profiles and technical frameworks) that coordinate
the use of well established standards (such as HL7 and DICOM) to address these needs.
For instance, IHE defines a profile, the Rosetta Terminology Mapping (RTM), which en-
ables the interpretation of X73PHD terminology —and thus, measurements acquired by
X73PHD-compliant devices— in IHE systems, such as PHRs, EHRs, alarm systems or
CDSS. It can be said that IHE profiles, like RTM, foster a model for pragmatic inter-
operability within end-to-end m-Health frameworks. Continua Health Alliance [90], on
the other hand, is an open non-profit alliance of several industry-leading technology and
health companies whose role is to establish a system of interoperable personal connected
health solutions with the knowledge that extending those solutions into the home fosters
independence, empowers individuals and provides the opportunity for truly personalized
health and wellness management. Continua tends to focus on people, and therefore covers
the m-Health domains: fitness monitoring, aging independently and managing chronic
disease. Their main goal is to leverage existing standards and to close recognized inter-
operability gaps by means of their Continua Design Guidelines. Among other standards,
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Continua endorses the X73PHD standard for medical device interoperability. Apart from
technical aspects, a further objective of the alliance is to establish a certification program
with a consumer-recognizable logo for the devices.
1.2.2 Biomedical tests coding
The core of biomedical tests (e.g. a stress test) are biomedical signals (e.g. an ECG),
whose clinical meaning often needs to be complemented with periodic measurements (e.g.
body temperature, heart rate, maximal oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide production,
speed of the treadmill), medical history and/or contextual information (annotations about
the signal, health status of the patient, his/her allergies, medication, etc.). They have a
high intrinsic value as enablers of m-Health applications, e.g. for early diagnosis, contin-
uous follow-up and customized care of patients; and, as explained in Section 1.2.1, their
exchange by means of well-established standards helps to achieve great interoperability
levels. Nonetheless, frameworks with critical energy constraints, such is the case of Body
Area Networks (BAN [91]), may not get along with the energy consumption caused by
the implementation of standards for the exchange of biomedical information. Their ver-
bosity translates into the demand of extra transmission bandwidth, which causes most
of the energy expenditure [92]. As a promising alternative, those frameworks may rather
implement a simple biomedical tests coding providing adequate data availability, i.e. com-
prising secure and efficient storage, exchange and access, to fit the m-Health paradigm.
The requirements that such coding shall fulfill may be summarized as:
• Information associated to the biomedical signal. Without appropriate data,
identifying the signal and enabling its interpretation, biomedical tests may become
useless. Therefore, the information in biomedical tests must be arranged as metadata
using some data structure and bound to the signal to difficult its lost.
• Signal compression. Algorithms for signal compression remove redundancies con-
tained by signals at different levels. These algorithms can be divided into two main
categories: lossless, which retrieve the original signal; and lossy, which reach higher
compression ratios than lossless at the cost of decreasing signal fidelity. The latter
are more interesting since they permit saving much more bandwidth in transmission
and space in storage. Nevertheless, in clinical applications the compression ratio
must be limited by measurable quality parameters to hold the clinical meaning of
the signal and avoid changing its diagnostic interpretation. Among lossy methods,
there are three modalities [93]: direct methods (basing their detection of redundan-
cies on direct analysis of the actual signal samples), transformation methods (mainly
utilizing spectral and energy distribution analysis for detecting redundancies) and
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parameter extraction techniques (e.g. measurement of the probability distribution,
subsequently utilized for classification based on a priori knowledge of the signal fea-
tures). The second modality (e.g. discrete cosine transform [94], Karhunen-Loe`ve
transform [95], wavelets [96], etc.) generally yields better results, especially the
wavelets, which provide a time-frequency representation of the signal with varying
resolution for fine description in both domains. Furthermore, the wavelet coefficients
can also be compressed by exploiting their similarity, as the SPIHT algorithm does
[97], in order to increase the final compression ratio.
• Security and privacy in storage and during transmission. As explained in Section
1.1, current legal regulations (the HIPAA [48], the PIPEDA [49], the LOPD [51],
the Digital Signature Laws in several countries) demand that any personal health
information must be protected, using adequate cryptographic means. The basic re-
quirements are (1) encrypting all private data, (2) embedding a digital signature to
verify data integrity and authenticate the signatory, and (3) encrypting the commu-
nications. When dealing with biomedical signals, researching on partial encryption
schemes[98, 99, 100] may be an interesting manner to reduce operations while main-
taining fair privacy levels. In addition to this, steganography [101, 102, 103] may
be used as a complement to introduce security or secret elements silently. Water-
marking [104], marking all objects in the same way (e.g. to demonstrate ownership)
and fingerprinting [105], marking each object specifically (e.g. to identify legitimate
users) are the most typical applications of steganography.
• Role-Based Access Control. M-Health services operate in scenarios with a variety
of different stakeholders: patients, relatives, paramedics, nurses, primary care doc-
tors/general practitioners, surgeons, medical specialists and subspecialists, teachers
and medical students, researchers, laboratories, insurance companies, governmen-
tal oversight agencies, and non-governmental oversight. For the same patient, the
information that each user is allowed to access must depend on his role: e.g. if
the patient has AIDS, the nurses and the paramedics need to know, but proba-
bly not the researchers using his/her medical tests. Attribute-level encryption and
de-identification are effective ways to overcome this issue.
• Low complexity encoding and short access time. Since the current tendency
is building portable medical devices and wearable sensors, which often mount low
power processors, the algorithms for encoding and protection should be as simple
as possible to not overload them with complex calculations and reduce demand on
the battery. Besides, fast execution and transmission are requirements to maintain
availability of the test at good levels and allow real-time services.
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There are many publications approaching these requisites separately, for example [106,
107, 108] for signal compression, [109, 110] for data embedding into signals and [111,
112, 113, 114, 115] for signal security). Furthermore, there are also proposals to inte-
grate together signal compression and encryption [116, 117, 118, 119, 120], compression
and embedding [121, 122, 123, 124, 125]; encryption and embedding [126, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 133]. Nonetheless, the definition of a coding harmonizing compression, em-
bedding and encryption, while guaranteeing signal quality, role-based access control, low
complexity and short access times is still an open issue.
1.3 Security trends in m-Health and what can be improved
1.3.1 Security in protocols for the exchange of biomedical information
The standardization of security measures has already been promoted by or-
ganizations such as IHE, joint committees such as JIRA/NEMA/COCIR and by major
standard protocols such as DICOM, which dedicates its Working Group 14 to this issue,
and HL7, which has a Security Working Group. As illustrated in Table 1.1, IHE has
issued several profiles to address a variety of security and privacy aspects: Audit Trail and
Node Authentication [134] to implement auditability and accountability policies, Consis-
tent Time [135], Healthcare Provider Directory (HPD), Document Digital Signature [136],
Document Encryption [137], Secure Retrieve [138], Access Control white paper [139], Basic
Patient Privacy Consents [140] to enforce privacy policies, Cross-Enterprise User Assertion
[141], Internet User Authorization [142], Enterprise User Authentication [143]). DICOM
addresses security in its part 15 [144] and through many supplements [145] — 31 (security
enhancements), 41 (security enhancements 2 - Digital Signatures), 51 (Media Security),
55 (Attribute Level Confidentiality), 86 (Digital Signatures for Structured Reports), 95
(Audit Trail Messages), 142 (Clinical Trial De-identification Profiles)) cover security based
on different secure profiles regarding: use, transport, digital signature and media storage
(among others). HL7 has also published several documents about security, notably its
Role-based Access Control Healthcare Permission Catalog [146], its Security and Privacy
Ontology [147] or its Healthcare Privacy and Security Classification System [148].
The security measures depicted in IHE (Section 2.1.1) and implemented by DICOM
(Section 2.1.4) and HL7 rely on standardized cryptographic resources. Essentially on en-
cryption, which may be symmetric or asymmetric; and on hashing, which is found in dig-
ital signatures and message authentication codes. The former is used to implement access
control policies (enforcing privacy, e.g. by means of Cryptographic Message Syntax, CMS
[151]) while the latter is intended for binary integrity control (tampered/non-tampered),
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Table 1.1: Selected IHE profiles, mapped to security and privacy controls
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authentication and non-repudiation. The main issue in this cryptography-based policies
is the difficulty to develop cooperative architectures where different users may edit the
biomedical test, e.g. by adding annotations or applying filters for better visualization
and diagnosis, while maintaining the validity of the security measures implemented. Any
change in the biomedical test invalidates all the previous signatures, and even though new
signature may be added, the traceability from the origin will be weakened or lost. An
alternative is that each user adds his/her changes to the original test, digitally signs it
and delivers the signed updated test to the rest of the users. In this way, the rest of the
users can access and/or store the updated test with security, and add new updates from
the last test version by following the same procedure. Nonetheless, as the number of users
and updates of the test grows, this approach becomes quite impractical in terms of delays,
bandwidth and storage. Another limitation, inherent to cryptographic-based approaches,
is that the biomedical test (e.g. an image) becomes totally unprotected when extracted
from its standard file (e.g. a DICOM file).
To date, there are also several protocols that give little consideration to security and
privacy issues. X73PHD basically delegates this task on the implementation of a
secure transport layer (e.g. Zigbee Health Care Profile or Bluetooth Health Device
Profile [152]), which can only authenticate and encrypt the frames exchanged by the per-
sonal health devices and the aggregators. No means are provided to authenticate the users
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and the legitimacy of personal health devices and aggregators, to attach digital signatures
on the measurements/signals acquired or to encrypt the measurements/signals that need
to be stored in the personal health devices when the connection with the aggregator is
broken. Similarly, in the case of SCP-ECG the lack of security specifications extends
from its transmission protocol to its storage policy, neither of them including any sort
of protection. Regarding the MFER standard, it does not directly address security, but
neither does it include patient data except by means of HL7. Thus, it can thus bene-
fit from HL7 security policies/recommendations. Lastly, the protocols associated to
open-source platforms are very simple and its security usually rely on implementing a
secure transport layer and on not including any identification of the user, which
on the other hand limits its integration with medical systems (e.g. personal and electronic
health records).
Regarding protocols associated to open-source platforms, they need to implement secu-
rity to facilitate compliance with m-Health applications, be able to operate in real-time and
also optimize its bandwidth (e.g. by coding measurements and signals), since low-power
sensors spend most of their energy in transmission [153].
1.3.2 Signal-based protection
The security measures implemented by the aforementioned protocols are strictly based
on the application of different cryptographic elements to the biomedical files and/or to
the communications between entities. Nonetheless, the addition of signal-based protection
techniques, relying on the basis of steganography, has the potential to rise the security and
privacy levels of the m-Health architecture. Two related alternatives can be highlighted:
generic steganography (also known as embedding or data hiding techniques), which permits
including significant amounts of data within biomedical — cover — signals, which silently
become stego-signals; and watermarking, an evolution or particular case of steganography
which permits binding limited amounts of data to the signals with adjustable strength
to implement different security applications — it was originally intended for copyright
protection. Table 1.2 summarizes and compares the defining features of steganography,
watermarking and encryption.
Steganography/embedding/data hiding
In the m-Health context, data embedding techniques [154, 155, 156, 157] aim at
introducing significant amounts of relevant data and/or security elements into
— cover — biomedical signals in an imperceptible, secure and efficient man-
ner. Although in traditional steganography the cover object and the secret data have
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no relation, it is usual in biomedical embedding that cover biomedical signals — 1-D
signals (e.g. ECGs, EEGs), images and/or videos — are related with the embedded con-
tents, which may be patient information, codes to enable fast indexing, hashes and digital
signatures for integrity control, digital envelopes including protected information, other
biomedical signals, QR codes for authentication or linking to valuable data, etc — see
[158, 159, 160, 161, 162] It is worth noting that the larger the cover biomedical signal,
the higher the payload capacity — i.e. biomedical videos (e.g. echocardiograms) can host
much more secret data than 1-D signals (e.g. ECGs) of the same duration.
Table 1.2: Comparison of steganography, watermarking and encryption in the m-Health
context, based on [154]
Criterion/
method
Steganography Watermarking Encryption
Carrier Any digital media Mostly biomedical images,
also 1-D signals and videos
Usually text based,
with some extensions
to digital media
Secret data Biomedical payload Watermark content
(when private)
Biomedical plain
text/media
Key Recommended Optional Necessary
Input elements At least two, unless in
self-embedding
At least two Usually one
Detection Blind Usually informative (i.e.
original cover or watermark
is needed for recovery)
Blind
Authentication Full retrieval of data Usually achieved by cross
correlation
Full retrieval of data
Main
applications
Secret captioning or
communications
Authentication, integrity
control, captioning
Data protection
Result Stego-file Watermarked-file Cipher-text
Main concerns Distortion, detectability and
capacity
Distortion, robustness and
detectability
Robustness
Main attacks Steganalysis Image processing and
collusion
Cryptanalysis
Visibility Never Not usually Always
Confidentiality Always Sometimes Always
Fails when Detected Removed/replaced and
detected when confidential
Decrypted
Relation to
cover
Not necessarily related to the
cover. The secret data is
usually more important.
Usually becomes an attribute
of the cover, which is more
important than the data.
N/A
Flexibility Free to choose any suitable
cover
Cover choice is restricted N/A
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Regarding embedding methods, several possibilities are available. There are — usu-
ally simple — approaches working in the temporal or spatial domain; methods working
in transform domains, which take advantage of the frequency decomposition (which is
associated to different energy levels) of the image to perform a more transparent and less
detectable embedding; and even proposals to hide information in compressed domains to
harmonize embedding and compression. In addition to this, a series of approaches work
with histograms since certain modification (e.g. controlled shifting) can achieve reversibil-
ity. Furthermore, there are techniques based on spread-spectrum principles that permit
spreading the secret payload throughout the cover signal. This preserves the statistical
properties of the image, which results in good stego signal quality, capacity and secu-
rity. Similarly, model-based steganography (also known as adaptive steganography and
statistics aware steganography) pursues embedding the secret payload without altering
the statistical properties of the cover.
Although the biomedical embedding of a secret payload in biomedical signals with
any of the techniques above will certainly imply some degree of distortion — reversible
techniques can remove the distortion only after extracting the embedded content —, the
top priority is that its clinical value is not affected. Even if the clinical quality
of the signal can be guaranteed in a simple manner, still the application of embedding
in the m-Health context presents two noticeable drawbacks. First, these techniques are
not specifically designed to endure modifications on the hosting signal, so any person not
aware of the embedded data may perform some processing on the signal (e.g. the appli-
cation of filters) causing the partial or total removal of the data. Second, the integration
of embedding in standardized biomedical files is controversial since the standardization
requires the thorough and public definition of the elements to be embedded, while the
purpose of any steganographic technique is to hide these contents as much as possible.
Watermarking
General watermarking methods may be applicable to different types of signals, but in the
m-Health context watermarking is mainly focused on biomedical images. Nonetheless, the
underlying principles of image watermarking techniques can be adapted to 1-D signals,
videos, etc. Medical Image Watermarking [163, 164] (MIW) techniques enable the
embedding of limited amounts of hidden data (e.g. biomedical information, security ele-
ments), one or several watermarks, within biomedical images by means of certain image
processing and random keys. One of its main differences with respect to data embedding
techniques is that the image can be manipulated (e.g. annotated, compressed with
JPEG2000 [165], adjusted with different contrast and brightness) by the users without
interference in its security — regardless if the user performing the image modifica-
Chapter 1. Introduction 17
tions knows about the existence of the watermarks — and that the former enables a good
variety of complementary security measures [166, 164, 167]:
• Role-based access control (RBAC), so that each authorized user can read and/or
edit certain contents of the image-based test according to his/her professional role,
e.g. physician, researcher, teacher, etc.
• Integrity control, to detect if the image has been tampered with, which would en-
danger its clinical value.
• Tamper location, pinpointing the areas where the image has been manipulated,
which may be helpful to validate images that are modified in permissible areas.
• Authentication, assessing if the image received corresponds to the image originally
acquired, to an image derived from the original or to an unrelated image.
• Private captioning, associating private information with the image, only retrievable
by authorized users of the authenticated image.
• Traceability control for user accountability, by associating marks from each entity
that processes the image.
• Copyright protection, to pursue illegal copies if the image has a commercial use.
As illustrated in Figure 1.3, the random keys generated for watermarking are symmetri-
cally required to retrieve the embedded data. Regarding the watermarks, there are differ-
ent types and they may be combined to implement a security policy. Robust watermarks
[168], whose content is retrievable even if the image has undergone heavy modifications,
may be used for authentication, traceability and copyright protection. Semifragile wa-
termarks [169], whose content is retrievable only if those modifications are mild (e.g. if the
image preserves its clinical value), may be used for private captioning — although some-
times are also proposed for integrity control. Moreover, several semifragile watermarks,
intended for different users, may be embedded in the same image in order to implement
role-based control. Finally, fragile watermarks [170], whose content is retrievable only if
the image is intact, may be used to implement integrity control and location of tampered
areas in the image — although sometimes are also proposed for captioning and authenti-
cation. It is worth highlighting that MIW techniques are required to produce a minimum
distortion on the image to preserve its clinical value. In fact, they are often grouped in
four categories depending on the manner how they cope with this requirement of high
transparency.
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Figure 1.3: Example of enhancement of the security of biomedical image tests through watermarking.
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The first group are the non-reversible techniques [171], which produce a per-
manent distortion on the image because they perform non-invertible operations (e.g.
bit quantization, replacement or truncation). As a consequence, a thorough clinical as-
sessment is necessary to guarantee that the clinical value of the watermarked images is
preserved. The second group of MIW techniques [172] corresponds to those that embed
mainly in regions of non-interest (RONI) of the image. This minimizes the interfer-
ence of the watermarks with the clinical content and avoids the need of clinical assessment.
However, the security of these techniques against eavesdropping and forgery is low,
since the modified pixels/coefficients where the watermarks were embedded are easy to
identify in the RONI, which is usually black. Moreover, the RONI may be used to insert
visible watermarks or removed if medical image compression [173] is applied. In both
cases the watermark(s) would be partially or totally removed. The third group are the
reversible techniques, which distort the image but can recover its original quality by fully
removing the watermarks after they have been detected and validated. This new concept
of watermarking was first introduced in [174] and it has undergone relevant improvements.
Nevertheless, any reversible technique has two important drawbacks. First, it requires
a secure environment since the image is unprotected once the watermarks are removed.
Second, a user not allowed to access certain watermarks will neither be able to remove
them, so he/she will work with a lower-quality version of the image. Finally, the fourth
group are the zero-watermarking/non-watermarking techniques [175], which by-
pass the image distortion introduced by the rest of watermarking techniques by avoiding
the embedding step. Instead, they propose associating the watermarks to certain
features extracted from the image (or from a transformed version). Although these
last techniques seem promising for the m-Health context, few works have been proposed
and they show certain shortcomings. First, most existing proposals do not include a thor-
ough risk assessment, which is the most basic feature of a security technique. Second,
most proposals focus on implementing only one or two security applications (e.g. image
authentication, private captioning, copyright protection). Third, the watermark coding
process is based on an XOR operation of certain image features with the contents to be
associated, which does not guarantee an optimum robustness-capacity tradeoff — this is
important when a variety of simultaneous security applications are to be implemented.
Fourth, most proposals do not include a complexity analysis demonstrating their sim-
plicity and scalability. Fifth, most proposals do not integrate appropriate cryptographic
elements for the protection of the watermarks.
In general terms, several disadvantages hinder the integration of watermark-based poli-
cies in standards such as DICOM and in m-Health architectures. First and most important,
there is a tradeoff between capacity, robustness and image distortion — except
for zero-watermarking techniques, whose tradeoff is only between capacity and robustness.
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Thus, as new watermarks are added, especially if they are robust, the quality of the image
decreases and the image may lose its clinical value — this affects greatly to non-reversible
techniques. Regarding the robustness-capacity tradeoff, it implies that robust watermarks
cannot be long. Second, watermarks embedded by different users may interfere
between them, since each new watermark may destroy part of the content of the others
— in the case of zero-watermarking techniques, the content of a watermark may reveal
part of the content of other watermarks associated to the same image. Finally, the use of
non-reversible, region-based and reversible watermarking in cooperative m-Health ar-
chitectures would imply an important cost in bandwidth and delays, since every
time that a user embeds a watermark in an image, he/she has to deliver the watermarked
image together with the watermark keys to the rest of users. If an image is watermarked
several times by different users, it needs to be transmitted every time to the rest of users.
1.3.3 What can be improved?
This Thesis studies a proposal for the integration of appropriate levels of security and
privacy levels in m-Health architectures in a cost-efficient manner, to cope with the
requirements depicted in Section 1.1. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, this proposal may be
divided into four interrelated blocks. There shall be a block —colored in blue in Figure
1.4— depicting a global security scheme that guarantees different security and interop-
erability levels according to how critical are the m-Health applications to be implemented.
In addition, it shall be guaranteed that all the protocols that cooperate in the m-Health
architecture for the acquisition, exchange and/or management of this information meet
the security standards described in the former security scheme. Therefore, there shall be
a block —colored in dark green in Figure 1.4— that addresses the extension of cer-
tain biomedical standardized protocols that put little emphasis on certain aspects
of security and/or privacy. Complementarily, there shall also be a block dedicated to the
development of novel, secure codings for biomedical tests —colored in light green
in Figure 1.4—, since those are sometimes handled out of the format of a standardized
protocol given its high content in clinical information. Finally, in parallel to the former
blocks, there shall be a block —colored in orange in Figure 1.4— including selected security
methods to be integrated in the rest of them. Within this block, it is worth highlighting
a sub-block dedicated to the development of novel methods for a supplementary
protection of biomedical tests through their associated signals.
At the time of designing the global security scheme, it is worth reminding that the
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) initiative already promotes and guides the
coordinated use of different standards in healthcare systems (e.g. PHRs, EHRs, alert
managers, CDSS), by defining profiles intended for use cases in the medical domain —
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Figure 1.4: Building blocks for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health architecture.
some of them dedicated to security. Nonetheless, an m-Health, IHE-based framework (e.g.
X73PHD-IHE) would lack continuity in security and privacy — given that PAN protocols
like X73PHD or SCP-ECG are very limited in this respect — and it would also lack in
specifications about the IHE profiles — apart from Rosetta, which permits sharing a com-
mon terminology between X73PHD and IHE — required to implement different m-Health
applications. Thereby, the proposal of a flexible model (e.g. layered and additive) link-
ing adequate IHE profiles with the demands of different m-Health applications — e.g.
oriented to health and fitness, independent living or chronic disease management; involv-
ing cabled or wireless setups; oriented to in-hospital care or remote monitoring — would
be fundamental for the development of secure, interoperable and cost-efficient solutions
in m-Health architectures. Such design shall comprehensively address the vulnerabilities
detected after a risk assessment of a generic m-Health architecture.
With respect to the strengthening of vulnerable standard biomedical protocols, most
effort shall be dedicated to PAN protocols. Two major, widespread and quite different
protocols deserve their security enhancement: ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD and SCP-ECG.
• The ISO/IEEE 11073 standard for Personal Health Devices enables an interoper-
ability model between generic PHDs, which can gather a variety of biomedical mea-
surements (e.g. weight, blood pressure) and signals (e.g. ECGs), and concentrator
devices — e.g. health appliances, routers. X73PHD provides a robust syntactic
model and a comprehensive terminology, but it places limited emphasis on security
and on interoperability with IHE-compliant systems and frameworks. However, the
implementation of m-Health applications are increasingly requiring features like se-
cure connection to mobile concentrators — e.g. smartphones, tablets —, sharing of
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devices among different users with privacy and interoperability with certain IHE-
compliant healthcare systems. Therefore, proposing a comprehensive IHE-X73PHD
extension based on the global security design of the m-Health architecture and tai-
lored to the features of X73PHD (especially its built-in security) would be of great
relevance. In this regard, the procedures to support the new features — such as
the identification of users to enable the sharing of PHDs and/or CDs with privacy,
the protection of the communications or the compliance with EHRs and CDSS —
shall be carefully chosen to minimize the impact on the X73PHD models, on its
architecture (in terms of delays and overhead) and on its framework. Moreover, the
extended X73PHD shall preserve its essential features while extending them with
added value.
• The SCP-ECG defines an interoperability model to allows the standardized storage
and exchange of ECGs between medical ECG devices (carts) and ECG user systems
but it does not integrate any security-related feature. Again, an enhancement of this
standard based on the global security design and adapted to its specifics would help
in the configuration of robust m-Health architectures. Therefore, such approach
shall permit SCP-ECG files to be stored safely and proper access to be granted
(or denied) to users for different purposes: interpretation of the test, consultation,
clinical research or teaching. The access privileges shall be scaled by means of role-
based profiles supported by cryptographic elements (encryption, digital certificates
and digital signatures), arranged as metadata extending the protocol. The resulting
extension shall have a low impact on the file size and access times, and be compliant
with any version of the standard.
As regards to signal-based techniques, embedding and watermarking, the former may
be of great use for the development of optimal biomedical test codings (see Section 1.2.2),
while the second may be mainly used to strengthen the security of standard biomedical
protocols with advanced features:
• The main difficulty of embedding techniques in the m-Health context is finding the
place where they can be truly useful. As illustrated in Figure 1.5, these techniques
would be appropriate to develop optimal test codings that could be integrated/en-
capsulated by simple PAN protocols (e.g. those associated to open-source platforms)
and also by well-established standards, to guarantee a layer of protection when the
signals are extracted and handled out of the standardized format. Since the signal is
the core of the typical biomedical test, it makes sense to develop optimal biomedical
test codings where different types of information may be embedded within the signal
(e.g. an ECG) to guarantee a tight association. As explained in Section 1.2.2, it
would be necessary that the coding of the signal with the embedded data integrates
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security and privacy, and enables high compression ratios in order to reduce the
energy for transmission. The most efficient manner to harmonize these requirements
is by performing the embedding in an adequate compressed domain, in such a man-
ner that the resulting signal preserves its clinical quality and the embedded data is
hidden and protected with a layer of cryptography. Regarding the contents to be
embedded, they would typically be periodic measurements (e.g. NiBP, Temp, CO2,
SPO2, pulse rate), contextual data (extracts of the health records of the patient)
and/or security elements (e.g. digital signatures, authentication codes).
• Watermarking might have been a good security complement for biomedical stan-
dards like DICOM, whose security measures have traditionally been implemented
by means of cryptography. Authentication, traceability control for user account-
ability, private captioning with role-based access control or integrity control with
tamper location are some examples of security application that may be added by
means of watermarking. However, certain drawbacks derived from the fact that
most watermarking processes modify the image, degrading its clinical quality (see
Section 1.3.2), explain why biomedical standards hitherto do not integrate them —
despite the existing research works [176, 177, 178, 179, 132]. The development of
a novel zero-watermarking-based technique meeting two essential requirements, 1)
the ability of performing a secure and fast association of different types of data to
certain image features and 2) the non-modification of the image (e.g. by encoding
the “watermarks” as a function of selected image features and the data to be associ-
ated), would presents five relevant improvements. First and most obvious, the image
would always preserve its clinical quality without the need for assessment. Second,
the most stable features could be used to associate information, which would guar-
antee optimum robustness-capacity. Third, no complex rules would be necessary for
a secure and robust selection of the image features. Fourth, image collusion and
forgery attacks would have no effect on this type of “watermarked” images and the
rest of threats could be prevented with basic cryptographic protection measures.
Fifth, this technique would enable the deployment of secure applications and effi-
cient, cooperative architectures, since each user could add information related with
the test with no risk of distorting or removing the information associated by others.
To share the updates of the information associated to the test, it would be enough
to send the new “watermarks” to the rest of the users.
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Figure 1.5: M-Health architecture intended for simple open-source platforms, based on the efficient and secure coding of biomedical information
acquired by several sensors and interfaces.
Chapter 1. Introduction 25
1.4 Thesis approach, hypothesis and objectives
The general approach of this Thesis is to research and make contributions to the field
of ICT applied to the Health area. Nowadays, research results in Communication Tech-
nologies and the Information Society are considered strategic. Moreover, the application of
these technologies to the Health area through the deployment of secure and cost-efficient
m-Health architectures facilitates citizens’ access to a broad variety of services for the
prevention, detection, follow-up and research of health conditions. Therefore, investiga-
tions in this area are highly relevant thanks to the benefits that users/patients, caregivers,
researchers and the whole health system enjoy.
Specifically, the focal aim of this Thesis is on designing an architecture that en-
ables the secure exchange of biomedical information in m-Health scenarios —focusing on
biomedical tests, mainly comprised by signals that may attach measurements and/or con-
textual data. This Thesis rests on two fundamental pillars: (a) the investigation on the
improvement of the security levels of protocols conducting the standardized storage and/or
transmission of biomedical information and (b) the contributions on the development of
novel methods for the protection of biomedical tests (e.g. cardiac rest tests) through se-
cure codings based on their associated signals (e.g. ECGs, echocardiograms), which may
be stored out of standardized formats (given its intrinsic clinical value) or transmitted
with simple protocols not including basic security —e.g. highly efficient PAN protocols.
This approach suggest the five uppermost hypothesis:
• A layer-based security proposal would permit the harmonization of standardized
protocols in m-Health architectures and the promotion of personalizable and cost-
efficient applications.
• A moderate security extension of the ISO/IEEE 11073 models would enable the har-
monization with IHE, to enhance the interoperability of personal health devices with
health information and medical systems (e.g. electronic health records, clinical de-
cision support systems, alert systems), without limiting the previous functionalities
of this set of standards.
• A simple security extension of SCP-ECG would guarantee adequate protection and
enforcement of role-based access control policies while maintaining small file sizes,
fast access times and compliance with regular SCP-ECG viewers and editors.
• The research on codings based on orthogonal transformations, which scale the energy
of signals efficiently, would enable the development of novel, cost-efficient techniques
for the secure embedding of large amounts of information —to support m-Health
services— on small-size biomedical signals while maintaining their clinical value.
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• Medical Image Watermarking techniques, particularly those based on orthogonal
transformations and zero-watermarking, contain robust basis for the evolution to-
wards innovative, non-distorting and efficient techniques for enhancing the security
of biomedical tests.
Thus, the major aim of the Thesis, together with the above mentioned hypothesis, lead
to the overall objectives:
• Design of a secure and cost-efficient m-Health architecture which facilitates the de-
velopment of services with different protection and interoperability requirements and
bridges contributions to the security of standards and biomedical tests.
• Study, proposal and evaluation of methods to enhance the security of standard proto-
cols for the exchange of biomedical information, according to criteria that maximize
their interoperability and cost-efficiency.
• Design and evaluation of novel, efficient methods to enhance the security of biomed-
ical tests through their associated signals, and which may be integrated by both
simple and standardized exchange protocols.
On a deeper level, the following detailed objectives can be mentioned. They are presented
subdivided into the main topics of the thesis. First of all, as regards to the contributions
on the design of a secure and cost-efficient m-Health architecture:
1. To prepare a detailed risk assessment of a generic m-Health architecture.
2. To analyze common demands of major legal regulations regarding the m-Health con-
text.
3. To present a well-depicted, cost-efficient, global security proposal for protecting the
exchange of biomedical information in m-Health architectures.
4. To translate the previous global security proposal into specific measures that guarantee
adequate levels of security and interoperability.
5. To assess the security of the m-Health architecture after its enhancement.
Second, concerning standardized protocols:
6. To design a cost-efficient security extension, based on 3), for the standard ISO/IEEE
11073 PHD.
7. To appraise and discuss the implications and the impact of the former extension on
the ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD models, architecture and framework.
8. To analyze the implications of the extension of ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD on IHE.
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9. To design a robust and simple security extension, based on 3), for the standard SCP-
ECG.
10. To evaluate the impact of this extension on SCP-ECG, by means of a proof of concept.
11. To define adequate means to enable the integration of novel signal-based protection
methods in DICOM.
Third, as regards to techniques for the protection of biomedical tests through
their associated signals:
12. To conduct reviews on the state of the art about methods that permit embedding large
amounts of hidden data on signals, laying emphasis on the biomedical types.
13. Design of an optimal coding for biomedical tests — signals, periodic measurements
and contextual information — that facilitates the development of secure and cost-
efficient m-Health services.
14. To develop such optimal coding through a proof of concept, evaluate it and adjust its
parameters optimally for both offline and real-time operation.
15. To conduct reviews on the state of the art about watermarking, laying emphasis on
Medical Image Watermarking methods.
16. To develop a novel, non-distorting and efficient technique, inspired in the most
promising watermarking methods, for the protection of biomedical images in m-
Health architectures.
17. To propose optimal parameter configurations for the previous technique (e.g. for the
selection of certain image features) in order to associate information to the biomed-
ical image in stable, semistable and volatile manners and to evaluate the robustness,
specificity and scalability of these alternatives.
18. To propose different configurations (content type and length of the data to be associ-
ated to the image; stable, semistable or volatile association; data detection threshold)
for the implementation of complementary image-based security applications.
1.5 Research context
This thesis, entitled “Design of a secure architecture for the exchange of biomedical in-
formation in m-Health scenarios” and supervised by A´lvaro Alesanco Iglesias and Jose´
Garc´ıa Moros, has been performed in the framework of the eHealthZ Research Group of
the Arago´n Institute of Engineering Research (I3A), within the Biomedical Engineering
Doctoral program of the University of Zaragoza, Spain.
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Regarding its research context, this Thesis has been developed mostly within wider
projects in the lines of Providing security to e-Health environments and m-Health tele-
monitoring architectures, such as:
1. PI029/09: “Analysis of echocardiogram coding and real-time transmission through
communications networks”.
2. MCINN - TIN-2011-23792/TSI: “Ontology-based interoperable architecture for pa-
tients telemonitoring and clinical decision support”.
1.6 Thesis outline
The rest of this Thesis is organized as follows: the state of the art of all topics covered —
e.g. standards for the exchange of biomedical information, signal coding methods, security
technologies — is presented in Chapter 2. This chapter also introduces the proposal of a
global design for a m-Health architecture integrating security levels in line with different
m-Health applications, which is the central issue of this Thesis. Such proposal specifi-
cally guarantees that all the biomedical information exchanged, according to biomedical
standards and/or ad-hoc formats, is adequately protected.
The contributions to the enhancement of biomedical standard protocols with low se-
curity levels are outlined in Chapter 3. Particularly, this Chapter introduces a security
extension for the protocols ISO/IEEE 11073 and SCP-ECG, including a thorough analysis
of the implications on their architectures, i.e. on their data and communication models,
and also on their frameworks, including attacks that are hindered and how these extension
affect the usability of the systems, the delays to access the biomedical information or the
interoperability with health information and medical systems.
The development of novel signal-based techniques for the protection of biomedical tests
is addressed in Chapter 4. It deepens into two complementary techniques, the former
permits embedding high amounts of hidden and protected data into compressed biomedical
signals while preserving their intrinsic clinical value — and includes optional support for
efficient signal encryption; the latter, called keytagging, permits associating information
— with variable strength — to biomedical signals without causing any distortion to them.
Furthermore, a series of security applications and scenarios of used are drawn for these
techniques, by setting operation parameters that yield optimal features (e.g. compression
levels, delays, robustness, specificity, capacity).
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes research objectives achieved, contributions and accom-
plished results of this Thesis, and it also lays out suggestions for future lines of research.
“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get
you there.”
Lewis Carroll
“A designer knows he has achieved perfection not when
there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing left
to take away.”
Antoine de Saint-Exupery
2
M-Health architectures: Background and proposed
guidelines for their security enhancement
This first part of this Chapter describes the foremost materials — i.e. background — of
this research, which includes overviews of major standards for the exchange of biomedical
information (Section 2.1), of major biomedical signal coding methods (Section 2.2), of
transport technologies eligible in m-Health architectures (Section 2.3) and of legal regu-
lations applicable to this context (Section 2.4). The second part addresses two relevant
methods developed in this research, an assessment of the risks of the m-Health architecture
(Section 2.5) and the proposal of robust guidelines for its security enhancement (Section
2.6) — which are followed and materialized in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.1 Overview of major standards for exchanging biomedical
information
This section introduces the main features of four relevant standardization initiatives in the
m-Health context: IHE, focusing on the profiles involved in the secure exchange of biomed-
ical information in the m-Health context (Section 2.1.1); two protocols for the exchange
of biomedical measurements and signals that require security enhancements, ISO/IEEE
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11073 PHD (Section 2.1.2) and SCP-ECG (Section 2.1.3); and a standard for the exchange
of biomedical images and videos, DICOM (Section 2.1.4), whose cryptography-based secu-
rity may be enhanced through signal-based methods. Finally, Section 2.1.5 compiles and
analyzes previous efforts for the security enhancement of these standards.
2.1.1 IHE & profiles overview
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) [89] is a non-profit organization founded in
1998 by healthcare professionals and industry members to improve the way computer
systems in healthcare share information. IHE is organized by clinical and operational
domains, each defining its own integration profiles and technical frameworks. The former
define accurately how different communication standards, such as DICOM [79], HL7 [77],
IEEE, W3C and security standards, can be implemented to meet specific clinical needs.
The latter establish how these integration profiles can be coordinated to facilitate appro-
priate sharing of medical information and to support optimal patient care. It is worth
highlighting that the IHE domains for Patient Care Devices and Health IT infrastructure
are closely related with m-Health architectures. In fact, these domains include several
integration profiles (Table 1.1) that would solve most of the security issues described in
Sections 2.4-2.5 and that would improve interoperability with different healthcare systems:
• Rosetta Terminology Mapping (RTM) [180]. This defines a vendor-neutral harmo-
nized mapping for patient care device observations based on ISO/IEEE 11073-10101
nomenclature terms and Unified Code for Units of Measure (UCUM) [181], to fa-
cilitate the syntactic — and to some extent semantic — interoperability between
devices and systems. The Rosetta Table also works as a temporary repository, in
the form of XML files, to allow inclusion of new terms.
• Consistent Time (CT) [135]. This provides the means to guarantee that the system
clocks — also time stamps and authentication logs — of the devices in a network
are synchronized with a median error less than 1 second. It requires the use of the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [182].
• Device Enterprise Communications (DEC) [183]. This enables a consistent commu-
nication between a Patient Care Device and other systems, such as CDSS or EHRs.
This communication may include physiological data (e.g. heart rate, patient weight),
point-of-care laboratory tests (e.g. home blood glucose tests), continuous data (e.g.
ECG, EEG) —but without addressing real-time operation—, patient information
and contextual data. This data can be filtered so that each system receives only the
information that it is subscribed to. The current profile does not address issues of
privacy, security and confidentiality associated with cross-enterprise communication
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of personal measurements. However, it strongly recommends the implementation of
IHE compliant transactions for automated acquisition of patient ID credentials —
e.g. by means of bar codes (BC) or radio frequency identification tokens (RFID-T)
— in order to reduce errors, increase user safety and enhance device and drug effec-
tiveness. This profile works by means of HL7 v2 messages and depends on the CT
profile.
• Alert Communication Management (ACM) [184]. This permits a Patient Care De-
vice to send the notification of an alert to a portable device, such as a smartphone
or a tablet. This alert may be a physiological alarm (e.g. heart rate out of the safe
range for a patient) for a caregiver, a technical alert (e.g. ECG leads off the patient)
or advisories not related with an alarm. This profile extends DEC.
• Waveform Content Module (WCM) [185]. This provides the semantics and the
data structure (based on the IEEE 11073 Domain Information Model) to enable the
transmission of waveforms acquired by Patient Care Devices (e.g. ECGs) to the IHE
actors involved in the DEC and ACM profiles. These waveforms can be provided
as bounded waveforms, snapshots associated with a diagnostic encounter or with an
alarm event; or as continuous waveforms to be used for remote real-time monitoring.
This profile is an option for DEC and ACM.
• Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) [134]. This enforces personal health
information integrity and confidentiality and user accountability by implementing
local user authentication in the nodes of the health IT infrastructure (e.g. based
on username and password, biometrics, smart cards or magnetic cards), connection
authentication between communicating nodes (using certificates for authentication
and secure transport) and audit trails (by means of the Syslog protocol [186]). This
profile depends on CT.
• Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) [187]. This provides standard-based
means — mainly based on HL7 v2 and OASIS ebXML [188] — for managing the
sharing of documents between any healthcare organization. This profile depends on
ATNA and CT.
• Enterprise User Authentication (EUA) [143]. This enables centralized user authen-
tication management — compliant with ATNA — and provides users with reliable
and fast single sign-on, which can be based on passwords, tokens, smart-cards and
biometrics. This profile relies on Kerberos [189] and HL7 Clinical Context Object
Workgroup (CCOW), and it depends on CT.
• Patient Identifier Cross Referencing (PIX) [190]. This provides interoperability
when cross-referencing patients among different systems. This profile uses the HL7
32 2.1. Overview of major standards for exchanging biomedical information
v2 protocol and depends on CT.
• Basic Patient Privacy Consents (BPPC) [140]. This permits patient privacy con-
sent(s) to recorded so that patients can selectively control access to their healthcare
information. It defines a mechanism — equivalent to that in EHR systems — to
enforce this policy. This profile complements XDS, so implementation of the latter
is required.
In addition to this, the IHE white paper “Medical Equipment Management: Cyber
Security” [191] addresses the increasing risks associated with different types of personal
care devices, specifically those risks of malware outbreaks and breaches of personal health
information, and provides guidance on countermeasures at different levels — devices pro-
tection, network architecture, life-cycle management, security best practices — to solve
these problems.
2.1.2 ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD overview
The ISO/IEEE 11073 is a set of standards aimed at providing interoperability between
personal health devices (referred to as “agents” in the X73PHD context) and concentrator
devices, usually called “managers” (e.g. smartphones, personal computers, personal health
appliances, maybe smart TVs), which has been successfully implemented in several devices
and platforms [192, 193, 194]. The architecture of a typical X73PHD-compliant system
involves a number of entities (Figure 2.11-A), namely:
• Users: The person the measurements belong to.
• Agents: The personal health devices used to take such measurements (e.g. weighing
scale, thermometer, pulse oximeter, etc.).
• Managers: The concentrator devices used to aggregate the measurements from
agents. Managers can associate to several agents simultaneously, but agents can
associate to only one manager at a time.
• Administrators: The person in charge of managing agents and managers. In a home
environment any user can play the role of administrator.
Furthermore, there are three additional entities that are common in a healthcare frame-
work (Figure 2.11-B):
• Manufacturers: The companies producing the devices (agents or managers).
• Certification authorities: Entities that issue digital certificate to uniquely identify
each entity (e.g. an agent, a managers, a user, etc.).
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• Health Information System (HIS): The information system the data may be sent
to, it includes other systems such as PHRs, EHRs, CDSS or alarm systems —which
may also operate independently from the HIS.
Figure 2.1: ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD standards overview.
Among the ISO/IEEE 11073 family (Figure 2.1), it is worth highlighting the 11073-
20601TM -2014 Optimized Exchange Protocol. This defines a reference model (Figure 2.2)
based on an object-oriented paradigm that guarantees extensibility and reusability by
defining three interrelated models:
• Domain information model (DIM). The DIM characterizes information from an agent
as a set of objects with one or more attributes, which describe measurement data
that are communicated to a manager as well as elements that control behavior and
report on the status of the agent. The DIM covers the definition of the MD system
(MDS) object, scanner objects (for data reporting), different metrics (numeric, real-
time sample array –RT-SA–, and enumeration objects) and persistent metric (PM)
objects, used for data storage.
• Service model. The service model provides data access primitives that are sent be-
tween the agent and manager to exchange data defined in the DIM. These primitives
include commands such as Get, Set, Action, and Event Reporting.
• Communication model. The communication model supports the topology of one
or more agents communicating over point-to-point connections to a single manager.
The dynamic system behavior for each point-to-point connection is defined by a
connection finite state machine (FSM), which defines the states and sub-states that
an agent and manager pair passes through, including states related to connection,
association, and operation.
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Figure 2.2: ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD three-level architecture.
Complementarily, several agent specializations have been issued and grouped in three
different domains:
• Disease Management (ranging from ISO/IEEE 11073-10400 to 11073-10439), which
includes specializations for pulse oximeters, heart rate monitors, blood pressure mon-
itors, thermometers, weighing scales, glucose meters, ECG 1–3 leads, international
normalized ratio (INR) monitors —of blood coagulation—, body composition ana-
lyzers, peak flows and, under development, for insulin pumps, sleep quality monitors,
urine analyzers, sleep apnoea breathing therapy equipment and continuous glucose
monitors.
• Health and Fitness (ranging from ISO/IEEE 11073-10440 to 11073-10469), with
specializations for heart rate monitors, weighing scales, thermometers, cardiovascu-
lar fitness and activity monitors, strength fitness equipment and physical activity
monitors.
• Independent Living (ranging from ISO/IEEE 11073-10470 to 11073-10499), which
groups specializations for disease management devices plus independent living ac-
tivity hubs and medication monitors.
Security features
While Health, Fitness and Independent Living applications are mainly intended for user
self-control of his/her health condition — which may be based on maintaining a PHR and
supervision by an alarm system —, Disease Management applications usually require some
degree of medical supervision — which may be based on the connection to an EHR, CDSS
and/or alarm system. Therefore, these applications demand integration capabilities and
security requirements. X73PHD does not address the former and, regarding the latter,
only a few aspects can be considered as security-related features:
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• User identification: The conditional attribute PersonID may be used to differentiate
different persons in a store-and-forward scenario. As a conditional attribute, agents
may not support this feature. This attribute is vendor-dependent and is modeled as
a 16-bit unsigned integer. In any case, the process of mapping this ID to a specific
person is outside the scope of the standard.
• Device identification and authentication: In X73PHD, managers are not identified.
Agents include the mandatory attribute System-ID in their DIM, which is an IEEE
EUI-64 which, in turn, consists of a 24-bit organizationally unique identifier (OUI)
followed by a 40-bit manufacturer-defined ID. There is also the mandatory attribute
System-Model, which contains the manufacturer’s name and the manufacturer’s spe-
cific model information in a printable ASCII form. Neither of these, however, is used
by X73PHD to complete a mutual agent-manager authentication. They are only used
to discern different agents in a manager and, eventually, to speed up the configu-
ration process of known agents. Nonetheless, the underlying transport technology
may implement its own procedure for secure device pairing.
• Time coordination: In X73PHD, agents shall implement a way of reporting the time
when measurements were taken if the measurements delivered by the agent are not
“freshly acquired”. Timestamps are mandatory when the measurements come from
the temporary storage of the agent — the PM-store.
• Encryption: X73PHD does not define any encryption mechanism. However, data
may travel encrypted if such a feature is implemented by the lower layer transport
technology.
2.1.3 SCP-ECG overview
With the spread of digital electrocardiography, the SCP-ECG [76] was created in the
early 90s to allow the storage of ECGs and the interchange between medical ECG devices
(carts) and ECG user systems. It was initially supported by the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) to achieve interoperability among most medical ECG equipment.
Now it is integrated in the ISO/IEEE 11073 family and the goal is more ambitious: to
interoperate with other medical devices as well. Nevertheless, harmonization is needed to
coordinate both standards [195].
The SCP-ECG defines a binary encoded format of data and mechanisms for the com-
pression of the ECG signal in order to reduce the final size of the ECG file. This permits
the transmission of ECGs in scenarios with low transmission ratios and the saving of disk
space in storage. Although the SCP-ECG was primarily intended for 12-lead records in
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short-term tests, it allows different numbers of leads and it has been successfully adapted
to stress tests, Holter recordings and real-time transmission [196, 197].
This standard also supports ECG measurements (i.e. average RR intervals), ECG
feature extraction (i.e. onset/offset of P waves and QRS complexes), pattern recognition,
ECG interpretation (i.e. normal ECG, left ventricular hypertrophy, left anterior fascicular
block, posterior myocardial infarction) and diagnostic classification.
Regarding SCP-ECG compliant software, there are many freely available programs [198]
including viewers, writers, parsers, format and content checkers. There are also methods
for the harmonization of this ECG standard with others, such as the aforementioned
DICOM Waveform Supplement 30 [199], HL7 aECG [200] and MFER (Part 2.6 of the
protocol).
SCP-ECG structure and data content
The SCP-ECG is divided into 12 different sections (Table 2.1), defined by its own encoding
rules and preceded by a common header (Figure 2.3). Regarding their contents, five
different groups may be distinguished:
• Section 0: this stores the pointers to the start of the remaining sections in the
record. This section does not contain any information itself, so it is considered as
public.
• A, Section 1 - tags 0-3, 5, 14-26, 31 : these fields contain the identification of the
patient and the physician(s), institution(s) and device(s) involved in the acquisition,
analysis and diagnosis of the ECG. These data must be considered as highly con-
fidential since they can identify the patient (directly or indirectly) in a file full of
health data.
• B, Section 1 - tags 4, 6-13, 27-30, 32-35, 255 : these contain general information
about the patient (e.g. age, weight, height), his/her health condition (e.g. medical
history, drugs) and data for the correct interpretation of the ECG (type of filtering
applied). This part (together with parts C and D) may be used to find correlations
between medical condition of large groups of patients and the more likely causes/risk
factors for a variety of heart diseases. In terms of privacy, these data itself do not
identify the patient.
• C, Sections 2-6 : these identify the leads which are present in the record (Section 3 )
and store the ECG signal data (Section 6 ), which may be kept as uncompressed
raw data or alternatively compressed by different methods. The compression ratio
which can be achieved ranges from less than 2-4:1, when only using Huffman tables
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(Section 2 ), or up to 6-20:1 when combining second-order differences (using Sections
4 and 5 ) with Huffman encoding and downsampling, at the cost of lower signal
quality. In the absence of patient identification, (A), this information can not be
used against the patient: even if it is used for biometric identification, another ECG
from the same patient must be known previously, so no new information is obtained.
• D, Section 7-11 : these sections can be optionally added to include:
1. global measurements (Section 7 ) and measurements from each lead indepen-
dently (Section 10 ), to help the physician’s work;
2. the diagnostic interpretation of the ECG record (Section 8 ), which must be
consistent with the manufacturer interpretive statements (Section 9 ) and the
universal ECG interpretive statement codes and coding rules (Section 11 );
These data interprets or helps to interpret the ECG of the patient, so if he/she is
identified (A), this information must be treated with strict confidentiality.
Sections numbered 12 to 127 and those above 1023 are reserved for future use. Regard-
ing compliance, the ISO/IEEE 11073-91064:200 protocol version defines two categories:
1. Demographics and ECG rhythm data (uncompressed or with lossless compression).
2. Demographics, ECG rhythm data (uncompressed, with lossless compression or with
high compression) and reference beats.
Parts B and D are optional, hence they will be referenced as [B] and [D] .
Table 2.1: SCP-ECG Data Sections
Section Status Content
- Required 2 bytes CRC Checksum
- Required 4 bytes Record Length
0 Required Pointers to data areas in the record
1 Required Header information – patient data/ECG acquisition data
2 Dependent Huffman tables used in encoding of ECG data
3 Required ECG lead definition
4 Optional QRS location (if reference beats are encoded)
5 Optional Encoded reference beat data if reference beats are stored
6 Required “Residual signal” if beat subtraction is performed, otherwise encoded rhythm data
7 Optional Global measurements
8 Optional Textual diagnosis from the “interpretive” device
9 Optional Manufacturer specific diagnostic and overreading data from the “interpretive” device
10 Optional Lead measurement results
11 Optional Universal statement codes resulting from the interpretation
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Figure 2.3: SCP-ECG standard overview. Mandatory parts A and C, and optional parts [B] and [D] defined in Section 2.1.3.
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SCP-ECG Messaging/Transport Protocol
Since the standard is intended for the exchange of SCP-ECG files, between ECG medical
devices (carts) or between carts and user devices (computers, PDAs, smartphones, etc.),
it dedicates:
• Annex D to recommending a simple architecture and a set of control (ID, Status,
Done, Advisory) and request messages to send/receive a) ECGs (types S, R), b)
ECG lists for specified patients (types E, L), or c) patient lists for specified names
(types I, P); and
• Annex E to giving a possible solution for low level transport of data (physical function
and data link function layers).
Protecting the communications involving patient data is as important as protecting the
SCP-ECG files, so this issue must be addressed in the security policy.
File size and access delays
The size of SCP-ECG files is highly concentrated in its part C, which stores the signal. This
protocol supports the storage of raw signals and the use of simple compression methods,
which depending on the signal length achieve compression rates ranging from 2-4:1 (lossless
compression) to 6-20:1 (lossy compression). Assuming that the typical signal duration
ranges from 10 to 30 seconds and the acquisition bitrate from 3000 bps (e.g. MIT-BIH
Compression database [201]) to 8000 bps (e.g. T-Wave Alternans Challenge database
[202]), this results in:
• minimum expectable signal size of 3000 bps · 10 s · 12 (leads)
6 (CR)
bits = 7.32KB.
• maximum expectable signal size of 8000 bps · 30 s · 12 (leads) bits = 351.6KB.
• typical expectable signal size of 4000 bps · 10 s · 12 (leads)
2 (CR)
bits = 29.3KB.
Regarding the remaining parts, A, composed of up to 19 fields, typically takes less
than 1 KB since it only contains IDs, names and free-text short descriptions. Part [B],
composed of up to 18 fields, typically takes less than 0.5 KB since most fields are described
with 1-4 bytes and only a few require free-text description. Part [D] , composed of up to 5
sections, is not expected to be larger than 2 KB, mainly contributed by Section 8 (expected
less than 0.35 KB) and Section 11 (expected less than 1.2 KB). Since only four fields of part
A (2,14,25,26) and part C are mandatory, the minimum expectable file size is ' 7.4KB.
In the opposite case, the maximum expectable size of a file is the sum of maximum of each
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part, (A) 1KB +(B) 0.5KB +(C) 351.6KB +(D) 2KB = 355 KB. In the most typical
cases, the expectable size is ' (A)0.5KB+(B)0.25KB+(C)29.3KB+(D)1KB = 31KB.
The delays associated to the SCP-ECG may de divided into:
• Collection of information about the patient and the recording session to complete
parts A and [B]. It depends on the means, a person typing the data can spend
several seconds (typically a minute) on this task, while a proper connection to a
patients database speeds up this operation (to typically 0.2-0.5 s).
• Acquisition of the signal, to be stored in part C. This is equal to the signal duration,
between 10 and 30 seconds. If the signal is compressed, there is a small additional
delay of ' 50 ms.
• Analysis of the signal to obtain part [D]. It comprises the obtaining of global mea-
surements and measures from each lead independently (40-120 ms) and its interpre-
tation by a cardiologists (≥ 1 minute) and sometimes an analyzing device (10-30
ms).
• Access to the file contents by using an application. Loading the data fields and
plotting the signal leads on screen typically takes less than 50 ms.
Two typical delays can be obtained from these data, (1) the delay to obtain a basic
SCP-ECG file (parts A, [B] and C ) is ' 10-30 seconds, and (2) the delay to access the
file and interpret it (using and/or completing part [D]) is ' 1 minute.
Security features
The SCP-ECG includes no security policy, so its security extension must be designed care-
fully. In the first place the main aspects of this standard must be analyzed in detail, since
the extension must be in harmony with the scope of the protocol, maintain its structure,
protect adequately and be able to retrieve its exact contents, not change substantially
its file sizes and associated delays and allow interoperability with existing devices and
software. Secondly the measures adopted by other major medical protocols to enforce
reliability and privacy must be surveyed. Third, the security measures that the SCP-ECG
shall implement must be accurately established no minimize costs.
2.1.4 DICOM overview
In response to the increasing use of digital images in radiology, the American College of
Radiology (ACR) and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) formed
a joint committee in 1983 to create a standard format for storing and transmitting medical
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images. The committee published the original ACR-NEMA standard in 1985. This has
subsequently been revised and in 1993 the standard was renamed DICOM. DICOM is
administered by the NEMA Diagnostic Imaging and Therapy Systems division and each
year the standard is updated. Details of recent improvements can be found on [79].
The standard describes how to format and exchange medical images and associated
information, both within the hospital and also outside the hospital. DICOM interfaces
are available for connection of any combination of the following categories of digital imag-
ing devices: (a) image acquisition equipment such as computed tomography, magnetic
resonance imaging, computed radiography, ultrasonography, and nuclear medicine scan-
ners; (b) image archives; (c) image processing devices and image display workstations; (d)
hard-copy output devices such as photographic transparency film and paper printers.
DICOM addresses five general application areas:
1. Network image management.
2. Network image interpretation management.
3. Network print management.
4. Imaging procedure management.
5. Offline storage media management.
DICOM is a message standard that facilitates interoperability of medical imaging equip-
ment by specifying:
1. For network communications, a set of protocols to be followed by devices claiming
conformance to the standard.
2. The syntax and semantics of Commands and associated information which can be
exchanged using these protocols.
3. For media communication, a set of media storage services to be followed by devices
claiming conformance to the standard, as well as a File Format and a medical direc-
tory structure to facilitate access to the images and related information stored on
interchange media.
DICOM file format
A single DICOM file contains both a header (which stores information about the patient’s
name, the type of scan, image dimensions, etc), as well as all of the image data. The
header and the image data are stored in the same file. The image data follows the header
information.
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Table 2.2: Relevant fields of the DICOM header from an Acuson device
Field Contents
Filename [1x65 char]
FileModDate “12-nov-2010”
FileSize 2361370
Format “DICOM”
FormatVersion 3
Width 1024
Height 768
BitDepth 8
ColorType “truecolor”
FileMetaInformationGroupLength 204
MediaStorageSOPClassUID “1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.6.1”
TransferSyntaxUID “1.2.840.10008.1.2.1”
ImplementationClassUID “1.2.276.0.7230010.3.0.3.5.4”
Modality “US”
Manufacturer “SIEMENS”
InstitutionName “HC LOZANO BLESA”
ManufacturerModelName “ACUSON SC2000”
PatientName [1x1 struct]
PatientID “XXXXXXXXXXXX”
PatientBirthDate “XX”
PatientSex “X”
HeartRate 88
SequenceOfUltrasoundRegions [1x1 struct]
The size of the header varies depending on the acquisition device and image type.
The DICOM elements required depend on the image type that are listed in Part 3 of the
DICOM standard [203]. DICOM requires a 128-byte preamble (these 128 bytes are usually
all set to zero), followed by the letters ’D’, ’I’, ’C’, ’M’. This is followed by the header
information, which is organized in groups: general information, patient, study, series,
frame of reference, equipment and image information. In Table 2.2 some fields of a header
for an ultrasound device are shown. Of particular importance is the “Transfer Syntax
Unique Identification” which reports the structure of the image data, revealing whether
the data has been compressed or not. Another important field in the DICOM header
included in the ultrasound is the regions calibration, see “SequenceOfUltrasoundRegions”
in Table 2.2. It defines regions on the ultrasound image with different calibration and the
calibration parameters in order to be able to perform measurements on the ultrasound
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regions. The calibration header is defined in Part 3 of the DICOM standard [203]. The
regions definition depends on the echocardiogram devices and not all the devices define
these regions. In Figure 2.4 the calibration regions for an M mode are shown. There are
four calibration regions that are defined with four coordinates each one: “Region Location
Min X0”, “Region Location Min Y0”, “Region Location Max X1” and “Region Location
Max Y1”. The “Region Spatial Format” and the “Region Data Type” of each region
indicates the type of mode and data within the region. For example M mode or 2-D mode
(tissue or flow) and color bar or spectral (CW or PW Doppler).
Figure 2.4: Calibration regions for the M mode of an echocardiogram acquired with an
Agilent device.
The DICOM image exam can be compressed either lossless or lossy in order to reduce
disk space. The image format is specified in the “Transfer Syntax Unique Identification”
header. The codecs included in DICOM are described in Part 5 of the standard. The image
formats supported for DICOM are raw data, lossless Run Length Encoding (RLE) [204],
JPEG [205] lossy and lossless mode, JPEG-LS lossless and near-lossless mode, JPEG2000
[165] lossless and lossy mode, MPEG-2 MP@ML and MP@HL image compression, and
MPEG-4 AVC/H.264 [206] high profile video compression.
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Security features
DICOM dedicates its Working Group 14 to develop extensions to the standard that ad-
dress the technical details of providing secure information exchange. These extensions
are published in the form of DICOM supplements (Section 1.3.1) and in part 15 of the
standard [144]. It is worth highlighting that there is a tendency to harmonize the security
policies of IHE, DICOM and HL7. Currently, DICOM includes security specification that
permit:
• Integrating Audit Trail and Node Authentication profile (IHE) (ATNA). These con-
tribute to access control by limiting network access, by implementing:
– User authentication, which is local for each node.
– Connection authentication between nodes.
– Audit trails for user accountability.
• Implementing secure transport connection (e.g. by means of Transport Layer Se-
curity [207] — TLS —, with Kerberos [189] or SAML [208] for identity negotia-
tion), in order to guarantee data integrity during transit, entity authentication and
confidentiality during transit via encryption. This protects against eavesdropping,
masquerading and tampering.
• Embedding Digital Signatures (DS), which
– Guarantee data integrity for the life of the file.
– Identify signatories, with optional timestamps.
– May be included in Digital Signature Profiles (Base, Creator and Authorization
RSA Profiles).
– May be included in Structured Reports.
• Implementing storage security profiles, which basically allows encapsulation of a
DICOM file into a Secure DICOM File guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity and op-
tionally data origin authentication. A Secure DICOM File shall contain an Enveloped-
data content protected by means of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [151].
• Protecting the confidentiality of sensitive attributes, by means of:
– De-identification and re-identification.
– Removal of sensitive data information (corresponding to certain DICOM at-
tributes — patient ID, study, series, date of acquisition — or to text annota-
tions) burned on the image.
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– Distortion of recognizable visual information in the image that permits the
recognition of a patient.
• Implementing robust network address management, with secure Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) [209] and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol DHCP [210] configura-
tions.
• Implementation accurate time synchronization of the machines in a network by
means of Network Time Protocol or Simple Network Time Protocol (NTP/SNTP)
[182, 211].
2.1.5 Related publications on the protection of biomedical standards
The security extension of SCP-ECG is not addressed specifically by any research work.
However, the analysis of certain related works can offer certain guidance on the matter.
For instance, [212] proposes an extension of this protocol, e-SCP-ECG+, to be included
in health monitoring systems, permitting the inclusion of information about positioning,
allergies, and five additional biomedical signals: noninvasive blood pressure (NiBP), body
temperature (Temp), Carbon dioxide (CO2), blood oxygen saturation (SPO2), and pulse
rate. The way in which it defines new sections and tags and implements software compo-
nents can be adapted to the purpose of enhancing the security of the protocol. In addition,
there are relevant works about ECG frameworks addressing security, although not inte-
grating it into the standard. [213] defines a proposal of protocol stacks — depicted in
Figure 2.5, which includes SCP-ECG, MFER, HL7 and may also include X73PHD — to
be implemented by the entities in a m-Health network. However, it can be observed that
in this proposal all the security relies on the physical layer in the communication between
the sensor device (PHD) and the gateway (CD) and that the authenticated access to the
encrypted data (AAA) is defined out of the standards. Furthermore, the files are not
digitally signed. Similarly, [214] depicts a workflow where ECG files in SCP-ECG, HL7
aECG and XML Mortara formats are encrypted with a secure, password-derived — AES-
256 — session key and sent to a central mailbox via secure Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP with SSL/TLS), where it is forwarded to the reviewer through secure Internet Mail
Access Protocol (IMAP with SSL/TLS). Again, the files are not digitally signed, there
is no definition of access control policy or at least a robust key management. Regarding
this issue, [215] depicts and ECG framework whose security components include not only
AES encryption but also privacy protection and access control (based on eXtensible Ac-
cess Control Markup Language [216] — XACML — and SAML). Finally, [217] defines a
12-lead ECG telemedicine service with enhanced security and privacy protection, based
on Windows Azure. To safeguard the ECG data in the cloud, this framework includes
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authentication for the use of Web roles and Worker roles, data encryption during mes-
sage communications among roles, and ECG file encryption and verification while ECG
reports are retrieved in storage accounts and database. In addition to this, ECG files are
transmitted via SSL based HTTP (HTTPS) where ECG files are protected by certificate
based encryption and verification.
Figure 2.5: Stack proposal for secure health monitoring, according to [213].
Regarding X73PHD, several publications address to certain — albeit different — ex-
tents the enhancement of the X73PHD security. [218] recommends the symmetric encryp-
tion, based on AES, of the measurements contained in PrstApdu frames and evaluates its
cost — the transmission delay grows from 18 to 26ms. However, a key management policy
is not defined. [219] recommends the use of NFC as a reliable and convenient out-of-band
pairing method when using Bluetooth as transport technology for X73PHD communica-
tions — being this a peripheral enhancement, since the standard is independent from the
transport technology. [220] proposes the joining use of Universal Plug and Play (UPnP)
and IEEE 11073 in home networks, establishing a UPnP Device-Protection service that
controls the access of different concentrating devices — smart TVs, game centers, smart-
phones — to user’s personal information. Nonetheless, the agent-manager communication
is not specifically protected and there are no means to distinguish the measurements
from different users who may share agents. More focused on the standard, [221, 222]
implement and discuss modified agent-manager association procedures, based on mutual
challenge-response authentication — a certificate-based authentication method cannot be
implemented since the agent has no direct means to check the validity of a certificate.
The former uses the RSA2048 algorithm to perform digital signature — of timestamped
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challenges —, which introduces high overhead, and implements USB Personal Healthcare
Device Class for a secure transmission. The latter derives a biometric key from the user
fingerprint, obtaining an insufficient 80% success rate. Another approach [223] focuses on
low-powered PHDs. It proposes either including the sending date and time in the initial
association frame of X73PHD and encrypting it partially — to hinder replay attacks and
obtain certain privacy —, or encrypting the whole message and attach an authentication
code — for integrity control. Nonetheless, still several attacks could thrive — e.g. user
impersonation, devices hacking. The proposal in [224] handles both agent-manager au-
thentication and encryption by means of a complex architecture, relying on either Device
Profile Web Services — for hospitalary and domiciliary setups — or Bluetooth Health De-
vice Profile — for high-mobility scenarios. This proposal includes global IDs for medical
devices, the involvement of authorities beyond the manager, the administration of many
cryptographic keys and the attachment of timestamps to verify their validity. However,
it does not analyze the implications of this proposal on the X73PHD models and on its
framework, and it lacks of details for an implementation based on its proposal. Moreover,
none of the works mentioned consider fulfilling legal regulations (Section 2.4) or coordinat-
ing X73PHD with certain IHE profiles (Section 2.1.1), which would increase the usefulness
of PHDs inside the healthcare ecosystem. On the other hand, [85] addresses both issues,
but without proposing any specific security enhancement for the X73PHD and presenting
a unique solution that limits the communications of X73PHD-compliant devices to PHR
systems only. Finally, it is worth noting that the authors of [225] propose including remote
controls in X73PHD and, from the perspective of security, they claim that the suitability
of some use cases — e.g. configuration of pacemakers, drug pumps, insulin dispenser —
should be analyzed.
As explained in Section 1.3.1, the Working Group 14 of DICOM has been very active
in including security policies — e.g. encapsulation of DICOM files by means of crypto-
graphic envelopes — and cryptographic elements — e.g. digital signatures —, some of
them previously suggested in the literature [226, 227, 228], for the security enhancement of
the standard. Therefore, it is foreseeable that more advances will be steadily included in
the coming years. For instance, the integration of openID [229] for decentralized authenti-
cation of users accessing DICOM objects through HTTPS-based Web Access to DICOM
Object (WADO [230]) services has already been addressed in the literature [231]. In ad-
dition, the implementation of QR-Code authentication for mobile DICOM image retrieval
has also been proposed [232]. Similarly, Latch [233] might be integrated as a safety switch
adding an additional level of security to the DICOM online services, switching them off
when the user does not need them. Furthermore, it is likely that new forms of efficient
anonymization (e.g. pseudonymization [234]) and encryption, such as quaternion-based
encryption [235] or searchable encryption [236, 237, 238], which is intended for a very
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efficient, robust and flexible privacy protection, are implemented by DICOM when these
techniques become mature enough. Alternatively, there is also a variety of proposals to
enhance the security and privacy of DICOM files through signal-based techniques, which
strengthen the binding between the biomedical image and its metadata. As discussed
in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, they can be of interest for certain security applications and
scenarios — e.g. medical cooperative architectures. For instance, steganographic tech-
niques have been proposed to embed silently into the biomedical DICOM image: the
DICOM header [162] — in order to reduce the overall file size with very low quality
loss —, a security-enhanced DICOM header [159] encapsulated in a digital envelope, or
patient record information [239, 240]. Similarly, various watermarking approaches have
been proposed for different purposes, such as the enhanced verification of integrity and
authenticity in individual [176, 178] and multiframe DICOM files [241], the location of
tampered areas in volumetric DICOM images [242] or the enhanced protection of patient
information confidentiality [243, 244]. Furthermore, certain works propose combining sev-
eral techniques to implement several security measures simultaneously in DICOM images,
such as authentication and data hiding [177], watermarking of encrypted images [132] to
enable integrity control while protecting privacy, or even joining lossless compression and
encryption [245] to enable the embedding of contents for authentication, captioning (e.g.
with EHR/DICOM metadata) with controlled access retrieval and tamper location.
2.2 Overview of major biomedical signal coding methods
This section introduces two widespread biomedical signal coding methods based on the
wavelet transform (Section 2.2.1), which facilitate compression preserving the clinical con-
tent of: 1-D signals — SPIHT, Section 2.2.2 — and individual images and short videos
(multiframe images) — the DICOM-compliant JPEG2000, Section 2.2.3. Finally, Section
2.2.4 presents relevant signal-based protection techniques, which may comply with these
(and other) coding methods.
2.2.1 Wavelet transform overview
The wavelet transform comprises the coefficients of the expansion of a original signal x(t)
with respect to a basis ψw,n(t), each element of which is a dilated and translated version
of a function ψ called the mother wavelet, according to
ψw,n(t) =
1√
2w
ψ
(
t− n · 2w
2w
)
, w, n ∈ Z, (2.1)
where Z is the set of integers. Depending on the choice of the mother wavelet appropriately,
the basis can be orthogonal or biorthogonal. The wavelet transform coefficients, given by
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the inner product of x(t) and the basis functions
W (w, n) = 〈x(t), ψw,n(t)〉 (2.2)
comprise the time-frequency representation of the original signal. The wavelet transform
has good localization in both frequency and time domains, having fine frequency resolution
and coarse time resolution at lower frequency, and coarse frequency resolution and fine
time resolution at higher frequency. Since this matches the characteristic of most signals,
it makes the wavelet transform suitable for time-frequency analysis. In data compression,
the wavelet transform is used to exploit the redundancy in the signal. After the original
signal is transformed into the wavelet domain, many coefficients are so small that no
significant information is lost in the signal reconstructed by setting these coefficients to
zero.
In digital signal processing, the fast-forward and inverse wavelet transforms are imple-
mented as tree-structured, perfect-reconstruction filter banks. The input signal is divided
into contiguous, non-overlapping blocks of samples called frames and is transformed frame
by frame for the forward transform. Within each frame, the input signal is filtered by
the analysis filter pair to generate low-pass and high-pass signals, which are then down-
sampled by a factor of two. Then this analysis filter pair is applied to the downsampled
low-pass signal recursively to generate layered wavelet coefficients. In different layers, the
coefficients have different frequency and time resolution. In layer i, each coefficient cor-
responds to two coefficients in layer i+ 1 in the time domain. For the inverse transform,
the coefficients in the highest layer are upsampled by a factor of two (zeros are inserted
between successive samples), filtered by the low- and high-pass synthesis filter and added
together to get the low-pass signal for the next layer. This process is repeated for all layers
until the full size signal is reached to complete the inverse transform.
Similarly, the 2-D discrete wavelet transform [246] decomposes images into several scales
(see the 5th-level decomposition of an echocardiogram represented in Figure 2.6), located
in ordered regions of the transformed image, which host coefficients concentrating certain
frequencies. This enables efficient compression —e.g. by means of SPIHT (Section 2.2.2)
or JPEG2000 (Section 2.2.3)— since any entropy and/or run-length coding that exploits
adequately the self-similarities of the quantized coefficients across different scales achieves
high compression ratios. The main advantage of using wavelets over other transforms is
its variable resolution: the higher frequencies, which correspond to details of the image,
are represented with higher spatial resolution than the lower frequencies. The image is
initially filtered by rows and columns with two filters, decimated by two and arranged
in four subimages: LL,LH,HL,HH — this process is represented in Figure 2.7. The
process is iteratively repeated, taking the last LL as input, until reaching the desired j-th
decomposition level.
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(a) Original image
(b) Wavelet decomposition
Figure 2.6: 5th-level wavelet decomposition of an echocardiogram image.
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Figure 2.7: Calculation of the first wavelet decomposition levels of a 2-D signal.
In implementation, the number of layers/decomposition level of the wavelet transform,
the filter pair and the frame size of the signal need to be appropriately selected. The
number of layers determine the coarsest frequency resolution of the transform and should
be at least four for adequate compression. The selection of different analysis-synthesis
filter pairs, which correspond to different wavelet bases, is very important for obtaining
high performance in the desired application: typically effective data compression, but also
in associating information to the signal (e.g. by means of watermarking). Information for
the design of perfect reconstruction filter pairs can be found in [247]. The frame size is
taken to be a power of two that exceeds the number of layers. For 1-D signals, the frame
should contain several periods of the biomedical signal, but should still be short enough
for acceptable coding delay and memory usage.
2.2.2 SPIHT overview
SPIHT was firstly presented in [97] as an efficient method for coding wavelet coefficients
(Section 2.2.1) in 2-D image compression. In [106] the algorithm was adapted to the one-
dimensional (1-D) case and applied to ECG signals, revealing that it was very efficient in
compression and in computation when compared with previous ECG compression meth-
ods. In addition to this, the SPIHT algorithm accounted with several desirable properties:
multiresolution scalability, progressive lossy to lossless coding, compatibility with lossless
entropy coding, low complexity (use of simple operators), moderate memory usage and
symmetric coding-decoding. These features motivated the later extension of the algorithm
to the 3-D [248] and 4-D cases [249], and its successful VLSI implementation in silicon for
ECG real-time compression in low-power applications [250].
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The principles of the SPIHT algorithm are partial ordering of the transform coefficients
by magnitude with a set partitioning sorting algorithm, ordered bit plane transmission
and exploitation of self-similarity across different layers. By following these principles, the
encoder always transmits the most significant bit to the decoder.
Temporal orientation trees
Basically the (1-D) algorithm uses a temporal orientation tree structure (Figure 2.8) to
define the temporal parent-offspring relations in the wavelet domain. Every point in layer
i corresponds to two points in the next layer i+ 1, with the arrow indicating the parent-
offspring relation. This definition is analogous to that of spatial orientation trees [97] for
the 2-D case. Each node either has no offspring or two offspring. In a typical 1-D signal,
most of the energy is concentrated in low frequency bands, so that the coefficients are
expected to be better magnitude-ordered as we move downward following the temporal
orientation tree to the leaves (terminal nodes).
Figure 2.8: Subbands and spatial orientation tree of a SPIHT coding example.
Set partitioning sorting algorithm
The same set partitioning rule is defined in the encoder and decoder. The subset of sub-
band coefficients ci in the subset T is said to be significant for bit depth n if maxi∈T {|ci|} ≥
2n, otherwise it is said to be insignificant. If the subset is insignificant, a zero is sent to the
decoder. If it is significant, a one is sent to the decoder and then the subset is further split
according to the temporal orientation tree until all the significant sets are a single signif-
icant point. In this stage of coding, called the sorting pass, the indices of the coefficients
are put onto three lists, the list of insignificant points (LIP), the list of insignificant sets
(LIS), and the list of significant points (LSP). In this pass, only bits related to the LSP
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entries and binary outcomes of the magnitude tests are transmitted to the decoder. In
implementation, the entries in the LIP and LIS which have the same parent are grouped
into an entry atom. For each entry atom in LIP, a pattern is estimated in both encoder
and decoder to describe the significance status of each entry in the current sorting pass.
If the result of the significance test of the entry atom is the same as the specified pattern,
one bit is used to represent the status of the whole entry atom which otherwise had two
entries and representation of significance by two bits. If the significance test result does
not match the pattern, the result of the significance test is transmitted for each entry in
the atom. Since most biomedical signals (e.g. ECGs) have periodic characteristics, the
pattern is correctly estimated with high probability, so were able to save one bit frequently
enough to give noticeable improvement in compression performance.
Refinement pass
After each sorting pass, the significant coefficients for the threshold 2n are obtained, and
then the nth most significant bit of every coefficient found significant at a higher threshold
are sent to the decoder. By transmitting the bit stream in this ordered bit plane fashion,
we always transmit the most valuable (significant) remaining bits to the decoder. The
outline of the full coding algorithm is as follows:
1. Initialization. Set the list of significant points (LSP) as empty. Set the roots of
similarity trees in the list of insignificant points (LIP) and insignificant sets (LIS).
Set the significance threshold 2n with n = blog2(max(i)|ci|)c.
2. Sorting pass. Using the set partitioning algorithm distribute the appropriate indices
of the coefficients to the LIP, LIS, and LSP.
3. Refinement pass. For each entry in the LSP significant for higher n, send the nth
most significant bit to the decoder.
4. Decrement n by one and return to step 2 until the specified bitrate or distortion is
reached.
An example of the SPIHT coding process
This section includes a simple example showing how the coding algorithm works. A four
level wavelet decomposition of an input signal of length 32 produces the 32 wavelet coeffi-
cients distributed among the subbands as shown in Figure 2.8, with the arrows indicating
the parent-offspring relationships in the temporal trees. The number in each cell is the
value of the integer-rounded wavelet coefficient. The actions of the coding process are
shown in Table 2.3. Below are the most important definitions:
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Table 2.3: First steps of a SPIHT coding example
Step Point or
set tested
Output bit Action Control lists Code bits
accumulated
1 LIS = 2A, 3A
LIP = 0, 1, 2, 3
LSP = empty
2 c0 1
+
c0 to LSP LIP = 1, 2, 3
LSP = 0
1
2
c1 1
-
c1 to LSP LIP = 2, 3
LSP = 0, 1
3
4
c2 0 none 5
c3 0 none 6
3 D(c2) 1 descending tests LIS = 2A, 3A 7
c4 0 c4 to LIP LIP = 2, 3, 4 8
c5 0 c5 to LIP LIP = 2, 3, 4, 5 9
changes of type LIS = 3A, 2B
D(c3) 0 none LIS = 3A, 2B 10
4 L(c2) 1 add new sets LIS = 3A, 4A, 5A 11
D(c4) 1 descending tests LIS = 3A, 4A, 5A 12
c8
c9
1+
0
c8 to LSP
c9 to LIP
LSP = 0, 1, 8
LIP = 2, 3, 4, 5, 9
13, 14
15
changes of type LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B
D(c5) 0 none LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B 16
L(c4) 0 none LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B 17
5 LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B
LIP = 2, 3, 4, 5, 9
LSP = 0, 1, 8
6 reduce threshold
7 c2 1
-
c2 to LSP LSP = 0, 1, 8, 2
LIP = 3, 4, 5, 9
18
19
c3 1
+
c3 to LSP LSP = 0, 1, 8, 2, 3
LIP = 4, 5, 9
20
21
c4 0 none LIP = 4, 5, 9 22
c5 0 none LIP = 4, 5, 9 23
c9 0 none LIP = 4, 5, 9 24
8 D(c3) 0 none LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B 25
D(c5) 0 none LIS = 3A, 5A, 4B 26
L(c4) 1 add new sets LIS = 3A, 5A, 8A, 9A 27
D(c8) 1 descending tests LIS = 3A, 5A, 8A, 9A 28
c16 1+ c16 to LSP LSP = 0, 1, 8, 2, 3, 16 29, 30
c17 0 c17 to LIP LIP = 4, 5, 9, 17 31
remove c8 from LIS LIS = 3A, 5A, 9A
D(c9) 0 descending tests LIS = 3A, 5A, 9A 32
9 c0 1 33
c1 1 34
c8 0 35
10 reduce threshold
...
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• LIS contains sets of wavelet coefficients which are defined by tree structures, and
which had been found to have magnitude smaller than a threshold (are insignificant).
The sets are designated by, but exclude the coefficient corresponding to the tree or
all subtree roots, and have at least two elements.
• LIP contains individual coefficients that have magnitude smaller than the threshold.
• LSP points found to have magnitude larger than the threshold (are significant).
• O(ci) in the tree structures, the set of offspring (direct descendants) of a tree node
defined by point location (i).
• D(ci) set of descendants of node defined by point location (i).
• L(ci) set defined by L(ci) = D(ci)−O(ci).
• Type A entry in LIS: the entry i represents D(ci).
• Type B entry in LIS: the entry i represents L(ci).
and explanations:
1. The largest coefficient magnitude is 59, so the threshold is 32. The LSP set is empty,
the initial LIP are coefficients {0, 1, 2, 3} and initial LIS are coefficients {2, 3}.
2. Sorting pass in LIP : SPIHT begins to code the significance of individual coefficients
in LIP. c0 is significant: a one is sent followed by a positive sign bit, and c0 is
moved to the LSP. c1 is significant; a one is sent followed by a negative sign bit, and
c1 is moved to the LSP. (1+ represents positive significant, 1− represents negative
significant). c2 and c3 are both insignificant, so a zero is sent for each.
3. Sorting pass in LIS : After finishing the LIP, SPIHT begins to test the LIS (active
entry indicated by bold letter). For type A entry, when an entry in LIS is significant,
a one is sent. Then its two offspring are checked like an entry in the LIP. If L(ci) is not
empty, that entry is moved to the end of the LIS and changed to type B. If is empty,
that entry is removed from the LIS. When an entry in the LIS is insignificant, a zero
is sent. In this case, the type A D(c2) is found significant, and split into offspring
c4, c5, and L(c2), which goes to the end of the LIS as type B. c4 and c5 are found
to be insignificant, they are moved to the LIP and two zeros are sent. D(c3) is
insignificant, so a zero is sent.
4. For a type B LIS entry, if it is significant, a one is sent, add its two offspring to the
LIS as type A, and remove that entry from LIS. If it is insignificant, a zero is sent.
In this case, L(c2) is significant, so a one is sent and the offspring of c2, c4 and c5
become roots of type A sets in the LIS, and L(c2) (2B) is removed from the LIS.
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D(c4) and D(c5) are then tested as above with the actions given in the table.
5. Refinement pass: After the sorting pass. SPIHT begins the refinement pass. Each
old entry of LSP (the coefficients which became significant under the last threshold) is
checked. Send a one if it is significant under this threshold and reduce its magnitude
by the current threshold. Since this is the first refinement pass, there are no old LSP
entries. These new entries of LSP, c0, c1, and c8, are reduced in magnitude by the
current threshold of 32, so that their values become c0(27), c1(16), and c8(11).
6. Sorting Pass in LIP : Check the significance for LIP entries under threshold 16. c2
and c3 are significant and moved to the LSP, while c4, c5 and c9 remain insignificant.
7. Reduce the threshold to 16.
8. Sorting pass in LIS : Check the significance for LIS entries under threshold 16.
9. Refinement pass: check old LSP members c0, c1 and c8, send their significance
information, reduce the magnitude of significant old LSP entries and all new entries
in LSP. Their values become c0(11), c1(0), c8(11), c2(9), c3(5), and c16(6).
10. Reduce the threshold to 8 and repeat sorting pass and refinement pass until the bit
budget or quality requirement is reached.
In the decoder side, the same process is executed. The only difference is that the
significance decisions found in the encoder — by comparing the coefficients to a threshold
— are input to the decoder. The lists are initialized identically and formed in the decoder
exactly as in the encoder. In the refinement pass, the threshold is added to the significant
coefficients, instead of subtracted. The addition or subtraction of threshold is equivalent
to adding or removing a bit in a bit plane representation of the coefficient’s magnitude.
2.2.3 JPEG2000 overview
JPEG2000 is an image compression standard that uses the state of the art wavelet tech-
nology. It was created in 2000 by members of the Joint Picture Experts Group with the
intention to solve most of the limitations of the original JPEG standard (created in 1992)
based on the discrete cosine transform. The JPEG2000 algorithm provides an efficient
representation and interchange of digital images with different characteristics (scientific,
medical, rendered graphics, etc.), allowing different imaging models, e.g. client/server,
real-time transmission, image library archival, limited buffer and bandwidth resources.
JPEG2000 also provides low bit-rate operation with rate-distortion and improves the sub-
jective image quality performance of the previous standard, JPEG. Although this standard
is still not as widely used for natural images as its forerunner, it is widespread in medi-
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cal imaging and included in the DICOM standard. According to the mean opinion score
(MOS) of medical experts [251], this codec maintains good clinical quality at compres-
sion ratios up to 8-16 for magnetic resonance, ultrasound and X-ray images. Compared
to JPEG, it presents a better image distortion-rate tradeoff and for an equal objective
distortion (e.g. PSNR = 35 dB), it obtains a higher MOS.
JPEG2000 features
JPEG2000 has many features, which were not available in most of the previous image
coding standards. They include:
• Excellent coding performance. It features superior rate-distortion and subjective
image quality performance especially at low bit rates. This is useful in applications
whereby file size or transmission time is critical.
• Lossless and lossy compression. It is capable of lossless compression, which is im-
portant to some medical imagery and image archival applications.
• ROI coding. It allows certain areas of an image to be encoded at higher fidelity.
More information on this feature can be found in [252].
• Spatial and Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) scalability. It allows progressive recovery of
images by resolution or quality.
• Good error resilience. It has added bitstream robustness to the presence of bit errors.
In addition, its flexible file formats JP2 and JPX allow the handling of color-space
information, metadata, and interactivity in networked applications as developed in
the JPEG Part 9 JPEG 2000 Interactive Protocol (JPIP) protocol.
JPEG 2000 encoder and decoder structure
As depicted in Figure 2.9a, the core structure of the JPEG2000 encoder follows a typical
sequence of operations used in a transform coding scheme, which consists of transforma-
tion, quantization and entropy coding. The JPEG2000 encoder works as follows. First,
the original image with unsigned data is DC-level shifted. Then, the component transfor-
mation can be carried out if the original image has multiple components. This procedure
provides decorrelation among image components and hence improves compression effi-
ciency. There are two component transforms available: one is reversible and may be used
for lossy or lossless coding, while the other is irreversible and may only be used for lossy
coding. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the image components can be
partitioned into tiles, which are rectangular non-overlapping blocks, and thus creating tile
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components that can be compressed independently of each other.
(a) JPEG2000 encoder
(b) JPEG2000 decoder
Figure 2.9: Processes of the JPEG2000 encoder and decoder.
Wavelet transform [253] (Section 2.2.1) may be performed on the tile components. In
the lossy case, an irreversible Daubechies 9-tap/7-tap filter is employed, whereas in a
lossless case, a reversible 5-tap/3-tap filter is used. The wavelet transform decomposes the
tile-components into different decomposition levels, each of which contains a number of
subbands filled with transform coefficients. Before entering into the entropy coding phase,
the quantization process is carried out to reduce the precision of the transform coefficients.
Note that for the lossless case, the quantizer is set to one, i.e. no loss in precision.
The remaining encoding process is grouped into two tiers. In the tier-1 encoder, the
quantized transform coefficients associated with each subband are arranged into rectangu-
lar blocks called code-blocks. Then, a bit-plane coding technique with three coding passes
is applied to each code-block, and the symbols that it produces are coded using an adaptive
binary arithmetic coder. In the tier-2 encoder, the inclusion and the order of appearance
of bit-plane coding passes along with the actual coding pass data are assembled together
to form the final compressed data. Finally, as regards to the JPEG 2000 decoder, its core
structure is illustrated in Figure 2.9b. It basically reverses the processes of the encoder.
2.2.4 Related publications on signal-based protection
This section extends the content of Section 1.3.2, which explains the fundamentals and
types of steganography and watermarking and discusses its potential security applications
and current shortcomings in the m-Health context.
Regarding embedding techniques, a categorization according to the embedding method
is established in Section 1.3.2. The approaches working in the temporal or spatial domain
may replace certain least significant bits of the signal [158, 159], change magnitude levels,
modify the difference between adjacent samples [254, 240], perform quantization index
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modulation [255], multiple base notational or embedding based on prediction. The meth-
ods operating in transform domains choose mainly the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
[256] and the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [257], while the proposals working in
compressed domains usually choose JPEG [160, 258] and SPIHT [259] bitstreams. As
regards to alternative embedding methods, the approaches working with histograms that
are focused in reversible transformations [161, 260] have good presence in m-Health, while
examples of spread-spectrum techniques [261] and model-based methods [262] are infre-
quent.
With respect to medical image watermarking techniques (MIW), they may be classified
as non-reversible — producing a permanent distortion on the image —, operating mainly
in the RONI — to minimize image distortion —, reversible techniques — which can
recover the original image after removing the watermarks —, and zero watermarking —
constructing watermarks based on the main features of the images in order to avoid the
embedding step which causes image distortion. The following paragraphs summarize and
classify different efforts — intended for enhancing the security of biomedical images or
that could be adapted to this purpose — in the four categories.
The non-reversible MIW techniques can perform the watermark embedding in differ-
ent domains. The simplest approaches work in the spatial domain, mainly performing the
replacement of least significant bits (LSB) in pixels [227, 171, 241] to embed fragile water-
marks, although there are also proposals to host robust watermarks by using more signifi-
cant bits [263, 264, 265]. Moreover, the transformation of the image prior to watermarking
can yield interesting properties. For instance, the use of regions of different amounts of
energy in transform domains allows the embedding of multiple (robust, semifragile and
fragile) watermarks in the same image [266, 267, 268]. There are watermarking-based
methods using the discrete cosine transform (DCT) [269, 160, 270] — thus, which are
compliant or could be adapted to the JPEG codec —, using discrete wavelet transforms
(DWT) [271, 272, 267, 268, 273, 274, 275, 276] — thus, which are compliant or could
be adapted to the JPEG2000 codec —, and others, such as the discrete wavelet packet
transform [277] or wave-atoms [278]. Furthermore, the robustness against geometrical
transformations, such as rotation-scaling-translation (RST), is also addressed — to dif-
ferent extents — by certain watermarking techniques — see a survey in [279]. There is a
good variety of methods to achieve this enhanced robustness, such as with the use of the
Fourier-Mellin transform [280], with log-polar coordinates [281], with the Radon transform
[282, 283], with the S-Radon transform [284] (which is invariant to shearing), with Zernike
moments [285, 286], with singular value decomposition (SVD) [287, 288], and with joint
approaches such as DCT-SVD [289], DWT-SVD [290, 291], Zernike-SVD [292], or even
DCT-DWT-SVD [293, 294]. Alternatively, the compressed domain can also be used for
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watermarking, usually exploiting the theory from compressed/compressive sensing [295].
There are examples with SPIHT [108], JPEG [296], JPEG2000 [297], and even encrypted
JPEG2000 images [298]. It is also worth noting that although the choice of the embedding
domain is very relevant in watermarking, the procedure to target the most appropriate pix-
els/coefficients — and inside them, the most adequate bits for watermarking — is also an
important factor to balance the tradeoff between robustness and imperceptibility. Certain
works focus on the optimization of this procedure, e.g. by means of fast neural networks
[299], particle swarm optimization [274], differential evolution [300], or by learning from
the coefficient relations established by compression algorithms like SPIHT [301].
The MIW techniques that distinguish the ROI and RONI of the image prior to wa-
termarking are intended to minimize the interference of the watermarks with the clinical
content of the image. Regarding the embedding domain, any of the listed above (DWT,
DCT, SVD, joint approaches, etc.) would be suitable, since these techniques only require
specifically to perform the corresponding spatial separation between ROI and RONI —
before or after the domain transformation. A common practice is embedding robust wa-
termarks in the RONI area surrounding the ROI [172, 302, 303, 177, 244, 245] to try to
avoid its deletion if the image is clipped. Nevertheless, some works propose embedding
in random locations [176, 304, 305] to increase the capacity. As regards to embedding —
total or partially — in the ROI, this practice is only allowed for fragile watermarks —
e.g. for integrity control —, since the distortion caused is minimal.
The MIW reversible techniques — see a recent survey in [306] — were first introduced
in [174], and since then a variety of methods have been developed. Difference expansion,
an integer wavelet transform with high redundancy, was proposed early on in [307], obtain-
ing low-distortion and high-capacity. This scheme has been adapted for several uses, such
as the embedding of patient data in the ROI of DICOM images [177] — for enhanced
robustness to image clipping without image distortion. Histogram operations, such as
circular interpretation of bijective transformations [308], are also an effective manner to
implement reversible watermarking with notable endurance to lossy compression. The
addition of a virtual border where patient data is inserted in the LSB, at the cost of
increasing the image size, has also been proposed [309]. The use of an estimator signal to
determine which pixel blocks can embed information was proposed in [310], further used
to embed a digest of the knowledge associated to the image [311], and refined in [178] by
introducing a random location signal for security and implementing tamper detection and
location. Furthermore, this work was extended to volumetric images in [242]. Similarly,
[312] depicts an effective tamper location watermarking based on partitioning an authen-
tication area into small regions in a hierarchical manner, and [243] proposes the reversible
embedding of R-S-vectors and patientID to provide authentication and confidentiality.
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Zero-watermarking techniques were first proposed in [313], and since then a few works
that adapt the research from non-reversible MIW have been proposed —see a recent re-
view in [175]. As examples of these adaptations, there are approaches working in the
space domain [314, 315, 316], in transform domains [313, 317, 318, 319, 320], with im-
age moments resistant to certain geometrical transformations [321], with decompositions
of the image (e.g. SVD) [322], with principle components [323], and hybrid approaches
[324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329]. Regarding techniques in the space domain, some of them
propose using most significant pixel bits [314], while others prefer high order cumulants
[315] or scale invariant features [316]. With respect to transform domains, it has been
proposed associating watermarks to selected high magnitude coefficients from the DCT
domain [313, 317], to the low frequency coefficients from the DFT [318] and DWT domains
[319], and using the 3D-DCT [320] to work with biomedical volume images. Finally, the
are several hybrid approaches, such as combining the use of DCT and DWT [324], DWT
and SVD [325], the phase feature from low to middle bands in DFT domain and two
generalized Radon transformations [326] —to identify the rotation and scaling parameters
of geometrical image transformations— , Contourlet transform and SVD [327] —for un-
ambiguous authentication of medical images—, log-polar mapping and DWT [328], and
log-polar mapping, SIFT and DWT [329].
2.3 Overview of transport technologies in the m-Health ar-
chitecture
M-Health architectures require that their transport technologies have support for both
“reliable” (i.e. confirmed) and “best-effort” (i.e. unconfirmed) bidirectional transport
services. Those transport profiles containing only unidirectional transport services or
only best-effort transport services are not eligible to be used in standards like X73PHD
(Section 2.1.2). In addition, some specific features are required to be present in the
selected transport technology. If they are not, it is possible to build a convergence layer
(also referred to as “shim” layer) to meet the required characteristics.
Some transport technologies already count with a specialization to handle healthcare
data. Such technologies are: Universal Serial Bus Personal Healthcare Device Class (USB-
PHDC [330]), Zigbee Health Care Profile (ZHCP [331]) and Bluetooth Health Device
Profile Multi-Channel Adaptation Protocol (BT HDP/MCAP [332]). Besides, there are
currently ongoing efforts to develop X73PHD-compliant devices with Bluetooth Low En-
ergy (BLE [333]) as transport technology. Additionally, some other transport technologies
— namely, Near Field Communication (NFC [334]), Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) Direct [335]
or Certified Wireless Universal Serial Bus (WUSB [336]) — could theoretically be used
62 2.3. Overview of transport technologies in the m-Health architecture
and therefore are considered in this Thesis as well. A complete review of them, including
features such as coverage, topology, frequency band or data rate can be found in [337].
Table 2.4: Security features of transport technologies eligible for m-Health architectures
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Secure Simple Pairing:
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128-bit AES CCM Mode Device address change
on a frequent basis,
packet counter
NFC - - - Physical security
(10 cm from devices)
WiFi Direct WiFi Protected Setup
(WPS)
with PIN, PBC,
NFC or USB
WPA2
= 128-bit
AES
CCMP Mode
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derived—
Packet counter, access
control with layer
management
Certified
Wireless
USB
Out-of-band first
association: numeric or
cable + Diffie Hellman
128-AES CCM Support for one-time
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The security features of these transport technologies are summarized in Table 2.4. From
this review, it can be observed that USB-PHDC and NFC are particular cases, since their
security relies only on the difficulty to access the physical medium (the cable connecting
the two devices or a radius of 10 cm around them) and on the foreseeable security on the
application layer. In the rest of the cases, the device pairing or joining (when there is
a network architecture) is carried out by a user or by an authority (e.g. a trust center),
usually by means of out-of-band method [338, 339], such as pushing a button (PBC), intro-
ducing a PIN/passkey in one or in both devices, or enabling NFC and approaching them.
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Furthermore, there is some derivation or negotiation of the session key(s) for encryption,
e.g. using the protocol Diffie-Hellman (DH) [340] or the more advanced Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH [341]). In the case of network topologies, there may be different
session keys so that each device can either communicate only with another one (e.g. link
keys in ZHCP) or broadcast frames/packets to all of them (e.g. network key in ZHCP).
The encryption with the session key(s) provides privacy, and it is performed with 128-bit
Advanced Encryption Standard [342] (AES) in CBC mode [343], to avoid the dictionary
attack. Except in BT HDP/MCAP, which uses a stream cipher based on Linear Feedback
Shift Registers (LFSR [344]). The ciphers use Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
to authenticate the packets/frames and counters (CCM/CCM*/CCMP [345] operation
modes) to prevent replay attacks. Only BT HDP/MCAP uses a different approach, a
SAFER+ [346] based authentication. Finally, some technologies enable additional secu-
rity features, such as device address change to difficult tracking (BLE), access control in
conjunction with layer management (WiFi Direct), or support for one-time association
and easy revocation (WUSB).
2.4 Legal regulations
The security requirements of personal health information (PHI) are usually defined by
strict ethics and legislative rules to which concerned entities must adhere. There are several
guidelines and standards for protecting PHI. In the first place, it is worth highlighting the
ISO 27799 [347], a basic international standard which specifies a set of detailed controls
for managing health information security and provides health information security best
practice guidelines. By implementing this international standard, healthcare organizations
and other custodians of health information will be able to guarantee a minimum requisite
level of security that is appropriate to their organization’s circumstances and that will
maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of PHI. ISO 27799 relies
on the implementation of ISO/IEC 27002 [348], which depicts a code of practices for
the selection, implementation and management of controls taking into consideration the
organization’s information security risk environment(s).
In addition to this, some countries count with their own security and privacy policies.
It is worth highlighting two regulations from US, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [48] and the Code of Federal Regulations number 45 (CFR
45) [349], and two regulations from Europe, the European Directive 95/46/EC [350] and
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [50]. These four regulations are expres-
sions of such constraints. The HIPAA Privacy Rule regulates the use and distribution of
PHI to entities linked with the patient in order to facilitate treatment, payment or health
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care operations. It mandates disclosing only the minimum necessary information required
to achieve a certain purpose (primary or secondary authorized by the the patient) and
keeping track of disclosures of information and document privacy policies and procedures.
Complementarily, the purpose of the HIPAA Security Rule is to identify and adopt na-
tional standards — including requirements and addressable implementation specifications
— for safeguards to protect the CIA of electronic PHI. Regarding CFR 45 (part 164:
security and privacy), this regulation pursues guaranteeing the CIA of all electronic PHI
that a covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits. To
achieve this purposes, it requires protection against any reasonably anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity of PHI and against any reasonably anticipated uses
or disclosures of PHI that are not permitted. With respect to Directive 95/46/EC, it
regulates the processing of personal data — any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person — within the European Union. This regulation establishes
that the processing of PHI can only be done under conditions of transparency, specified
explicit and legitimate purposes and proportionality, i.e. data shall be adequate, relevant
and not excessive with respect to the purpose for which it is collected and/or further pro-
cessed. Finally, as regards to the GDPR —whose adoption is expected by 2017—, it has
been designed as the replacement for the obsolete Directive 95/46/EC. This regulation
takes into account the developments that shape the current technological panorama —
e.g. cloud computing, social networks. Some of the GDPR key points include the ex-
tension of privacy obligations to foreign companies processing data of EU residents, the
harmonization of data protection regulations throughout the EU, strict responsibility and
accountability duties, legal obligation to notify data breaches, right of the data subject to
request erasure and right to request a copy of his/her data in a format usable and ready
to be to transmitted to another processing system.
The legislative rules, as mentioned above, are based on strict ethics that give rights to
the users/patients and duties to the health professionals and technicians. The biomedical
standards (e.g. ISO/IEEE 11073, SCP-ECG, DICOM, etc.) and their associated technical
frameworks can play a crucial role in the development and implementation of security
and privacy protection features. Although certain aspects of these regulations cannot be
addressed by the biomedical standards (e.g. the administration of backups, the protection
and control of physical media, or the notification of data breaches), important aspects of
security and risk management in the context of information security can be implemented
by biomedical standards in order to enhance the compliance with these regulations. In
brief, the following security requirements can be demanded to the biomedical standards
and their surrounding frameworks:
• All concerned entities (e.g. PHDs, CDs, PACS in hospital or clinic, and consultants/
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specialists at distant places) shall have appropriate levels of security and privacy.
• CIA of all PHI have to be ensured during measurements/test acquisition session,
consultation process, and information transmission, processing, management, and
preservation.
• In all domains and scenarios, proper authorization process must be employed through
transmission and access controls.
On the other hand, the security concept derived from the regulations mentioned above
can be established through different stages. The major stages make a cycle including: (1)
initial threat analysis/risk assessment of the scenario — Section 2.5, (2) determination of
appropriate level(s) of security — Section 2.6, (3) establishment of the security policy —
Sections 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7, (4) final threat analysis/risk assessment — Sections
3.2.1, 3.4.1, 4.4.1 and 4.7.8 — and (5) discovery or publication of new threats, which
implies going back to (1).
The initial risk assessment helps to determine the expected threats from the entities
involved in the m-Health context (e.g. PHDs, CDs, etc.). The determination of the ap-
propriate level(s) of security shall include all entities involved in the m-Health context and
may depend on the type of m-Health domain or application. The establishment of the
security policy deals with either reducing the probability of occurrence of the threats or
reducing the damage if an adverse event is unavoidable. This includes the selection of suit-
able measures that reduce the risks to a tolerant level. Some examples of such measures are
the protection of configurations, communications, stored data and tests; the identification
and authentication of users and devices; the implementation of access controls, audit trails
audit and accountability systems; etc. As regards to the final risk assessment, it includes
the evaluation of the selected security measures, examining the cost-effect relationship —
Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.4.2, 4.2 and 4.6 — as well as analyzing any further risk or limitation
— see Sections 3.2.4, 3.4.3, 4.4.2 and 4.7.9. The security enhancement cycle ends when
certain new threats appear, such as the discovery of vulnerabilities affecting implemented
security algorithms or the inclusion of new, non-secure entities or protocols in m-Health
frameworks, which indicates the beginning of the next cycle.
2.5 Risk assessment of the m-Health architecture
A typical m-Health architecture, as the illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 2.11-A, involves
several entities that need to cooperate in order to acquire and transmit the biomedical
measurements (signals and/or tests) of the user. Although the transport technologies used
to communicate between PHDs and CDs may implement security (Section 2.3), there is
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uncertainty about the actual identities of the entities involved (e.g. users, PHDs, CDs,
medical systems, etc.). This extends to a lack of reliability about the provenance and
integrity of commands and data transmitted along this framework. Various threats may
cause loss, corruption or theft of the measurements, thus endangering the health and the
privacy of the user. To address these issues, the hot spots in m-Health architectures shall
first be analyzed. The following potential risks have been compiled from three reference
publications on the matter; [351] covers the topic of security in e-governance, [352] specif-
ically deals with the e-Health scenario and [353] with the transmission chain of a medical
health monitoring system (the m-Health scenario).
• Users: If the PHD does not support personal ID attributes (e.g. personID in
X73PHD agents), it is hard or impossible to differentiate the measurements of dif-
ferent users. When these attributes are supported, simple methods to distinguish
users (e.g. a push button, a keyboard) do not authenticate them. Even if some user
authentication method is implemented, an attacker may try to impersonate users by
using open sessions or stolen credentials — e.g. shoulder surfing users’ passwords,
stealing the user access token, faking the biometric recognition of the victim. If
the purpose is causing denial-of-service (DoS), introducing wrong passwords several
times might be enough. Finally, those measurements of the user acquired outside
the hospital and not digitally signed may later be repudiated by medical entities.
• Personal health devices: A counterfeit/hacked PHD may forward the gathered mea-
surements and/or the user identity credentials to an unauthorized device. Besides, if
the PHD stores the measurements provisionally (e.g. in the case that the connection
with the concentrator device is temporarily unavailable), an attacker may attempt
to establish a local access to retrieve them — from the disk, from cache or from the
RAM memory. A third possible misconduct, which may affect the user follow-up,
is to reprogram the PHD to deliver fake measurements when using it. Finally, in
setups with several PHDs and CDs (e.g. hospitals), a PHD may wrongly send the
measurements of a user to a CD that was not intended to receive them.
• Personal health devices — concentrator devices communication: This is especially
sensitive in the case of wireless technologies because of the easy access to the physical
medium, which brings several opportunities to attackers. First, they may attempt
to inject their own commands in the PHD-CD communication and eavesdrop the
exchanged frames to obtain measurements. If the communication relies on a secure
transport technology, frames are encrypted and authenticated. Cracking the keys
used for encryption, authentication or signature usually requires a very significant
effort, but less so when the keys are too short, used over long periods of time or for
several purposes at the same time (e.g. encryption and signature). In the absence
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of counters or timestamps, attackers may perform replay attacks to inject encrypted
frames that have been eavesdropped and it is known that correspond to certain com-
mands. Another possibility is to perform a man-in-the-middle attack: the attacker
associates with the PHD and CD, even negotiating encryption with each one, to
inject commands and obtain measurements without restrictions. On the other hand,
injection of noise can be used to disturb the communications and cause DoS.
• Concentrator devices: A counterfeit/illegitimate CD may attempt to associate to one
or several PHDs to obtain both measurements that they store and measurements
that they will acquire in future sessions. Besides, a rightful CD temporarily storing
measurements may also be a target of hacking attacks (e.g. code injection) to corrupt
those data, or to steal the data via local access — from the disk, from cache or from
the RAM memory. Finally, it must be guaranteed that the access to the acquired
measurements is limited to authorized users (e.g. the physicians that supervise a
patient) and systems.
• Concentrator devices — health system communication: Typically by means of the
Internet or mobile networks (e.g. 4G). Information transmitted at this point is very
sensitive because it may include data from different PHDs. The main threats at this
point are the impersonation of a HS to retrieve measurements from rightful CDs;
the impersonation of CDs to deliver fake measurements to rightful HS; and the use
of weak encryption in rightful transmissions, which facilitates eavesdropping. Since
the information to be exchanged may be formatted according to different protocols
— e.g. HL7, CEN/ISO 13606 [83] —, specific protection measurements provided by
those protocols shall be considered. Otherwise, at least standard protection of the
communications — e.g. by means of TLS [207] (transport level) or IPsec [354] (IP
level) — shall be implemented.
• Health system and administrator. The reliability of the measurements received from
PHDs/CDs and their suitable delivery to the intended professionals (physicians,
researchers, etc.) are the main security issues faced by these entities. For the
former, the identification of the patient to whom the measurements belong (and of
the devices that acquired and forwarded them) and the verification of its integrity
are essential requirement. For the latter, the administration of a robust role-based
access control and the management of audit trails.
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2.6 Guidelines for the security enhancement of the m-Health
architecture
This section presents the guidelines proposed to enhance the security of m-Health archi-
tectures, in order to prevent the threats analyzed in Section 2.5, taking into account the
background introduced in Sections 2.1-2.4. The contents included in this section are rep-
resented in Figure 2.10, surrounded in red. Particularly, Section 2.6.1 proposes a global,
layered structure adapted to the features of different m-Health applications and Section
2.6.2 translates these layers into — already-existing and new — IHE profiles, some of
them involving user authentication elements. Section 2.6.3 specifies the cryptographic
recommendations for this proposal, Section 2.6.4 draws a way to integrate signal-based
protection — keytagging — in this structure and eventually Section 2.6.5 analyzes the
implications of this proposals for IHE and its profiles.
Figure 2.10: Building blocks for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health architecture. Contents
addressed in Chapter 2 surrounded in red.
2.6.1 Additive, layered structure
M-Health applications, often grouped in the domains of Health and Fitness, Independent
Living and Disease Management, require different levels of security and interoperability
with healthcare systems (Section 2.1.1). Furthermore, in a real-world market, users ex-
pect to have a choice ranging from cheap PHDs and CDs (intended only for basic home
monitoring) to increasingly more expensive devices (those which include more dynamic
and secure uses). An additive, layered approach is thus a reasonable and cost-effective
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manner of providing varying, enhanced security and interoperability levels for different
m-Health applications in a gradual manner. The following bottom-up layered structure
would provide a specific solution for the applications of the different domains —and its
associated PHD specializations, see for instance Section 2.1.2— within a general policy.
• Layers 0.x — intended for simple applications (e.g. basic monitoring) not requiring
integration with PHRs, EHRs, alert managers or CDSS —and thus with low security
demands.
– Layer 0 — to be used when taking health measurements in cabled setups.
– Layer 0.5 — to be used when taking health measurements in wireless setups.
• Layers 1.x — intended for applications which may require integration with PHR
systems and alert managers (typically belonging to the domains of Health, Fitness
and Independent Living) —and thus with medium-high security demands.
– Layer 1.0 — to be used when users own their personal devices/equipment.
– Layer 1.5 — to be used when users share the devices/equipment.
• Layers 2.x — intended for applications which may require integration with EHR
systems, alert managers or CDSS (typically belonging to the Disease Management
domain) —and thus with high-very high security demands.
– Layer 2.0 — oriented to patient emergency monitoring and in-hospital care.
– Layer 2.5 — intended for patient remote monitoring, follow-up and laboratory
tests.
It is worth noting that only the security measures and interoperability capabilities of
each layer have been fixed. The examples of assignation of specific m-Health domains to
the Layers, however, are illustrative. Any user would be able to buy a higher or lower
device, according to their needs or the requirements of the specific domain or scenario.
As depicted in Figure 2.11-A-B, the implementation of these layers would not conflict
with the already-existing interoperability between PHDs and CDs (e.g. driven by means
of X73PHD), since a CD would still be able to associate and operate with one or more
PHDs simultaneously. The only restriction added is that the layer established for an
application needs to be supported by the user, PHD(s) and CD involved in the test(s)
acquisition session. To give an example, if the user uses an identification method which
is valid up to Layer 2.0, the PHD is compliant up to Layer 1.5 and the CD is compliant
up to Layer 2.5, they can all work together using up to Layer 1.5 —therefore, this setup
would not be appropriate for Disease Management applications. It is also worth noting
that there would be five different ways of accessing the tests in the CD. In Layers 1.0+,
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the administrator —that is the user in Layer 1.0— would be able to access all the tests
any time and the automated online processes (e.g. warnings if some measurement are
abnormal) as they reach the CD —after validating and decrypting them. Besides, each user
would be able to directly access his/her stored tests whereas authorized professionals (e.g.
trainers, physicians) would be able to access the tests of certain users for professional use
(e.g. training monitoring, follow-up of a patient). Additionally, in Layers 2.0+ automated
offline processes (e.g. monthly analysis of measurements) would be able to access protected
tests stored in the CD after it associates with the PHD(s) that acquired them.
2.6.2 IHE profiles in each layer
A proposal for the implementation of the layers depicted in Section 2.6.1 by means of the
IHE profiles introduced in Section 2.1.1 is summarized in Table 2.5. The entities of the
m-Health framework that implement each of these profiles are illustrated in Figure 2.11
—they are connected by arrows labelled with the profile name. In the first place, it is
worth highlighting that there is a need for a new IHE profile, tightly bound to ISO/IEEE
11073-20601 and called Secure Device Observation (SDO), whose main aim is providing
appropriate levels of security in the PHD-CD association, configuration and operation to
enable the secure acquisition of user measurements/tests (DEC), alerts (ACM) and wave-
forms (WCM). The security countermeasures defined by SDO, intended to minimize the
risks analyzed in Section 2.5, may be divided into several components. There is a com-
ponent dedicated to challenge-based PHD-CD authentication, CBA, which enhances the
proposals in [221, 222, 224]. In addition, another component addresses the secure setting
and renewal of cryptographic elements, SRC, in order to hinder key stealing and/or crack-
ing. Furthermore, the SEC component implements secure communications (encrypted
and authenticated) and the UID component carries out user ID capture, so that this
is attached with the user’s measurements/tests to prevent their loss. Additionally, the
CMA component controls the measurements acquisition to prevents user impersonation
and acquisition of measurements/tests by unauthorized PHDs and/or CDs. Moreover,
the MV component verifies that the measurements/tests come from a rightful PHD. In
addition, the UDS component guarantees that the user’s DS is attached with the user’s
measurements/tests to prevent their repudiation by medical entities that did not acquired
them. Complementarily, the SST implements secure standard storage to hinder the steal-
ing of measurements or their corruption by means of local access. Finally, there is also an
optional component for strengthening the security of measurements/tests through signal-
based protection methods, SBP, which may be considered as a complement to the protec-
tion provided by cryptography and authenticators. An example of implementation of the
SBP component is depicted in detail in Section 2.6.4.
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Regarding already-defined IHE profiles, Layers 1.0+ implement RTM, CT, DEC, ACM
and WCM mandatorily since they are essential for supporting the communication of online
measurements —in a comprehensive format— and alarms sent from the CD to healthcare
systems (and/or to a PHR stored in the CD, based on HL7 PHMR). Layers 1.5+ also add
the use of RFID-T or BC (in the PHD) to capture the personID of the user whose measure-
ments are to be acquired, ATNA and XDS so that both online and offline measurements
(coordinated by DEC/WCM instead of by XDS in the former case) can be transferred
with security to healthcare systems. In addition to this, Layers 2.0+ implement three
profiles related with the medical context, PIX to enable patient cross-referencing (e.g. in
case a user has several identifiers), EUA to enable single sign-on authentication —using
a RFID-T or a SC— and BPPC to record and apply the consent of the patient to the
authorization policies. Finally, Layer 2.5+ includes the use of SC in the PHD, so that
these devices can attach digital signatures of the user to his/her measurements, preventing
their repudiation when they are acquired outside the hospital.
Table 2.5: IHE profiles to be created (blue) and implemented (light gray) for the enhance-
ment of security and interoperability in m-Health architectures
``````````````````LAYERS
IHE PROFILES
SDO: RTM CT
CBA SRC SEC UID CMA MV UDS SST SBP
LAYER 2.5 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Optional ! !
LAYER 2.0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Optional ! !
LAYER 1.5 ! ! ! ! ! ! Optional ! !
LAYER 1.0 ! ! ! ! Optional ! !
LAYER 0.5 !
LAYER 0.0
``````````````````LAYERS
IHE PROFILES
DEC: + RFID-T
or BC
+
SC
ACM WCM ATNA XDS EUA:
RFID-T
or SC
PIX BPPC
LAYER 2.5 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
LAYER 2.0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
LAYER 1.5 ! ! ! ! ! !
LAYER 1.0 ! ! !
LAYER 0.5
LAYER 0.0
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Figure 2.11: Layer-based proposal for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health architecture.
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2.6.3 Suggested algorithms for the SDO Profile
Various alternatives are available for performing the cryptographic functions required by
the newly proposed IHE profile, Secure Device Observation. Those showing the best
balance between security, complexity, overhead and free availability of the algorithm will
be recommended. To assess security, the recommendations of the NIST are followed,
regarding key lengths for long term use (> year 2030), summarized in Table 2.6, and
crypto periods (time span during which a key is authorized for use), summarized in Table
2.7. In addition to this, priority of choice is given to algorithms not usually implemented by
the transport technologies. This practice, implementing the same cryptographic functions
at different levels with different algorithms, reduces the impact of attacks based on the
vulnerability of some specific algorithm. The time complexity of the candidate algorithms,
shown in Table 2.8, is estimated in cycles per operation (e.g. digital signature) or cycles
per byte (e.g. in encryption), which is directly related with energy consumption and
with delays, two major issues in BAN/PAN architectures [91]. With respect to space
complexity, it is estimated by means of the overheads introduced, regarded as a fixed
amount of bytes when calculating security items (challenge, hash, HMAC, DS or FP)
and an estimation (half block length) when performing encryption, since the latter case
is due to the addition of padding bytes to fit the cipher block length. It is worth noting
that the overhead introduced by the algorithms will also have an impact on the energy
consumption and delays of the architecture that implements them (due to the transmission
of extra bytes) and hence on the demand of more powerful processors to enable real-
time transmission. Finally, it is checked whether the algorithm is standard, under any
restricting license, and if there are reliable free implementations available. This proposal
includes the following:
• Symmetric encryption: Twofish [356], which is a suitable supplement to the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES [22]), usually implemented by secure transport
technologies. This algorithm, designed by Bruce Schneier, was in fact one of the five
finalists to become the AES [357], together with MARS, RC6 [358], Rijndael (chosen)
and Serpent [359]. It can be considered very secure (third most voted after Rjindael
and Serpent) and pretty fast (29.4 cycles/B), although slower than AES (12.6 cy-
cles/B) and RC6 (17.3 cycles/B). Its mode is set to CTR (which is non-authenticated
encryption), since it hinders cryptanalysis and does not require a previous padding
of the plain text to the block size of the cipher. Regarding overheads, the three
produce the same since their block size and key length are equally set to 128 bits.
The main advantage of Twofish over RC6 is that the former has not been patented
and has a reference implementation in the public domain. Symmetric master keys
(MK) will be renewed every year. Symmetric keys for encrypting frames, S, will be
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renewed every session and symmetric keys for encrypting stored data have a single
use. If Twofish were to be compromised in the future, the order of preference for
replacement would be Serpent, RC6, MARS and AES.
• Asymmetric encryption: RSA (≥ 2048) [360] is the algorithm recommended for the
exchange of master secrets, which supplements DH/ECDH [341], implemented by
most secure transport technologies. RSA and elGamal [361] are the alternatives,
but the former is preferred for being standard and less similar to DH. Nonetheless,
RSA2048 introduces more overheads than ECDH (block length 2048 bits vs 256)
and performs more slowly (11.41 Mcycles vs 5.17). Asymmetric encryption keys will
be renewed every 1-2 years. If RSA were to be compromised in the future, elGamal
would be recommended as a replacement.
• Challenges generation: The standardized SHA-512 [362], which produces longer chal-
lenges (512 bits) than other hash functions and ciphers, and thus reduces the possi-
bilities of repetitions. In addition, it does not imply extra overheads since challenges
are protected with RSA2048, resulting in 2048 bits regardless of the fact that the
initial length is less. Another advantage is its performance (17.7 cycles/B), very close
to the fastest cipher (RC6, 17.3 cycles/B). To obtain a challenge, a secret seed stored
in the device is concatenated with the current time (at its maximum resolution) and
hashed. If SHA-512 were to be compromised in the future, Whirlpool [363] would
be recommended as a replacement.
Table 2.6: Cryptographic key length recommendations by NIST [355]
Date Minimum of Symmetric Factoring Discrete logarithm Elliptic Hash(A)1 Hash(B)2
strength algorithms modulus Key Group curve
2010
(Legacy)
80 2TDEA 1024 160 1024 160 SHA-1
to SHA-512
SHA-1
to SHA-512
2011-
2030
112 3TDEA 2048 224 2048 224 SHA-224
to SHA-512
SHA-1
to SHA-512
>2030 128 AES-128 3072 256 3072 256 SHA-256
to SHA-512
SHA-1
to SHA-512
>>2030 192 AES-192 7680 384 7680 384 SHA-384
SHA-512
SHA-224
to SHA-512
>>>2030 256 AES-256 15360 512 15360 512 SHA-512 SHA-256
to SHA-512
1 Hash(A): Digital signatures and hash-only applications.
2 Hash(B): HMAC, key derivation functions and random number generation.
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Table 2.7: Cryptoperiods recommended by NIST for different types of key uses [355]
Key type Cryptoperiod
Originator usage Recipient
period (OUP) usage period
Private signature key 1-3 years
Public signature key Several years (depends on key size)
Symmetric authentication key ≤ 2 years ≤ OUP + 3 years
Private and public authentication keys 1-2 years
Symmetric data encryption and key wrapping keys ≤ 2 years ≤ OUP + 3 years
Symmetric and asymmetric RNG keys Upon reseeding
Symmetric master key About 1 year
Private key transport key ≤ 2 years
Public key transport key 1-2 years
Symmetric key agreement key 1-2 years
Private and public static key agreement keys 1-2 years
Private and public ephemeral key agreement keys One key agreement transaction
Symmetric, private and public authorization key ≤ 1-2 years
• Hashing: RIPEMD-256 [364], which performs faster (11.1 cycles/B) than other ref-
erence functions such as SHA-256 [362] (15.8 cycles/B) or Whirlpool (30.5 cycles/B).
RIPEMD-256 and SHA-256 introduce less overhead than Whirlpool [363] (512 bits),
while fulfilling the recommendation of the NIST (256 bits). Although Tiger operates
faster (8.1 cycles/B), its key length (192 bits) is not secure enough. Furthermore,
RIPEMD-256 will never be patented and reference implementations can be found in
the public domain. If RIPEMD-256 were to be compromised in the future, the order
of preference for replacement would be Whirlpool and SHA-256.
• HMAC with counter: The standardized Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 [365] is
sufficient to implement these codes, since they do not need to be as secure as regular
hashes. Part of the original content, a key SA, is unknown to the attacker, which
minimizes the odds of finding collisions. Among the SHA family of standards, SHA-1
is the fastest (11.9 cycles/B) and most compact (160 bits). The counter is a 2-byte
number, used to avoid a replay attack by re-sending frames gathered from the current
session. SA will be renewed every session.
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• Digital signature, fingerprints and certificates: The standardized Elliptic Curve Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm ≥224 (recommended 256) [366], which performs signature-
verification slightly faster (3.92-6.56 Mcycles) than the other two algorithms autho-
rized by the NIST, DSA [367] and RSA [360] with 2048-bit key length. DSA was
replaced by ECDSA because the latter operates with smaller numbers, and thus it
is hard to find implementations of DSA supporting 2048 bits. On the other hand,
RSA2048 has a similar overall performance (11.06-0.29 Mcycles), but ECDSA pro-
duces a much shorter signature (512 bits vs 2048) with a roughly similar security
level. Digital signature keys will be renewed every 1-3 years. If ECDSA were to be
compromised in the future, the order of preference for replacement would be DSA
≥ 2048 and RSA ≥ 2048.
Table 2.8: Performance of relevant cryptographic functions [368]
Algorithm MiB/s Cycles per byte µs to setup key and IV Cycles to setup key and IV
3DES/CTR 13 134.5 27.317 49989
AES/CTR 139 12.6 0.698 1277
Twofish/CTR 59 29.4 7.716 14121
Serpent/CTR 32 54.7 1.197 2191
RC6/CTR 101 17.3 2.802 5128
MARS/CTR 47 37.2 3.516 6435
Blowfish/CTR 58 30.0 62.683 114710
Whirlpool 57 30.5
Tiger 214 8.1
MD5 255 6.8
SHA-1 153 11.4
SHA-256 111 15.8
SHA-512 99 17.7
RIPEMD-128 153 11.4
RIPEMD-160 106 16.5
RIPEMD-256 158 11.1
HMAC(SHA-1) 147 11.9 0.509 932
Operation ms/Operation Mcycles/Operation
RSA 2048 encryption—decryption 0.16—6.08 0.20—11.12
RSA 2048 signature—verification 6.05—0.16 11.06—0.29
DH 2048 key-pair generation with precomputation 2.14 3.92
DH 2048 key agreement 3.84 7.03
ECDH over GF(p) 256 key-par generation with precomputation 2.19 4.01
ECDH over GF(p) 256 key agreement 2.82 5.17
ECDSA over GF(p) 256 signature—verification with precomputation 2.14—3.58 3.92—6.56
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2.6.4 Integration of signal-based protection within biomedical standards
This Section details an example of implementation of the Signal-Based Protection compo-
nent of the newly proposed Secure Device Observation profile (SDO:SBP). Particularly, it
is introduced a new file format based on DICOM that enables the efficient segmentation
of an echocardiogram frame into regions in order to, on the one hand, enhance storage
capacity and on the other, to enable a security-enhanced anonymization process. Basi-
cally, once the information to be anonymized is extracted, the process of anonymization
is carried out through a signal-based security technique, called keytagging (introduced in
Section 4.5), which meets essential requirements for the integration with DICOM: secu-
rity, transparency to the image, cost-efficiency and fully compliance with JPEG2000. The
following paragraphs explain this processes involved in detail.
Segmentation based on echocardiogram characteristics
On the whole, echocardiogram images have three different regions, as shown in Figure 2.12:
the ultrasound image (white solid line), auxiliary images (green dotted line) and text (yel-
low dashed line). The ultrasound image is the most important because it contains the
most relevant information for the diagnosis. The ultrasound is always present and only
appears once in each frame. The auxiliary images surround and complement the ultra-
sound region. These are, for example, the ECG, the color label, other ultrasound images
to supplement the information of the main ultrasound image and some symbols regarding
the configuration. The text is always present in all the images and contains information
such as patient data, date, time and configuration details of the acquisition session or
measurements derived from the study, as shown in Figure 2.12. It is worth highlighting
that certain text regions can contain very relevant information for the diagnosis.
An ultrasound study can be composed of one or several frames. The studies with
multiframes, acting as a video sequence, show a temporal evolution — e.g. the B mode
of echocardiograms represent the heart movement. The typical number of frames that
needs to be stored for accurate diagnosis is 16, but there may be as many as 64 frames, as
commented in the introduction. For multiframe studies, it is worth noting that the only
region that change over time is the ultrasound region, the rest remain invariant. For each
echocardiogram acquisition device, the distribution and the size of the regions, the number
of auxiliary regions and the text engraved are different. Another difference is that some
image regions contain color information that is relevant for the diagnosis while others not
— e.g. the Doppler modes include relevant information in color in the ultrasound image
and in the color scale.
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Figure 2.12: Echocardiogram regions of the color Doppler mode. The white solid line
contains the US, the green dotted the auxiliary images, and the yellow dashed the text.
New Storage Format based on DICOM
Basically, a DICOM file contains a header and the image. It is proposed creating a new
image format, to be included in the DICOM standard, which takes advantage of the
segmentation capabilities already incorporated in acquisition devices — and also available
in certain postprocessing software. The final file, which the device shall provide, is a
DICOM file (Section 2.1.4) and consequently has two parts: the DICOM header and the
image coded according to the the proposed image format. These parts are described below.
• DICOM header: The header composition for each image type is listed in Part 3
of the DICOM standard. The header fields included in a file depend on the image
type and on the acquisition device. Nevertheless, it always stores certain mandatory
data, such as the width, height, bit depth, color type and image format. The format
of the image part is defined by means of the “Transfer Syntax Unique Identifier”
header field, included in Part 5 of the DICOM standard. The header also contains
information about the patient, such as the patient’s name, and other information
regarding the echocardiogram test, such as the type of scan, position, acquisition
device and number of frames. An important field of the DICOM header, included
in the ultrasound image, is the calibration of the regions. It defines regions on the
ultrasound image with different calibrations and the calibration parameters, which is
of use to perform measurements in the ultrasound regions. To this regard, no changes
are needed in the DICOM header in order to integrate the proposed image format
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in the DICOM standard. It is only necessary to define a “Transfer Syntax Unique
Identifier” for the proposed format, to permit its specification and implementation
in DICOM files.
• Proposed image format: DICOM can use either lossless or lossy compression, and the
codecs supported are specified in Part 5 of the standard. Among them, JPEG2000
has been selected for this format given its efficiency and compatibility with the
image-based security technique chosen (Section 4.5). It has been designed an image
compression format that separates the image into regions. First, the acquisition de-
vice provides the regions and their types: ultrasound, auxiliary or text, as shown in
Figure 2.12. Then, the acquisition device generates the image format, which consists
of two parts: an Extensible Markup Language (XML) file, where the information
related to the regions configuration is included, and the coded regions. The XML
format is proposed because it is extremely portable and similar to the DICOM head-
ers system. This file shall encode the text efficiently but without losing quality, since
it can contain relevant information for the diagnosis. With respect to the indepen-
dent storage of echocardiogram regions, it facilitates the addition of information for
the diagnosis and the removal (or edition) of the least relevant regions for enhanced
compactness.
XML File: Figure 2.13 shows a common XML implementing this file format. The
XML file contains the following information, including the corresponding XML fields
between brackets:
– The size of the whole image (tsize: w, h), as a copy of the corresponding fields
contained in the DICOM header.
– The regions configuration (region), one per region present in the image. The
types are: ultra-sound or ROI (roi), auxiliary image (img) and text (text).
– The position of the regions (pos). The initial position (x0, y0) has to be defined
for all types of region and also the final position (x1, y1), except for the text
region since its size is adjusted to the space available. All the regions have a
rectangular shape.
– The image codec (cod) may be indicated for the ultrasound and image regions,
the default codec is JPEG2000.
– The sizes of the ultrasound (size) and image (L) regions, in bytes.
– In the case of having several frames, the ultrasound is the only region that
changes in every frame, so only one region (roi) has to be indicated in the XML
file. The number of frames is indicated in the ultrasound region (frames). The
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field size (size) of every ultrasound frame can be added in the case that the size
changes for each one, otherwise it only needs to appear once.
– The text regions (text) include their contents in the XML file. The acquisition
device shall provides the XML file, as it already does with similar headers in
the DICOM file — e.g. the file size or the calibration regions.
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
<!DOCTYPE configuration SYSTEM ”roistorageformat.dtd”>
<format>
<tsize w=”512” h=”256”/>
<region>
<pos x0=”44” y0=”75” x1=”564” y1=”597”></pos>
<roi><size>33893</size></roi>
</region>
<region>
<pos x0=”0” y0=”0”></pos>
<text>PATIENT?S DATA</text>
</region>
<region>
<pos x0=”77” y0=”574” x1=”615” y1=”573”></pos>
<img L=”149”></img>
</region>
</format>
Figure 2.13: Example of XML file to support the new image format.
Encoded regions: The second part corresponds to the encoded regions, except the
text, which is included in the XML file. The role of the XML respect to these
regions is to specify the order of the regions and the codec and compression quality
for each individual region, which can be adjusted according to criteria such as their
diagnostic relevance. This coding process would not add complexity if integrated in
DICOM-compliant acquisition devices.
Security mechanism
The new DICOM-based format, which stores the echocardiogram information in differ-
entiated regions, facilitates the implementation of image-based security techniques (e.g.
steganography, watermarking, keytagging). The following paragraphs describe how the
best fitting technique, keytagging, can enhance the levels of security of the echocardio-
gram. For the sake of clarity, a brief summary of the main principles of the keytagging
algorithm is provided below.
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Keytagging is a novel technique intended for the protection of medical image-based
tests, thus, including echocardiograms. Complete details about this technique can be
found in Section 4.5. Basically, it relies on the association of tags (any type of binary
content, T ) to stable, semistable or volatile features of the image, producing access keys
(called keytags, KT ) that depend on both the image and the tag content. Once the
keytagging of an image I is done, the keytags KT shall replace the original content of
the tags T associated to the I, being KT and I — the latter may have undergone some
modification(s) — necessary to retrieve T .
Going to the multiframe case, the first step is to select the frame(s) I and the content(s)
T to be associated by means of keytagsKT . Multiframe images can include up to 64 frames
and any of them can be selected for keytagging. Although a frame may be composed
by more than one image region, T shall be linked to the main image region, the ROI.
To perform the association of KT , the keytagging algorithm transforms the ROI into
grayscale, performs the Cohen-Daubechies-Feauveau (CDF) 9/7-tap wavelet transform
of the grayscale ROI, extracts stable, semistable and volatile features from the wavelet
coefficients — these features correspond to certain bits of relevant coefficients belonging
to selected wavelet subband — and efficiently encodes T based on these features. The use
of the CDF 9/7-tap wavelet transform, used by JPEG2000, guarantees high compliance of
keytagging with this DICOM-compliant compressor — which is extensible to the standard.
It is worth noting that, unlike other image-based security techniques (e.g. steganogra-
phy, traditional watermarking), keytagging can associate information to the most stable
features of the image without distorting it. As a consequence, this method preserves the
clinical content of the image without the need for assessment, prevents eavesdropping and
collusion attacks, and obtains a substantial capacity-robustness tradeoff with simple oper-
ations. Furthermore, another very relevant feature is that the strength of the link between
I and T through KT can be adjusted. If a T is linked to the image by means of a stable
KT , the content is retrievable even from heavily modified (and distorted) versions of I,
I˜. By contrast, semistable KT only retrieve the original contents of T if the image modi-
ficacion(s) are mild (e.g. if I˜ preserves its clinical content). Finally, volatile KT retrieve
highly distorted T˜ even if the modification(s) of I˜ are mild, since they are intended to
work only with the original I. Therefore, they have different applications in security —a
complete description can be found in Section 4.7.1. For instance, stable keytags may be
used to persistently associate relevant test IDs (e.g. the patient ID), semistable keytags
are useful for associating information that will not be (by any means) retrievable if the
image gets highly distorted (the test diagnosis) and volatile keytags to associate known
patterns in order to detect, and even locate, tampered image areas.
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Integration of the keytags in the DICOM header
The keytagging algorithm permits associating information of interest T to the echocar-
diogram I by means of keytags KT . Any frame in the multiframe video — regardless its
mode — is suitable to be I. So as to obtain a smooth integration in DICOM files, each
KT is placed in the DICOM header replacing the corresponding T field. For instance, if
T is the name of the patient and it is associated to frame 1 (I) by means of a semistable
KT , this KT replaces the actual patient’s name in the corresponding field (0010,0010)
of the DICOM header. Note that in order to identify which frame(s) and region(s) have
been used as I, these details are included along with the KT . This schema permits the
keytagging of frames/regions in an unambiguous way.
As regards to privacy, the DICOM fields may contain sensitive information. In this
case, DICOM mandates their storage in digital envelopes protected with CMS. Therefore,
all DICOM field(s) replaced with KT will be adequately protected with the cryptographic
means implemented by DICOM. Any KT shall be placed in protected envelopes, digitally
signed (with ECDSA ≥ 224, DSA ≥ 2048 or RSA ≥ 2048), and encrypted if T (and
thus KT ) is confidential, preferably using Twofish for the symmetric encryption and RSA
≥ 2048 for the asymmetric.
2.6.5 Implications for IHE and its profiles
The main implication is the suggestion of SDO (Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3), a new IHE
profile which would belong to the PCD domain and which would enable a standardized
and secure communication in the first segment of DEC (alone or combined with WCM) —
from the PCD to the Device Observation Reporter— and ACM (alone or combined with
WCM) profiles —from the Alarm Source to the Alarm Aggregator—, which are currently
not detailed. The hypothetical integration of SDO in IHE would imply the addition of
new advisories in ACM, related with security issues —e.g. invalid certificate, unautho-
rized user trying to take his/her measurements— and would open up the possibility of
recommending the use of the enhanced —SDO-compliant— version of ISO/IEEE 11073
in implementations of DEC, ACM and WCM.
“Hackers are breaking the systems for profit. Before, it
was about intellectual curiosity and pursuit of knowledge
and thrill, and now hacking is big business.”
Kevin Mitnick
“For good ideas and true innovation, you need human in-
teraction, conflict, argument, debate.”
Margaret Heffernan
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Enhancement of the security of standard protocols
for the exchange of biomedical information
This Chapter deals with the blocks of the proposal for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health
architecture that are surrounded in red in Figure 3.1. While Section 2.6 (blue block in
Figure 3.1) proposed a solution consisting of a flexible structure that provides features
tailored to the needs of different types of m-Health application — e.g. the identification of
users by means of authentication elements to enable the sharing of PHDs and/or CDs with
privacy, the cryptographic protection of the communications or the compliance with the
IHE profiles implemented by EHRs and CDSS —, Chapter 3 addresses the extension and
strengthening of weak biomedical standards according to it. Particularly, the two security
extensions described herein are applied to the widespread standards ISO/IEEE 11073
PHD (X73PHD, Section 2.1.2), which covers the communications between a variety of
PHDs and CDs, and to SCP-ECG (Section 2.1.3), which specifies conventions required for
the storage and interchange of ECG information between ECG devices and host systems.
The manner how the X73PHD models are extended and how X73PHD-compliant devices
(PHDs acting as agents and CDs acting as managers) implement the IHE profiles included
in the layered proposal is detailed in Section 3.1. In addition, Section 3.2 analyzes the
security of this extension and its associated costs: implications for X73PHD and impact on
the X73PHD-IHE architecture and on its surrounding framework. Similarly, Section 3.3
defines the extension for the security enhancement of SCP-ECG files, Section 3.4 assesses
the security of this extension and its associated costs and Section 3.5 presents a proof of
concept. Finally, the main conclusions from this research are drawn in Section 3.6.
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Table 3.1: Operators and notation of the extensions of X73PHD and SCP-ECG
Operators Meaning
[x,y] Concatenate strings x and y
x=y x takes the value of y
x==y Returns the result (true or false) of comparing x and y
x{y} Cipher or decipher string y using key x
f(x,y) Execute function f with parameters x and y
Notation Meaning
X Entity. It could refer to an agent (A), a manager (M), a user (U),
an administrator (Ad) or a manufacturer (Mf)
Ch1 Challenge used by a manager to authenticate an agent
Ch2 Challenge used by an agent to authenticate a manager
h(x) Hash of string x
MK Symmetric master key to derive symmetric session keys (S, SA)
S Symmetric session key for encryption of frames
SA Symmetric session key for authentication of frames
CEX Certificate for encryption of entity X
PrEX Private key for encryption of entity X
PbEX Public key for encryption of entity X
CSX Certificate for signature of entity X
PrSX Private signature key of entity X
PbSX Public signature verification key for entity X
Fi Frame in clear text to be exchanged between agent and manager after C&A function
HMAC(Fi,SA) Message authentication code of frame Fi using key SA
C&A(Fi,S,SA) = [S{Fi},
HMAC(S{Fi},SA)]
Frame i exchanged between an agent and a manager, using session key S
for encryption and session key SA for authentication
d Medical measurement(s)
D d concatenated with identification or authentication strings
DS(D,PrSX) Digital signature of frame D performed by entity X
ID(X) In case of devices, this is the EUI-64.
In case of users, this is the PersonID
FP(D,X) =
[ID(X),DS(D,PrSX)]
Fingerprint of frame D performed by entity X.
It includes the identity (ID) of X and its DS
StAi Symmetric key i for encryption of data to be stored in an agent
StMi Symmetric key i for encryption of data to be stored in a manager
RFID-T Radio Frequency Identification Token
BC Bar code
SC Smart Card
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Figure 3.1: Building blocks for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health architecture. Contents
addressed in Chapter 3 surrounded in red.
3.1 Enhancement of the security of ISO/IEEE 11073 Per-
sonal Health Devices
This section depicts in detail the extended X73PHD-IHE framework and also the role of the
entities involved in the implementation of the IHE profiles included in the global, layered-
based security scheme — see Section 2.6.2. The notation to interpret this proposal is
summarized in Table 3.1. Focusing first on the enhancement of the X73PHD architecture,
the series of steps proposed to carry out this task —by including compliance with the SDO,
DEC, ACM, WCM and RTM profiles— are defined in Tables 3.2-3.4, and related with
the layer(s) that implement it and with the corresponding IHE profile(s). Furthermore,
an example with the steps of the first connection between an agent and a manager in
Layer 2.5 is included in Figure 3.2. Complementarily, the Finite State Machine (FSM)
of the extended X73PHD is illustrated in Figure 3.3 and the new and modified frames
and attributes are specified in Tables 3.6-3.8. Regarding the peripheral processes that
integrate the X73PHD-IHE framework, the manufacturing and initial configuration of the
devices are addressed in Table 3.2, and the local consultation of measurements and the
forwarding to the appropriate healthcare systems — according to the illustration in Figure
2.11 — are guaranteed through the implementation of the IHE profiles listed in Section
2.1.1 in the manner described below.
• CT : The manager shall connect, as time client, to a NTP/SNTP [182, 211] server
to obtain the current time.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of a successful first connection between an agent and a manager
in Layer 2.5 of the extended X73PHD.
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• DEC and WCM : The manager shall act as the Device Observation Reporter, which
forwards the acquired measurements to Device Observation Consumers, such as
PHR, EHR or CDSS, by means of a subscription mechanism that enables their
filtering by means of Device Observation Filtering actors.
• ACM and WCM : The manager shall act as the Alert Reporter —whose alerts may
have their origin in the agent— communicating with an Alert Manager which notifies
Alert Communicator(s) such as the smartphone of the administrator —e.g. for
advisories regarding security issues—, or nurses and next of kin —for physiological
and technical alarms.
• ATNA: The manager and the healthcare systems (e.g. PHR, EHR, CDSS, alert
system) shall implement a secure node, so that they can authenticate users and
authorize them to consult stored measurements. The events of acquisition of mea-
surements —as they reach the manager, PHR, EHR, CDSS or alert system— and
access of users to them are recorded in an audit repository to which these entities
connect to.
• XDS and BPPC : When the manager stores the measurements acquired by agents
as documents, it may become a XDS-compliant Document Source for PHR and
EHR systems that shall implement a Document Repository for persistent, secure
and reliable storage. Both PHR and EHR systems may implement a Document
Registry to facilitate easier retrieval of these documents for Document Consumers
(e.g. a CDSS). BPPC shall be implemented by XDS actors to implement policies
of private access based on user consent, that is to say, a type of access to personal
biomedical data that is constrained by the consent of the user.
• EUA: The manager shall act as a Client Authentication Agent, which connects to
a centralized Kerberos Authentication Server of the HIS to get user authentication
—based on either RFID-T or SC— and service tickets, enabling further kerber-
ized secure communications. In addition, a specific system filters any meaningful
command that a malicious user may try to introduce as a password through the
Authentication Agent.
• PIX : The HIS takes the role of Patient Identity Source —providing patient identity
feed based on the user’s demographic data and on his/her personID (e.g. extracted
from RFID-T, BC and SC), which is registered as patientID—, and also the role
of PIX Manager —in charge of the cross-referencing— and the entities with access
to user measurements (e.g. PHRs, EHRs, CDSS, alert systems) shall act as PIX
Consumers —for homogeneous referencing.
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Table 3.2: Steps for a successful first connection between an agent and a manager in the extended X73PHD (I)
Step Layer(s) Entity Action(s) IHE profile(s)
State: processes of device(s) manufacturing and initial configuration (related to X73PHD framework)
1 1.5+ Mf Providing the agent with a BC reader and a passive RFID sensor, and each user with a BC or a RFID-T —e.g. as bracelets, as personal cards. SDO, DEC, ACM
2.0+ Providing the manager with a RFID sensor and a SC reader EUA
2.5 Providing the agent with a port that enables the attachment of a SC card reader with its corresponding keypad. SDO, DEC, ACM
2 1.0+ Mf Generating, signing and holding the CEA and CSA certs of the agent. These contain the agent’s EUI-64, and respectively, its public encryption key,
PbEA, or its public signature verification key, PbSA. CEA and CSA are stored in a public repository and their paired private keys, PrEA and
PrSA, are stored inside the agent.
SDO:SEC
3 1.0+ Mf Repeating the actions of step 2 in the manager — if off-the-shelf — with CEM (only in Layers 2.0+) and CSM. SDO:SEC
Ad Repeating the actions of step 2 in the manager — if not off-the-shelf — with CEM (only in Layers 2.0+) and CSM.
4 1.0+ Ad Installing the admin’s CEAd and CSAd certs, bundled with their password-protected private key, in the manager. SDO:SEC
5 1.0+ Ad Based on the consent of the users, implementing a XACML-based policy setting which users (e.g. trainers, physicians) can access the measurements
of others (e.g. clients, patients) after authentication (with password in Layer 1.0, with RFID-T/SC in Layers 1.5+).
EUA, ATNA, BPPC,
SDO:SST
1.5+ Configuring the manager to establish the RFID-T/BC of the users from which it is allowed to receive measurements. SDO:CMA
2.5 Storing a copy of the public encryption cert (CEU) of the users from which it is allowed to receive measurements. SDO:CMA
6 0.5+ Ad Pairing/associating agent and manager with authentication (e.g. PIN, passkey, NFC) if the chosen transport technology supports it. SDO:SEC
State: associating with authentication process (related to X73PHD standard)
7 1.0+ A Negotiating a security layer and launching its EUI (the manager may have requested it) together with a fresh challenge, Ch1.
Signing this frame, x, with PrSA –to enable further verification– and sending it to the manager.
SDO:CBA
8 1.0+ M, A The manager receives the frame and checks whether the security layer is supported. If it is not supported, the agent will attempt to establish an
association with lower security requirements in s24. If the proposed security is supported, the manager consults its association table to check if there
has been previous association to that EUI. If so, the manager knows MK and goes to step 14 — unless if frame x contains a request to renew some
key or cert.
SDO:CBA
9 1.0+ M Sending a frame to the agent’s manufacturer, including the administrator’s certificates CEAd, CSAd and x (from s7), concatenated with the
admin’s fingerprint. To obtain the fingerprint, the admin is required to manually introduce the password of his/her private signature key, PrSAd.
SDO:SRC
10 1.0+ Mf Verifying the fingerprint of y and the signature of x, and also that CSAd corresponds to the buyer of that agent. SDO:SRC
11 1.0+ Mf Sending its certificate CSMf, the agent’s certificates CSA and CEA and MK signed by the manufacturer. If x (from s7) contained a renewal request
–which happens with a periodicity of 1-3 years–, both the old and the new key/cert requested will be attached and digitally signed. This entire
frame is encrypted with the corresponding admin’s public encryption key, PbEAd.
SDO:SRC
12 1.0+ M Decrypting the frame by using PrEAd. Then, verifying the certs by means of CRL or OCSP. If they are not valid, rejecting the connection — by
means of a frame in s24 — and instructing the admin to contact the agent’s manufacturer. Otherwise, PbMf, PbSA and PbEA are obtained.
SDO:SRC, ACM
13 1.0+ M Using PbMf to verify DS(MK,Mf), both decrypted in the previous step. If it is valid, obtaining MK. SDO:CBA-SRC
14 1.0+ M Using PbSA to verify the signature of frame x (from step 7). If it is valid, obtaining the challenge Ch1 and generating its own fresh challenge, Ch2. SDO:CBA
15 1.0+ M If x (from s7) contained a renewal request –which happens with a periodicity of 1-3 years–, sending to the agent both the old and the new key/cert
requested and its digital signature — by the manufacturer —, all encrypted with its public encryption key, PbEA.
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Table 3.3: Steps for a successful first connection between an agent and a manager in the extended X73PHD (II)
Step Layer(s) Entity Action(s) IHE profile(s)
State: processes of device(s) manufacturing and initial configuration (related to X73PHD framework)
16 1.0+ A Decrypting the frame with its private decryption key, PrEA. Next, checking that the signature of the frame is valid and that the old cert/key is correct. SDO:SRC
17 1.0+ A Accepting or rejecting the update of the key/cert (based on the previous step) by means of a frame sent to the manager.
Destroying the old key/cert in case of acceptance and sending a warning message to the admin otherwise.
SDO:SRC, ACM
18 1.0+ M Sending an authentication frame, composed of PbEA{Ch2} and h(Ch1 + h(Ch2) + h(MK)), to the agent. SDO:CBA
19 1.0+ A Decrypting Ch2 by using PrEA. Using it, Ch1 and MK to check that the received h(Ch1+h(Ch2)+h(MK)) is valid.
Authenticating the manager if the verification is successful.
SDO:CBA
20 1.0+ A Calculating h(h(Ch1)+Ch2+h(MK)) and sending it to the manager. SDO:CBA
21 1.0+ M Authenticating the agent if the verification of the frame received is successful. SDO:CBA
22 1.0+ M Confirming the authentication to the agent, by sending the frame h(Ch1+Ch2+h(MK)). SDO:CBA
23 1.0+ A, M Deriving session keys for encryption, S = h(MK + Ch1) + Ch2, and authentication, SA = h(MK+ Ch2) + Ch1. SDO:SRC-SEC
24 1.0+ A, M Aborting the connection if the certs of the agent are not valid (s12) or to negotiating a lower security layer that both agent and manager support (s8).
The frames exchanged between agent and manager from here on are encrypted and authenticated.
SDO:CBA-SRC
State: configuring process (related to X73PHD standard)
25 1.0+ A Sending the frame Fi, encrypted with S, to establish the further transmission of measurements. This frame is concatenated with a Hash Message
Authentication Code, HMAC(S{Fi}, SA), dependent on both the encrypted frame, and on the session key for authentication SA. The resulting frame,
[S{Fi}, HMAC(S{Fi}, SA)], is denoted as C&A(Fi, S, SA), named after “Ciphering & Authentication”.
SDO:SEC
26 1.0+ M Using SA to verify the HMAC of Fi. If it is valid, then the manager deciphers the frame with S and interprets it. This process,
inverse to that in s25, is denoted as Ch&D(C&A(Fi, S, SA)) named after “Checking HMAC & Deciphering”.
SDO:SEC
27 1.0+ M Sending the frame C&A(Fj, S, SA) to continue with the configuration process. SDO:SEC
28 1.0+ A Using SA to verify the HMAC of Fj. SDO:SEC
Steps 25-28 may be repeated several times, until all configuration frames have been exchanged.
State: data measurement and transmission processes (related to X73PHD standard and its framework)
29 1.5-2.0 U Swiping his/her RFID-T/BC through the passive sensor of the agent. SDO:UID,
DEC:RFID-T or BC
2.5 Inserting his/her SC in the slot of the agent and introducing his/her PIN/password. SDO:UID, DEC:SC
30 2.0+ A Applying C&A() to a frame Fi = h(PersonID) and sending C&A(Fi, S, SA) in order to find out if the manager knows the user corresponding to
h(PersonID).
SDO:CMA
31 1.5+ M Applying Ch&D() to the received frame and obtaining Fi = h(PersonID). SDO:CMA
1.5+ Checking that the admin had configured a PersonID whose hash is precisely the received h(PersonID).
Otherwise, requesting the admin to do it now. If he/she does nothing, rejecting the association.
SDO:CMA
ACM
2.5 Checking that the admin had stored the public certificate whose PersonID hash is precisely the received h(PersonID).
Otherwise, requesting the admin to do it now. If he/she does nothing, rejecting the association.
SDO:CMA
ACM
1.5+ If the connection has not been rejected, checking the state of the ID credentials of that user (enabled or disabled).
If it is disabled, sending a warning message to both the user and the admin.
SDO:CMA
ACM
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Table 3.4: Steps for a successful first connection between an agent and a manager in the extended X73PHD (III)
Step Layer(s) Entity Action(s) IHE profile(s)
32 1.5+ M Sending C&A([PersonID, state], S, SA) to the agent. SDO:CMA
33 1.5+ A Calculating Ch&D(C&A([PersonID, state], S, SA)). Subsequently, checking that the PersonID of the user identified in the agent matches
the PersonID received from the manager.
If the state of the credentials is disabled, the acquisition session is not started, go back to step 29
SDO:CMA, ACM
34 0+ U Taking his/her measurements “d” by means of the agent. DEC, WCM
1.5+ A Logging off the user 10-seconds after he/she takes his/her last measurement. SDO:CMA
0+ A Going back to step 29 to begin a new acquisition session — unless agent and manager were disassociated for some reason. SDO:CMA
35 1.5-2.0 A Adding the PersonID, provided by his/her RFID-T or BC, to d. D= [d, PersonID]. SDO:UID, DEC: RFID-T or BC,
WCM
2.5 Adding the user’s fingerprint, provided by his/her SC, to d. D= [d, FP(d, U)]. SDO:UID-UDS, DEC:SC, WCM
36 1.0+ A If it does not know the user (checked in step 31), generating a symmetric key for storage, StAi, calculating and storing StAi{D} and
PbEM{StAi} in the PM-Store.
Next, wiping properly the variables and buffers storing the plain D and StAi, and going back to step 29.
SDO:SST
37 2.0+ A Adding its own fingerprint to D, D=[D, FP(D,A)] SDO:MV, DEC, WCM
38 1.0+ A Sending C&A(D,S,SA) to the manager. SDO:SEC, DEC, WCM
39 1.0+ M Calculating Ch&D(C&A(D,S,SA)). SDO:SEC, DEC, WCM
40 2.0+ M Verifying the agent’s fingerprint in D with its associated public signature verification key, PbSA. If it is not valid, refusing D. SDO:MV, DEC, WCM
41 2.5 M Verifying the user’s fingerprint in D, with its associated public signature verification key, PbSU. If it is not valid, refusing D. SDO:MV, DEC, WCM
42 2.0+ A If steps s38 or s39 fail, getting notified and storing D in the PM-store, as in step 33 — the data rejected.
Instructing the admin to check the certificates CSA and CSU, and rejecting the association.
ACM
43 1.0+ M Mapping the acquired measurements D for its representation with IHE-harmonized syntax and semantics. RTM, DEC, WCM
44 1.0+ M The measurements D are readily available for applications that need to process them online (e.g. real-time displaying).
45 1.0+ M Generation of physiological alarms, if the value(s) of D are far out of a healthy range (e.g. systolic blood pressure ≥ 180 mmHg, the user
did not take several pills
of his/her medications), and also technical alarms, if the values of D are inconsistent (e.g. constant zero).
ACM, WCM
46 1.0+ M Secure standard storage of D: SDO:SST
Creation of a symmetric key StMi for encrypting StMi{D} of D.
Storage of StMi{D} in a HL7 Personal Healthcare Monitoring Report (PHMR).
Wiping properly the variables and buffers storing the plain D and StMi.
The securely stored D are available for those users authorized by the XACML policy —implemented in step 5—
after an authentication process that will filter any attempt of code injection.
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3.2 Evaluation of the security-enhanced ISO/IEEE 11073
PHD
This section begins assessing the security of the proposal in Section 3.1, by analyzing the
countermeasures that each security layer implements against different threats, in Section
3.2.1. Then, the implications that this extension would have for the X73PHD models are
laid out in Section 3.2.2. Next, Section 3.2.3 evaluates the performance of the extension,
by measuring the impact that the implementation of each layer produces on the X73PHD
architecture — in terms of overheads and delays — and on its surrounding framework.
Finally, the potential limitations of this proposal are summarized in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Risk assessment
The risk assessment is depicted in detail in Table 3.5. Columns 1-2 summarize the risk
assessment of the X73PHD architecture —as described in Section 2.5— and columns 3-4
the measures against those threats depending on the layer implemented —based on the
proposal described in Section 3.1. Table 3.5 shows that the preexisting Layer 0 imple-
ments no security and that the preexisting Layer 0.5 puts emphasis only on the secure
pairing of devices (which on the other hand might be counterfeits or have been hacked)
and on secure wireless communications between them. Layers 1.0+ add security mea-
sures to both agent and manager to detect counterfeiting, to impede hacking and undue
local access to measurements, and new countermeasures for private and authenticated
communications. Layers 1.5+ include the possibility that several users share agents and
managers with privacy, by means of secure identification/authentication with BC/RFID
tokens or smart-cards, automatized user log-off, remote activation/deactivation of iden-
tification credentials and checking that the user is known by the manager before he/she
takes his/her measurements. In addition, these layers also implement audit trails of mea-
surements acquisition, transmission (e.g. to EHR systems) and access to guarantee data
traceability and user accountability. Layers 2.0+ add mandatory timestamps and finger-
prints in the measurements for a strengthened verification in the manager. Finally, Layer
2.5 improves the identification of users in the agent (by requiring a smartcard and a pass-
word), and includes the digital signature of the user in his/her measurements to prevent
their repudiation.
The chosen algorithms, their key sizes and crypto periods (Section 2.6.3) are consid-
ered secure until 2030, regardless of the layer. Furthermore, the key management policy
(described in Section 3.1) is oriented towards Perfect Forward Secrecy. This implies that
in the unlikely case that a session key is cracked, the damage is confined to that session
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Table 3.5: Security analysis of the architecture of the layer-based, enhanced-X73PHD
Threats Countermeasures Layer: 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
U
S
E
R
User impersonation
by credential theft
or no request of
identification/authentication
credentials
Use of physical tokens for user identification/authentication ! ! !
Use of an additional password for user identification in the agent !
Use of an additional password for user authentication in the manager Op. Op.
Remote activation/deactivation of identification credentials
—used in the agent— and user warnings
! ! !
Exploitation of open sessions User log-off 10s after taking user measurements ! ! !
DoS by wrong user
identification in the agent
BC/RFID token requested ! ! !
Smartcard requested !
Repudiation of user
measurements
Including the PersonID attribute with all the measurements ! ! !
Including a digital signature of the user in his/her meas. !
Including a timestamp with meas. from agent’s PM-store ! ! ! ! ! !
Extending the timestamp to freshly acquired measurement ! !
A
G
E
N
T
Device counterfeiting
Device certificate, signed by manufacturer, requested ! ! ! !
Authentication by manager ! ! ! !
Device hacking to deliver
wrong measurements
Fingerprints in measurements ! !
Manager verifies fingerprints ! !
Data theft by local access
Asymmetric encryption of the PM store:
decryption possible only in the manager
! ! ! !
Proper wiping of critical variables/buffers ! ! ! !
Sending measurements to a
wrong manager
Checking if the user is known by the manager ! ! !
A
G
E
N
T
-M
A
N
A
G
E
R
Injection of commands
Secure transport ! Op. Op. Op. Op.
Frames with HMACs ! ! ! !
Cracking of
cryptographic keys
Use of secure algorithms, complementary to
those of the secure transport layer
! ! ! !
Key sizes recommended by NIST ! ! ! !
Keys are renewed (and the previous ones are destroyed)
before expiration or if they are revoked
! ! ! !
Perfect Forward Secrecy ! ! ! !
Eavesdropping
Secure transport ! Op. Op. Op. Op.
Frames encryption ! ! ! !
Replay attack
Secure transport ! Op. Op. Op. Op.
Fresh challenges and counter in frames ! ! ! !
Man in the middle attack
Secure device pairing (PIN, PBC, NFC, etc.) ! Op. Op. Op. Op.
Agent-manager authentication ! ! ! !
DoS by injecting noise
HMACs and retrials ! ! ! !
Report to admin, secure storage of meas. in PM-store ! ! ! !
M
A
N
A
G
E
R
Counterfeiting to associate
to a rightful agent
Admin and agent’s manufacturer authorization requested to managers. ! ! ! !
If ad-hoc device, cert. requested –signed by its manufacturer ! !
Authentication by agent ! ! ! !
Hacking to corrupt the
measurements
Audit trails of measurements acquisition, transmission and access ! ! !
Data theft by local access
Single-use keys and asymmetric encryption of measurements:
authenticators required for decryption
! ! ! !
Proper wiping of critical variables/buffers ! ! ! !
Access of authorized users to
unintended measurements
Role-based access control: regular users, professionals, admin,
automatized online and offline applications
! ! !
Injection of malicious codes Command filtering in the authentication system ! ! !
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and the attacker will only be able to read those frames (if he/she discovers S) or to authen-
ticate forged frames (if he/she discovers SA). To minimize the likelihood that the master
key is discovered, it is used only to derive session keys that protect the transmission of
frames. But even if at some point an attacker discovers MK and some session keys, frames
exchanged in previous sessions will be safe since session keys are derived from MK and
another random secret, Ch2, which is protected by the public key of the agent. Finally,
the measurements from an acquisition session are protected with symmetric keys of single
use protected with asymmetric cryptography.
3.2.2 Implications for ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD
The implications that the proposal suggested in Section 3.1 would have for X73PHD
can be seen through the modifications involving its service, communication and domain
information models. This is mainly illustrated in Tables 3.6-3.8 — service model and,
eventually, DIM — and Figure 3.3 –communication model and, incidentally, service model.
The four columns on the left in Tables 3.6-3.8 show the four modified and four newly-
created frames to meet the proposals suggested in Section 3.1. The modified frames and
attributes are shown in shaded cells, while the newly created ones appear in unshaded
cells. Additionally, an explanation of the frame or attribute can be found in the second
to the right column, which is linked to the proposals in Section 3.1. The layers involved
in every modification are shown in the far right column. A few of them are required only
in Layers 2 and 2.5. Regarding the — MDER [74] — data types of the attributes, those
with a fixed numeric value — indicated between brackets — are INT-U16, and the rest of
them — hashes, HMACs, FingerPrints, etc. — are OCTET STRING. The types CHOICE
and SEQUENCE (concatenation) are used to represent the combination of two or more
attributes.
Similarly, a complementary illustration of the implications is provided in Figure 3.3.
The figure shows a conveniently modified FSM of both agents and managers. Thus, it
includes the existing states frames and attributes, along with the newly suggested sub-
state (authenticating), and the new frames and attributes. The links between the new
frames and the steps (noted as sX and suggested in Tables 3.2-3.4) are also shown in
Figure 3.3. To differentiate existing and newly proposed states, frames and attributes, the
latter are written in italics.
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Table 3.6: Generic structures (lightly shaded cells), modified (shaded cells) and newly created (unshaded cells) frames and attributes in the
extended X73PHD (I)
Frame Sub-Frame
(level 1)
Sub-Frame
(level 2)
Sub-Frame
(level 3)
Additional information Security
Layers
AarqApdu PhdAssociationInformation ProtocolVersion protocol-version4(3) This bit shall be set if the extended version of 11073-20601 is supported. 0+
option list RegCertDataList It is recommended adding auth-body-IHE(3) to the AuthBody compliance list. 0+
Layer This indicates the layer of the extended version of 11073-20601. 0+
zero(0) 0+
zero-and-a-half(1) 0+
one(2) 0+
one-and-a-half(3) 0+
two(4) 0+
two-and-a-half(5) 0+
RenewalRequest Request to renew z, the master key and/or certain certificates, {MK, CEA, CSA, CSMf}. 1+
MasterKey(0) 1+
AgentEncryptionCert(1) 1+
AgentSignatureCert(2) 1+
ManufacturerSignatureCert(3) 1+
Challenge 1 This is the agent-to-manager challenge, Ch1. 1+
DigitalSignature Signature by the agent, DS(PhdAssociationInformation, PrSA). 1+
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Table 3.7: Generic structures (lightly shaded cells), modified (shaded cells) and newly created (unshaded cells) frames and attributes in the
extended X73PHD (II)
Frame Sub-Frame
(level 1)
Sub-Frame
(level 3)
Additional information Security
Layers
RerqApdu This is a manager-to-agent frame, encrypted with the public encr. key of the agent, PbEA. 1+
Renewal{MasterKey, AgentEncryptionCert,
AgentSignatureCert, ManufacturerSignatureCert}
[z old, z].
Purpose: updating an old key/certificate with a new one.
1+
DigitalSignature Signature by the manufacturer, DS(Renewal{...}, PrSMf). 1+
RereApdu This is an agent-to-manager frame. 1+
ResultRenewal{MasterKey, accepted h([z old, z]). Purpose: to approve the update of a key/cert. 1+
AgentEncryptionCert,
AgentSignatureCert,
rejected-unmatching-
{key/cert}
h([z, z old]). Purpose: to reject the update of a key/cert, z, because the value of the current key/cert in RerqApdu,
z old, was not correct.
1+
ManufacturerSignatureCert} rejected-invalid-signature h([z, z old, z old]). Purpose: to reject the update of the key/cert because the signature in RerqApdu was invalid. 1+
AucApdu AuthenticationChallenge This is a manager-to-agent frame. It contains the manager-to-agent protected challenge, PbEA{Ch2},
concatenated with h(Ch1+h(Ch2)+h(MK)). Purpose: to allow the agent verify that the manager knows MK.
1+
AurApdu This could be both an agent-to-manager and a manager-to-agent frame. 1+
AuthenticationResponseAgent This is an agent-to-manager frame, based on hashes to hinder its manipulation. 1+
accepted h(h(Ch1)+Ch2+h(MK)). Purpose: to verify positively AucApdu. 1+
rejected-unmatching-hash h(h(Ch1)+h(Ch2)+h(MK)). Purpose: to indicate that AucApdu does not match the value calculated by the agent. 1+
AuthenticationResponseManager This is a manager-to-agent frame, based on hashes to hinder its manipulation. 1+
accepted h(Ch2+1+h(MK)). Purpose: to verify AuthenticationResponseAgent positively. 1+
rejected-unmatching-hash h(Ch2+2+h(MK)). Purpose: to indicate that AuthenticationResponseAgent does not match the value calculated
by the manager.
1+
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Table 3.8: Generic structures (lightly shaded cells), modified (shaded cells) and newly created (unshaded cells) frames and attributes in the
extended X73PHD (III)
Frame Sub-Frame
(level 1)
Sub-Frame
(level 2)
Sub-Frame
(level 3)
Additional information Security
Layers
AareApdu AssociateResult Encrypted with session key S if Layer requires so. 1+
rejected-unsupported-layer(9) 1+
rejected-invalid-certificate(10) 1+
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code, HMAC(AssociateResult, SA).
Purpose: to authenticate AssociateResult.
1+
RlrqApdu ReleaseRequestReason ReleaseRequestReason travels encrypted with session key S if Layer requires so. 1+
person-unknown(3) This could be both an agent-to-manager and a manager-to-agent frame.
Purpose: it is sent by the manager when it does not know the person to whom the data pertain, and by
the agent when it checks that the manager does not know that person.
2+
invalid-agent-fingerprint(4) This is a manager-to-agent frame. Purpose: to indicate that the agent’s fingerprint is invalid. 2+
invalid-user-fingerprint(5) This is a manager-to-agent frame. Purpose: to indicate that the the user’s fingerprint is invalid. 2.5
HMAC HMAC(ReleaseRequestReason, SA). 1+
PrstApdu DataApdu DataApdu travels encrypted with session key S if Layer requires so. 1+
Message personID If Layer ≤1.0, this is the PersonID as defined in 11073-20601TM -2014 (16b).
If 1.5 ≤ Layer ≤ 2.0, then PersonID takes the same value as the EUI-64 RFID-T/BC (64b).
If Layer == 2.5, then PersonID is the Subject Unique Identifier of the X.509 CU (64b).
1+
knownPerson This is the hash of PersonID in agent-to-manager frames and PersonID otherwise. 2+
FingerPrint This is necessary if measurement data are present inside the frame. 2+
Counter and HMAC HMAC(DataApdu, SA). 1+
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The creation of additional DIM attributes supporting the new security features could
be useful for better modeling of PHDs. However, this is not imperative because not all
transmitted information is modeled in the DIM. For example, within the PhdAssociation-
Information frame, there is the ProtocolVersion information which is used to communicate
acceptable X73PHD versions. ProtocolVersion is not modeled in the DIM, even though
it provides information of what the agent is. The newly proposed Layer provides compa-
rable information and therefore, according to the DIM definition it could be incorporated
to the DIM but not necessarily. Similarly, in the PhdAssociationInformation frame, the
RenewalRequest — defining requests to update some important keys or certificates —
and the Challenge 1 could be added to the DIM if a new, security-enhanced version of the
standard were to be created, but not compulsorily.
3.2.3 Impact on the ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD architecture and on its
framework
This is evaluated in Table 3.9 by means of three reference examples, carefully chosen to
cover a broad range of information transmission cases when using X73PHD. They have
very different frame sizes —which affects the relative overhead— and may require real-time
transmission —which is influenced by delays:
• Case 1: sending a discrete measurement, a weight represented with a frame of 36
bytes.
• Case 2: sending a continuous signal, a 3-lead ECG divided into 1-second blocks,
sampled at 200 Hz and represented with 16 bits per sample. That is to say, blocks
of 9600 bits. It is worth noting that this is a concrete —although rather common—
set of parameters for ambulatory ECGs. Nonetheless, ECGs may range from a few
seconds —e.g. 10 seconds in a resting ECG test— to several hours —e.g. in a Holter
test. Regardless of their duration, the analysis of the features in the transmission of
the security-enhanced signals at global scale is the same as per each individual signal
block when real-time transmission is guaranteed [369]. Therefore, it is necessary to
obtain an estimation of the computational power required to guarantee real-time
operation.
• Case 3: sending measurement(s) in a frame whose size is the maximum allowed in
X73PHD (63 KBytes). In this case, there is no real-time transmission involved. It
consists of one large frame being transmitted in one go. It is worth noting that this
is an extreme case.
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Table 3.9: Absolute and relative overhead and delays of the new and modified frames proposed in Tables 3.6-3.8
Frame(s) Entity Case Original size (b) Absolute overhead (b) Relative overhead Delay (Mcycles)
s7, s8 A, M 1-3 54 16+64+512+512=1104 20.44 3.92
s14, s18 M 1-3 — 2048+256=2304 — 6.86
s19-s20 A 1-3 — 256 — 11.12
s21-s22 M 1-3 48 256-48=208 4.33 >0.01
s23 A, M 1-3 — — — > 0.01
s25/s27 A/M 1-3 var ≈ 128/2+176=240 var >0.01
s26/s28 M/A 1-3 — — — >0.01
s30 A 1-3 — 256+176=432 — >0.01
s31-32 M 1-3 26 128-26+176=278 10.69 >0.01
s33 A 1-3 — — — >0.01
s35-s41, s46
— Layer 2.5 —
A, M 1, 2, 3 x= 288, 9600, 516096 1424, 1456, 1456
— ceil( (x+2·(64+512)+64)/128 )·128+176-x —
4.94, 0.15, >0.01 22.73, 22.86,
29.95
s35-s40, s46
— Layer 2.0 —
A, M 1, 2, 3 Idem 912, 944, 944
— ceil( (x+2·64+512+64)/128 )·128+176-x —
3.17, 0.10, >0.01 12.25, 12.38,
19.47
s35, s38, s39, s46
— Layer 1.5 —
A, M 1, 2, 3 Idem 272, 304, 304
— ceil((x+64)/128)·128+176-x —
0.94, 0.03, >0.01 0.89, 1.02, 8.11
s35, s39, s46
— Layer 1.0 —
A, M 1, 2, 3 Idem 272, 176, 176
— ceil(x/128)·128+176-x —
0.94, 0.02, >0.01 0.31, 0.44, 7.53
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The proposed extension of the protocol consists of 46 steps, described in Section 3.1.
Nonetheless, only 16 of these steps introduce some overhead or delay, which are calculated
based on the data provided in Section 2.6.3. The results in Table 3.9 show that the
maximum overhead introduced by one step is 2304 bits. Although this can be considered
as high (in relative terms) when the original frame is short (e.g. s7), it is almost negligible
when protecting ECG signals or long measurements for transmission (Layers 1.0-2.5, cases
2 and 3). It is also worth noting that the relative overhead grows significantly with the
layer when protecting short measurements (Layers 1.0-2.5, case 1), varying from 0.94 in
Layer 1 to 4.94 in Layer 2.5. This is mainly due to the addition of the fingerprints of the
user (s35) and the agent (s37). Regarding delays, each operation has either a fixed delay
(a certain amount of cycles) or a variable delay, which depends on the input data size (e.g.
in encryption). The latter is calculated by multiplying the speed of the operation and the
data size. Some steps involve two or more sequential operations —e.g. those denoted as
C&A()— and in that case their individual delays will be added. Therefore, the cells in the
delay column are calculated by summing the delays produced by all operations involved
for each row. It is observed that steps s35-s41 contribute most to the overall delay, which
grows notably with each layer implemented. Short measurements and ECG signals (cases
1 and 2) obtain similar results (<1 Mcycle in Layers 1.x, about 12 Mcycles in Layer 2.0,
about 23 Mcycles in Layer 2.5), while the same evaluation with the maximum frame size
(case 3) obtains approximately 7 extra Mcycles.
One of the most demanding real-time application that can currently be supported by
X73PHD is the transmission of ECGs, as in our case 2. Table 3.9 shows an associated
delay of 22.86 Mcycles when implementing Layer 2.5, the most secure and complex, to
protect the ECG block and access it. On the other hand, real-time ECG applications
usually require that the overall delay, starting when the acquisition of the block begins
and finishing when the block can be interpreted, is approximately ≤ 2s [369]. Since
the block length is 1s, there is 1s (disregarding the transmission delay) to execute 22.86
Mcycles in real-time. Assuming that the transport technology introduces low/moderate
overhead and that it is able to transmit the protected ECG block (11056 bits) with a
negligible delay, it is enough that the agent and the manager operate at approximately 23
MHz. If the manager features a much faster processor (e.g. >1 GHz), which is very typical
in smartphones or tablets, the requirement for the agent can be dropped to 9 MHz. This
happens because the selected algorithm, ECDSA, performs the signature (in the agent)
with fewer operations than the signature checking (in the manager, which is usually a
more powerful device). It is worth noting that, for these estimations, it has been assumed
a throughput of 1 MIPS/MHz (1 million instructions per second per megahertz), which is
a reasonable ratio in off-the-shelf 8-bit microcontrollers (e.g. the Atmel ATmega328). A
simple 8-bit microcontroller was chosen as reference for the following reasons: a) an 8-bit
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microcontroller is powerful enough to run a X73PHD agent [370, 371], b) manufacturers
of medical devices look for cost-effective implementations, and c) by choosing an 8-bit
architecture for the estimations, we are positioned in a scenario with limited processor
capability (considering the current state-of-art), i.e. if the architecture is changed (e.g.
a manager running in a mobile phone, which has for example an ARM Cortex micro,
which is a much more powerful processor), the processor would have a larger MIPS/MHz
throughput, which implies the capability of executing more instructions per clock cycle,
and so the situation would be more favorable.
Regarding the impact of the X73PHD extension on its framework, a simple initial setup
is required. As detailed in Section 3.1, an administrator installs his/her certificate in the
manager (s4) and implements a XACML-based privacy policy setting out which users are
authorized to take and/or consult measurements (s5). He/she may also pair/associate
the agent and the manager with the most secure method implemented by the transport
technology (s6). In addition to this, certain layers of the enhanced X73PHD —see Table
2.5— demand items to identify/authenticate users —which requires extra hardware—, the
implementation of reliable PHRs in the manager and the implementation of IHE profiles to
enable communications with healthcare systems. Nevertheless, the proposed enhancement
of X73PHD does not hamper the automatic verification, access and processing of the
acquired measurements and it would facilitate its integration with PHRs, EHRs and CDSS,
and the triggering of alarms at abnormal values. Furthermore, when an authorized user
accesses this data with his/her regular software, additional information about its associated
features (layer, validity of timestamps and fingerprints) may be displayed.
With respect to the agent implementation, it is suggested a programming language fea-
turing a reduced computational load, such as ANSI C. It is worth noting that the delays
presented in Table 3.9 have been calculated based on the data in Table 2.8, corresponding
to a speed benchmark of cryptographic algorithms coded in C++. Nevertheless, the pro-
gramming language choice for the agent implementation falls directly on the developer (or
the manufacturer), who would assume the inherent trade-off between scalability/easiness
and computational efficiency. Managers, on the other hand, could be developed using
a different programming language —e.g. Java in an Android-based manager. Java has
the advantages of being highly portable and abstract but it is —generally speaking— less
computationally efficient. However, since managers are, at the same time, more powerful
devices, their performance would not be greatly affected.
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3.2.4 Potential limitations
Although the proposal presented herein has several advantages over the regular non-
extended standard, there are also some challenging caveats to be considered. In the
first place, it is necessary to keep track of the discovery of potential vulnerabilities in the
security algorithms implemented, so that the compromised algorithms can be replaced
with the second options proposed in Section 2.6.3 (or by new, more secure algorithms
that might be created in the future). Also, users of the system have to be appropriately
trained in security practices, e.g. choice of strong passwords, remote activation/deactiva-
tion of identification credentials. Additionally, a reference implementation — which has
not been carried out at the moment of writing — would be useful for testing purposes.
In fact, a pilot evaluation comprising a variety of potential users (e.g. fitness enthusiasts,
elderly people, hospital patients, physicians and systems administrators) would certainly
be a reliable source for learning valuable lessons about the possible technical enhance-
ments and potential social issues (e.g. reluctance to use personal authentication means)
as well as the benefits of deploying and using this security framework in daily practice.
Moreover, it would be mandatory to keep track of new versions of the standards and
norms on which our proposal relies. Should a new version of the X73PHD standard or
the IHE profiles be published, this security proposal must be revised to guarantee flawless
adaptation to them. Finally, since there is ongoing work towards the inclusion of remote
control in X73PHD personal health devices [372], it would be mandatory to review this
eventual final document for two main reasons. First, it is necessary to check whether
the new remote control feature compromises the security framework proposal. If so, the
proposal must be modified to cover the new potential security breaches. Second, the new
feature could be used to extend the security framework so that administrators can send
security commands to personal health devices (e.g. force the device to use 256-bit key
size — instead of 128-bit — in symmetric encryption, so that all devices comply with an
eventual new recommendation of NIST, without the need for physical access to the device
to update it).
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3.3 Enhancement of the security of SCP-ECG
This section addresses the security enhancement of the SCP-ECG standard (Section 2.1.3),
which specifies rules for the storage and exchange of ECG information — signal data, ECG
measurement (e.g. the onset/offset of particular ECG wave-points such as the QRS),
interpretation results and specific patient’s data — between ECG PHDs and CDs/HS.
SCP-ECG is composed of a well defined and compact file format and a messaging part.
Given that this standard has been successfully harmonized with the standard X73PHD
[195], whose layer-based security extension has been addressed in Section 3.1, and that the
messaging part of SCP-ECG is informative (but not normative), this proposal includes
extending the SCP-ECG file format for its security enhancement and reusing the security-
enhanced X73PHD (Section 3.1) for the exchange of ECG information. As illustrated in
Figure 3.4, the ECG information would be acquired by the ECG PHD and sent to the CD
(or directly to the HS) by using the extended X73PHD-IHE standard, where it would be
stored according to the extended SCP-ECG format, which can be forwarded to HS (or to
an end user) through secure channels. Therefore, it can be considered that this proposal
extends the previous X73PHD-IHE framework — which implements the layered model
defined in Section 2.6 — to a X73PHD-SCP-IHE framework. Moreover, this common
framework aligns the security of both extensions and provides X73PHD with a secure
and standardized storage format for ECG information and SCP-ECG with a secure and
standardized communication protocol.
It is worth noting that the compliance of the SCP-ECG extension with the X73PHD-
IHE framework can only be guaranteed if the former implements the newly-created IHE
profile SDO:SST (Secure Device Observation – Secure Standard Storage), which is manda-
tory for Layers 1.0+ (Table 2.5) and corresponds to step 46 in Table 3.4. To fulfill this
requirement, the protection policy for SCP-ECG files relies on cryptography and imple-
ments three basic and interrelated measures, explained in Section 3.3.1: role-based access
control based on privacy profiles, adequate encryption of contents and addition of digi-
tal signatures. The formal security extension of regular SCP-ECG files addressing this
protection policy is defined in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Privacy profiles for Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
As explained in Section 2.1.3, a SCP-ECG file may be divided into four parts with different
sensitivity levels: A, identification of the patient and the elements involved in the ECG
acquisition session; [B] , general patient data, health status and medication; C , ECG
signal and [D] , ECG measurements and interpretation. In addition to this, it is worth
noting that a SCP-ECG file can be requested for different purposes (see Figure 3.4), to
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wit teaching, research, examination, diagnosis and storage. Both classification, parts of a
SCP-ECG file and possible uses, have been taken into account for the definition of a RBAC
policy that preserves the principles of data processing and purpose binding of privacy. The
following privacy profiles, which include different privacy measures and access privileges
(see Figure 3.5), were defined after consultation with three independent cardiologists:
0. Teaching/research
• Use: to disclose those parts useful for teaching/research ([B], C and [D]).
• Privacy: [B], C and [D] are in plaintext and A is replaced by a template
with bogus values.
• Privileges: reading.
1. Examination
• Use: to allow clinicians caring for the patient to read the whole SCP-ECG.
• Privacy: all the parts are encrypted.
• Privileges: reading.
2. Diagnosis
• Use: to complement the file with additional data, such as the delineation of
ECG fiducial points or the diagnosis of the cardiologist who interprets the
ECG.
• Privacy: all the parts are encrypted.
• Privileges: reading all the parts, writing [D] and tags 15, 17, 19-20 of part A,
which identify the analyzing device, department, institution and physician.
3. Storage
• Use: secure storage.
• Privacy: encryption of all the parts.
• Privileges: making protected exact copies of the file, with no permission to
interpret, write or modify the plaintext.
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Figure 3.4: A scenario of use for the SCP-ECG security extension. Regular and security-enhanced SCP-ECG files are depicted in detail in
Figures 2.3 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Security-enhanced SCP-ECG file types depending on its profile (Section 3.3.1). It shows which security element ultimately protect
each part and which access privileges correspond to the intended user(s). Section 0, parts A, [B] , C and [D] defined in Figure 2.3, section
12 defined in Table 3.10.
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These privacy profiles implement part-level encryption in a manner similar to that of
the Context Envelopes defined by DICOM. The content of the parts is sealed by means
of encryption and the syntax to make them verifiable and retrievable to the targeted
user(s) is placed in a new section (Section 3.3.2). As in the X73PHD extension, this
proposal combines symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption and digital signatures
for an optimal security-performance tradeoff, and it follows the suggestions for the choice
of algorithms of the SDO profile (Section 2.6.3). As regards to supporting several profiles
in a single SCP-ECG, this is not recommended since it would lead to too large an increase
in the size of the syntax with respect to the average size of a SCP-ECG file. In summary,
each security-enhanced SCP-ECG file is generated on demand in the CD — it could also
be generated in other points of the architecture, such as in the HS to protect already stored
regular SCP-ECG files — from its regular counterpart, choosing the best-fitted privacy
profile according to the information retrieved from the IHE profile XDS and BPPC —
implemented by CDs and HS integrated in the X73PHD-SCP-IHE framework.
3.3.2 SCP-ECG extension
The SCP-ECG is a well defined protocol, which can be extended by defining new sections
(numbers 12 to 127 and those above 1023, see [212]) or employing existing free spaces.
Since security is not addressed in any existing section, it is proposed dedicating an entirely
new section to enhance the security of SCP-ECG files according to the proposal in Section
3.3.1. The notation regarding cryptographic elements of this extension is contained in
Table 3.1. To avoid confusion with regular files we call this new format security-enhanced
(or protected) SCP-ECG. The files are given the extension .pscp for easy distinction.
Section 12 structure
Like the rest of the SCP-ECG sections, this is divided into two parts:
• The Section ID Header, which is common to all the sections in this standard
(Figure 2.3) and precedes the Data Part. It is composed of:
– Bytes 1 to 2: 16 bit CRC-CCITT over the entire section (excluding these two
bytes).
– Bytes 3 to 4: Section ID number.
– Bytes 5 to 8: Section length including the Section ID header (in bytes).
– Byte 9: Version Number of the Section.
– Byte 10: Version Number of the Protocol.
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– Byte 11 to 16: Reserved.
• The Data Part (Table 3.10), which adopts the structure corresponding to Section
1 to allow the flexible storage of several fields of variable length. Each field details
the options (e.g. privacy profile, cryptographic algorithms and parameter values) to
set up a security-enhanced SCP-ECG file. These are described by:
– The corresponding tag: a specification byte which indicates the field we refer
to. It would be possible to use up to 255 different tags, although only 7 are
required.
– The length: a 2-byte specification indicating the length of the field value (in
bytes). The maximum possible length described by 2 unsigned bytes is 65535
bytes, but in practice this value is much lower.
– The parameter data: the content of the field, an element to provide security.
If length == 0, the parameter data of the corresponding tag is empty.
Finally, it is necessary to add the corresponding pointer in Section 0 (Figure 2.3) to address
the new section, indicating: section ID number (2 bytes): 12, section length (4 bytes) and
index to section (4 bytes).
Section 12 content
The tags included in Section 12 (Table 3.10) enable the security measures under this
extension:
• Role-Based Access Control by means of privacy profiles (RBAC, Section 3.3.1).
Tag involved:
0. Specifies the professional role of the user, the ECG file is protected accordingly.
• Digital signature (DS) to verify the reliability of the ECG signal and the rest of
the data — thus, protecting against forgery and manipulation. Tags involved:
1. CSE, identifies the entity generating the security-enhanced SCP-ECG file and
contains his/her public key for signature, PbSE.
2. Specifies which hash function has been used, taking as input the whole file.
3. Stores the DS, resulting from the encryption of the hash with the private key
of the protecting entity, PrSE.
• Part-level encryption: which maintains confidentiality according to the consent
of the patient. Tags involved:
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Table 3.10: Structure and content of the Section 12 Data Part of a security-enhanced
SCP-ECG file
Tag Length Value (parameter data)
0 1 byte Privacy profile
Value Type
0 Teaching/research
1 Examination
2 Diagnosis
3 Storage
1 length
Certificate of the entity generating the security-enhanced file (PEM coding):
The certificate shall be X.509 type. Three different public key algorithms are allowed
for signature: ECDSA (≥ 224, recommended 256), DSA (≥ 2048) and RSA (≥ 2048).
See Table 3.11 for certificate sizes.
2 1 byte Hash function ID
Value Algorithm
0 RIPEMD-256
1 Whirlpool
2 SHA-256
3 length
Digital signature, DS(pSCP − ECG,PrSE)
This is the encryption of the hash using the private key for signature of the entity
generating the file (PrSE, initially DS = blank). At the user’s end the DS is used to
verify the integrity and authenticate the file. The length of the DS depends on the type
of entity’s certificate for signature (tag 1), see Table 3.11.
4 1 byte Symmetric encryption algorithm ID
Value Algorithm
0 Twofish
1 Serpent
2 RC6
3 MARS
4 AES
5 length
Encrypted symmetric key(s), encrypt(S, Tag 4, P bEU)
The symmetric encryption key(s) S — to be used for encrypting the confidential sections
— are generated with a secure random function and encrypted with the public key
specified in the user’s certificate, PbEU (entity’s certificate in profile 3). Thus, the
length of this field depends on the user’s certificate type, see Table 3.11. This field is
not present in profile 0 (tag 0), since there is no encrypted parts.
6 25·n
bytes
Secure access record, SAR.
Each entry is:
Byte Name Type Notes
1 to 15 Certificate issuer, ASCII
Common Name
16 to 20 Certificate serial Integer
number
21 Type of access Integer Allowed values: 0 to 3
22 to 25 Request date Integer Seconds since January 1,
1970, 00:00:00 GMT
For profiles 0-2 there is only one entry, for profile 3 there may be several.
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0. Indicates which parts of the file are private (Section 3.3.1).
4. Specifies which symmetric cipher is used to encrypt the content of the private
parts.
5. Stores the symmetric key(s), randomly generated and protected by the public
key of each authorized user.
Only the intended user can recover the symmetric key(s) and decrypt the confidential
parts of the file, for which he/she needs to load his/her private key.
• Secure Access Record (SAR), which reinforces the implementation of the ATNA
profile in the provision of transparency to the patient. Tag involved:
6. Has a double mission: to identify publicly and uniquely the intended user for
privacy profiles 0-2 and to keep an updated copy of all granted accesses for
profile 3. The protecting entity can immediately export this list for patient
consultation.
3.4 Evaluation of the security-enhanced SCP-ECG
This section begins evaluating the security of the proposal in Section 3.3 against different
threats (Section 3.4.1). Next, the implications of this extension for the SCP-ECG file
format and its performance are analyzed (Section 3.4.2). Finally, the potential limitations
of this proposal are summarized (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Risk assessment
The security-enhanced format for SCP-ECG files, to be managed by CDs and HS (maybe
also by PHDs) in secure m-Health architectures, involves cryptographic elements, publicly
stored in the newly created Section 12 of these extended files. In this proposal, it is
considered that plain SCP-ECG files will be totally replaced by their security-enhanced
counterparts, that the variables created in the processes of protection and access will
be thoroughly cleaned and that the private keys involved will we managed adequately.
Therefore, the possibility that an attacker accesses a CD or a HS and founds unprotected
SCP-ECG files, relevant ECG information or private keys — e.g. in the hard drive, in
the RAM memory or in cache — is excluded. Regarding the security-enhanced SCP-ECG
files, they cannot be considered as hard to obtain always since their transmission in the
BAN/PAN may be wireless — with a security configuration that may be inadequate – and
because some patients may cooperate in granting access (with their informed consent) to
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their biomedical tests (or part of them) for certain m-Health applications — e.g. research
— under strict RBAC, which increases the number of requests for SCP-ECG files (and
the number of potential opportunities for attackers accordingly).
An attacker with access to security-enhanced SCP-ECG files may try to perform cer-
tain attack(s). The following risk assessment analyzes attacks depending on the actions
intended by the attacker and the cryptographic elements he/she needs access to.
• Unauthorized reading of confidential parts from security-enhanced SCP-ECGs. Its
Section 12 contains the syntax to read the contents that are confidential, and given
its relevance, it is protected with asymmetric encryption. Breaking this encryption
or obtaining the private key(s) from an authorized user is considered highly unlikely.
Therefore, the only opportunity for an attacker is attempting a brute-force attack
on each individual confidential section — since they are encrypted with independent
symmetric encryption keys —, which has a low success likelihood.
• Generation of forged security-enhanced SCP-ECG files. Anyone can create his/her
own security-enhanced SCP-ECG files, since the procedure is public. However, at-
tempting to forge the origin of the biomedical test requires generating a legitimate
digital signature from a trusted entity (e.g. a rightful CD). To do so, the attacker
would need to break or steal the private key of a trusted entity — which is highly
unlikely if appropriately protected.
• Malicious removal of legitimate contents from security-enhanced SCP-ECG files. An
attacker may remove certain parts of a legitimate file. Nonetheless, this would lead
to a failed verification of the digital signature embedded in its Section 12, which will
alert authorized users about the tampering.
• Malicious edition of legitimate security-enhanced SCP-ECG files. This is a combina-
tion of the previous types of attack. It requires knowing the plain contents of the file
(thus, breaking the encryption of the confidential parts), editing certain part(s) (as
intended by the attacker) and re-protect the SCP-ECG file. The last step includes
re-encrypting the confidential parts of the file and replacing the previous signature
with a new valid one, the latter requiring the private key of a trusted entity — which
is highly unlikely to obtain.
Therefore, this analysis demonstrates that extended SCP-ECG files feature adequate
levels of security.
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Table 3.11: Typical size (KB) of Section 12 fields of a security-enhanced SCP-ECG file
Entity’s certificate type Tag 1 Tag 3 User’s certificate type Tag 5
ECDSA 224 0.6 0.06
ECDSA 256 0.6 0.06 RSA 2048 0.26
DSA 2048 1.6 0.05 RSA 4096 0.51
DSA 4096 2.6 0.05
RSA 2048 1.1 0.26 Tags 0, 2, 4 Tag 6
RSA 4096 1.8 0.51 0.003 0.025·#entries
3.4.2 Implications for SCP-ECG and impact on its architecture
The main implications for this standard are the addition of the new Section 12, the en-
cryption of confidential contents — which depends on the privacy profile implemented —
and the coordination with the security-enhanced ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD standard for the
exchange of ECG information. The use of encryption has a severe distortion effect on
confidential SCP-ECG parts. This effect has been evaluated on 30 SCP-ECG files from
www.openecg.net, by calculating the normalized cross correlation, corr ∈ [0, 1], between
all pairs of metadata and signals from different files. Related signal pairs, such as leads
from the same patient record, obtained corr values higher than 0.6 while unrelated signal
(and metadata) pairs obtained values close to 0. As expected, the corr values between
pairs of original signals/metadata and their encrypted counterparts were also close to 0,
showing the decorrelation power of encryption.
On the other hand, the security extension of SCP-ECG files also results in a different
file size and access time:
• File size. The addition of Section 12 implies dealing with bigger files, which will
increase the size of the file database and the time used for the transmission of these
files. As shown in Table 3.11, the main factors are the certificate type of the entity
generating the protected file (Tag 1), which also determines the length of the DS
(Tag 3), and the user’s certificate type, which fixes the encrypted symmetric key(s)
length (Tag 5). They account for approximately 95%-99% of the section size. The
contribution of the rest of the fields (hash function ID, symmetric encryption ID,
etc.) is very low.
For security-enhanced SCP-ECG files implementing privacy profile 3 the number of
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entries in Tag 6 may grow substantially, so it is proposed limiting this field to the last
40 accesses (1 KB). Notice in Table 3.10 that Tag 5 is not included for profile 0. The
section size ranges from 0.66 (profile 0 with ECDSA 224/256 entity’s cert, — Tag
5 is empty, 1 entry in Tag 6) to 4.16 KB (profile 3 with RSA 4096 entity’s cert for
encryption in Tag 5, DSA 4096 entity’s cert for signature in Tags 1, 3 and 40 accesses
in Tag 6). Since the size of a typical SCP-ECG file is 31 KB (Section 2.1.3), the
typical overhead is within 0.66/31−4.16/31 ' 2−13.4%. When taking the minimum
file size (7.4 KB), the overhead ranges from 0.66/7.4 ' 9% to 4.16/7.4 ' 56.2%.
These results show the importance of choosing ECDSA certificates to reduce the
overhead without security degradation. Finally, the overhead for the maximum file
size (355 KB) ranges from 0.66/355 ' 0.2% to 4.16/355 ' 1.2%.
• Protection-access time. This is the average delay introduced by the operations de-
scribed in Section 3.3.2 through a software implementation (Section 3.5):
– Security enhancement of a regular SCP-ECG file: typically 0.5-1 s.
– Access to the contents of a security-enhanced SCP-ECG file: typically 0.5-1 s.
– Generation of a security-enhanced SCP-ECG file (profiles 0-3) from another
security-enhanced SCP-ECG file (profile 3, Figure 3.4): typically 1.5-2.5 s.
The last procedure takes longer because it implies accessing the confidential contents
and protecting again twice (one time to update the secure access record in the file
of the protecting entity and add a new signature, and another to produce the whole
user’s file). Comparing the time to generate the contents of a SCP-ECG file (' 10-30
s) and the delay to protect it, the latter is only ' 2-10 %. Comparing the delay
to access a security-enhanced file to the time to represent its contents and interpret
them (≥ 1 min), the former represents only ≤ 5 %.
To provide a reference of the performance, all the tests were executed on an Intel Core
2 CPU E850 at 3.16 GHz running Windows XP.
3.4.3 Potential limitations
Given the simplicity of this format extension, the only potential limitations might come
from the discovery of vulnerabilities in the algorithms implementing the cryptographic
functions used. Since the choice of algorithms falls directly in the newly proposed SDO
(IHE) profile (Section 2.6.3), any related issue shall be solved from there, by updating pe-
riodically the list of algorithms — including novel, highly secure algorithms and removing
those vulnerable or less secure.
114 3.5. Proof of concept
3.5 Proof of concept
It has been built a simple graphical user interface (Figure 3.6) that implements the pro-
cedures depicted in Figure 3.4 in order to provide users (clinicians, researchers, hospital
system administrators, etc.) with a way to protect their SCP-ECG files and access them
easily. Thus, this GUI guarantees the compliance of the extension proposed with regular
SCP-ECG equipment and software (viewers, editors, parsers). If this extension is adopted
officially, ECG devices will be able to provide security-enhanced SCP-ECG files and SCP-
ECG viewers will be able to show their contents using the software principles already
implemented in this GUI.
Figure 3.6: SCP-ECG↔Security-enhanced SCP-ECG graphical user interface. A scenario
of use for this GUI is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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All the operations of encryption, decryption, writing and checking are carried out by
the application. Nevertheless, some interaction is required:
• With the entity that protects the regular SCP-ECG file — he/she shall (1) set the
privacy profile, (2) choose the symmetric cipher and (3) the hash function, (4) load
his/her certificate, (5) his/her private key and (6) the users’ certificates. The set
[symmetric encryption algorithm ID, hash function ID, protecting entity’s certificate
and protecting entity’s private key] can be fixed to save time. It is recommended
using [Twofish, RIPEMD-256, ECDSA ≥ 256 for signature].
• With the user that accesses a security-enhanced SCP-ECG file — to access the
confidential parts in the protected file he/she shall load his/her private key (not
necessary for profile 0).
This GUI is openly available at http://sourceforge.net/projects/pscp/, also as
an applet for integration in web pages.
3.6 Conclusions
The main objective of this Chapter was to illustrate the procedures and considerations
involved in the security extension of biomedical standards according to the global, layer-
based proposal in Chapter 2. Furthermore, this chapter has exemplified the extension
of two well-known standards that previously featured an insufficient enforcement of basic
security requirements: X73PHD and SCP-ECG. The main conclusions regarding these
extensions are summarized below:
• The proposal and evaluation of the security-enhanced version of X73PHD indicates
that it not only maintains, but also augments, the defining features of the origi-
nal X73PHD. In fact, the agent can persistently store the acquired measurements,
with security; the manager can establish associations with different agents at the
same time, by negotiating differentiated layers, and it can also communicate with
PHRs, EHRs, alert managers and CDSS; the manager is able to access and process
all the information without human intervention and also to show authorized users
additional information regarding security and interoperability features. The security
assessment demonstrates that the implementation of any layer proposed includes at
least one countermeasure against each threat affecting the m-Health applications
intended for that layer, and that the number of countermeasures grows with the
layer implemented. As regards to the costs involved, it can be considered that the
modification that this extension produces in the three models defining X73PHD are
moderate. It is not required extending the DIM with new attributes; the new service
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model adds four new frames and extends another four with new sub-frames (most
of them common to all layers); and the communication model only adds one new
sub-state, ‘Authenticating’. Furthermore, the enhanced X73PHD architecture can
be considered lightweight since an agent with a simple 9 MHz processor (assuming
a throughput of 1 MIPS/MHz) can implement the top layer and transmit a 3-lead
ECG in real-time to a manager with a one-core processor at 1 GHz (also assuming
the same throughput). As regards to the surrounding framework, it is required that
an administrator initially configures the agent and the manager, that users shar-
ing these devices have tokens for identification/authentication, and that managers
implement certain IHE profiles to enable their integration with healthcare systems.
• The security enhancement of SCP-ECG relies on the extension of its file format and
on the exchange of ECG data through the security-enhanced X73PHD. The design
of this security extension prioritizes its robustness and the ease of use for clinicians
caring for the patient, cardiologists who interpret ECGs, researchers, teachers and
hospital system administrators, who can keep using their regular SCP-ECG devices,
editors and viewers. The intermediate software developed in this work to protect
SCP-ECG files and access the protected files is openly available. An adequate level
of resistance to attacks against the security of the files and the privacy of the personal
health information is achieved by means of cryptography. Since this is an evolving
field, the list of cryptographic algorithms proposed (and the order of preference)
are specified in the SDO profile, which will be updated periodically. The costs
required to perform the security-enhancement of the files and the further access to
the contents are low or moderate: typically 2 − 13.4% of overhead with respect to
the size of a regular file, 2 − 10% extra delay to protect a newly generated SCP-
ECG file and ≤ 5% extra delay to access it for interpretation. Thus, a good level
of availability of the test is technically feasible. Finally, this extension follows the
guidelines for security standardization since it implements role-based access control,
digital signature, part-level encryption and registry of accesses to carry out the secure
storage of (ECG-related) biomedical contents, which correspond to the SST part of
the SDO profile.
To sum up, these two interrelated proposals follow the guidelines of the global security
proposal and provide efficient and standardized solutions for the acquisition, exchange
and storage of biomedical information — mainly in the BAN/PAN part of the m-Health
architecture. Moreover, it can also be considered that these extension of X73PHD and
SCP-ECG achieve security levels in line with those of reference biomedical standards, such
as DICOM and HL7, with low or moderate costs.
“Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower.”
Steve Jobs
“Doubt is not a pleasant state of mind, but certainty is absurd.”
Franc¸ois-Marie Arouet Voltaire
“The most important thing in science is not so much to obtain
new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them.”
Sir William Bragg
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Enhancement of the security of biomedical tests
through their associated signals
This Chapter deals with the blocks of the proposal for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health
architecture that are surrounded in red in Figure 4.1. Once the layer-based security
scheme has been designed (blue block in Figure 4.1) and weak biomedical standards have
been extended according to it (dark green block in Figure 4.1), there is still room for
enhancing the security of biomedical tests, which may be managed by means of biomedical
standards but may also be handled out of these formats — given its intrinsic clinical
value. Since the protection of biomedical standards is entirely based on cryptographic
resources, the application of another type of resources (which may be combined with
traditional cryptography), relying on different security principles, seems the most adequate
to strengthen the protection of biomedical tests. Particularly, the two security techniques
described herein are based on signals, which are the core components of most biomedical
tests. The first technique enables an efficient and secure coding of biomedical test by
embedding their periodic measurements and contextual information into their biomedical
signals (Section 4.1). Its performance — signal distortion, embedding capacity, delays,
bandwidth requirements — is thoroughly evaluated, by means of various ECG and EEG-
based tests (Section 4.2), and implemented as a proof-of-concept (Section 4.3). Next,
it is proposed the implementation of various secure m-Health applications based on this
coding (Section 4.4). Then, the second signal-based technique, called keytagging, details
a procedure for the association of information to images in a secure, cost-efficient and
non-distorting manner (Section 4.5). The major features of keytagging — robustness-
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Figure 4.1: Building blocks for a secure, cost-efficient, m-Health architecture. Contents
addressed in Chapter 4 surrounded in red.
capacity tradeoff, specificity, compliance with compression, runtime cost, scalability —
are experimentally tested (Section 4.6) and taken into account to define the operating
parameters of a variety of keytagging-based security measures (Section 4.7). Finally, the
main conclusions of this Chapter are drawn (Section 4.8).
4.1 Novel coding for biomedical tests
The first signal-based security technique developed in this Thesis, a novel coding for
biomedical tests based on embedding, is presented, analyzed and evaluated throughout
Sections 4.1-4.4 and 4.8. Its notation is summarized in Table 4.1. The outline of the
new cryptosteganographic coding for biomedical tests composed of signals (e.g. ECGs),
periodic measurements (e.g. oxygen in blood, body temperature) and contextual data
(e.g. allergies, medication of the user) is formally defined in Algorithms 1-2, illustrated in
Figure 4.2 by means of an example and explained in detail in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.3. It is
worth mentioning that this coding is mainly intended for Personal/Body Area Networks,
being the biomedical test acquired by a device with multiple interfaces and sensors con-
nected to it. The acquiring device will encode this information with this novel coding,
which fulfills the requirements in Section 1.2.2 by integrating appropriate methods for
signal compression, embedding of additional metadata — contents of the test and ele-
ments to provide security and privacy — and partial encryption of the signal. Real-time
coding/decoding is feasible since the coder works with length-adjustable signal blocks to
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Table 4.1: Operators and notation of the algorithm for coding biomedical tests
Notation Meaning
output(s)← f(input(s)) Assignment of value to one or several outputs from a function or operator f()
with one or several inputs.
[ ] Concatenation operator.
⊕ Binary XOR operator.
{X} Set of elements of type X, each element i represented as X{i}.
#X Number of elements that compose the set X.
V (i : j : k) Vector derived from a vector V , corresponding to a subset of its elements,
[V (i), V (i+ j), V (i+ 2 · j), ..., V (k)].
S Vector corresponding to a signal associated to a biomedical test.
Th Distortion threshold allowed after the processing of S.
contents Vector corresponding to periodic measurements and/or contextual information
associated to a biomedical test.
CTU Coded Test Unit, see Figure 4.2.
CTUp Plain (not partially encrypted) Coded Test Unit, see Figure 4.2.
RC Recovery Container, defined in Table 4.2.
lengthNoise Length of the noisy vector to be hosted between two consecutive containers in
order to hide their locations.
IV Initialization Vector, to be used for the partial encryption of a CTUp.
wcoef ←WT (S) Function that performs the wavelet transformation of a signal S
and returns the resulting coefficients, wcoef
SPIHTb, pointer ←
compress(S, SPIHT , Th)
Wavelet transformation of S and encoding of the resulting coefficients with the
SPIHT coder, which returns a bitframe SPIHTb that truncated at pointer and
reconstructed returns S with a distortion of Th.
S ← decompress(SPIHTb, SPIHT ) Reconstruction of a signal S from its SPIHTb bitframe. The former will have
some degree of distortion if the latter has been truncated.
wSPIHT , LIS, LIP, LSP ←
decodeWavelet(SPIHTb)
Reconstruction of the wavelet coefficients, wSPIHT , of the SPIHTb bitframe. It
can also return the three lists involved in the decoding, LIS, LIP and LSP .
wadded ← decodeWavelet(SPIHTb,
index1, index2, LIS, LIP, LSP )
Reconstruction of the wavelet coefficients corresponding to the segment of
SPIHTb from index1 + 1 to index2. The process can be boosted by providing
the LIS, LIP and LSP of the reconstruction of SPIHTb(1 : index1).
Sk Secret key used for symmetric encryption-decryption.
PrU Private key to be used by user U for asymmetric decryption of data or for its
signature.
PbU Public key of user U , used by any user for asymmetric encryption of data
intended for U , or to verify any signature issued by U .
DS(D,Alg, PrU) Digital signature of D using the algorithm Alg and the private key of U .
checkDS(D,Alg, PbU) Verification of the DS of D by using the algorithm Alg public key of U .
encrypt(Plaintext,Alg,K) Encryption of Plaintext using the algorithm Alg and the key K.
decrypt(Ciphertext, Alg,K) Decryption of Ciphertext using the algorithm Alg and the key K.
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constrain the delays, producing Coded Test Units (CTU s). As shown in Figure 1.5, within
the m-Health scenario these CTU s may be sent from the acquiring-coding device to one
or several concentrator devices (e.g. aggregators), which in turn may re-forward them to
other systems (e.g. PHRs and/or EHRs). Regardless the device/system storing CTU s,
the access to the signal(s), measurements and data that they contain is limited according
to the professional role(s) of the consulting user(s). Particularly, access to the signal can
be provided to any user (under the consent of the patient) by providing the plain CTU,
which would be decompressed as a whole — maintaining the secrecy of the metadata em-
bedded. Complementarily, users who know the coding of CTU s can always access their
authorized contents and detect if there is corruption. Furthermore, this coding is designed
to prevent unauthorized users/attackers from accessing contents, not only by encrypting
them, but also by hiding their locations within the CTU s.
4.1.1 Signal compression
The signal compression process appears in Algorithm 1: line 2. As detailed in Sections
2.2.1-2.2.2, the combination of the wavelet transform and the 1D SPIHT coder is well tai-
lored for the compression of 1D biomedical signals. It offers a good compression-distortion
tradeoff and counts with noteworthy features, such as progressive lossy to lossless coding,
low complexity (use of simple operators), moderate memory usage and symmetric coding-
decoding. Precisely the SPIHT decompression of the signal appears in Algorithm 2: line
11. Another outstanding property of this coder is that large amounts of data can be
embedded and retrieved from truncated SPIHT bitframes with simplicity and secrecy. To
enable real-time operation and reduce memory demanding, the signal is divided into short,
non-overlapping and equal-length blocks S, prior to compression. In offline mode, longer
block lengths are recommended, since the content of the lower frequencies grows and the
compression becomes more efficient. Adequate block length values, balancing bandwidth
requirements and delays, are discussed in Section 4.2.3.
The 1D SPIHT uses a temporal orientation tree structure to define the temporal parent-
offspring relations in the wavelet domain, across consecutive layers. The set partitioning
rule creates subsets of subband coefficient indices to create and update three related lists.
The returned stream interleaves bits corresponding to wavelet coefficient values, called
refinement bits, and instructions to update the lists and continue the decoding, called
significant bits. The stream bits are ordered according to their significance, and it can
be truncated at any point to enable compression with distortion under a threshold that
preserves the signal diagnostic value.
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Figure 4.2: Proposed coding (and decoding) for 1D biomedical tests in m-Health
architectures.
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Algorithm 1 Coding of biomedical tests as CTU s
1: procedure Biocoding(S, Th, {contents}, RC, {Sk}, {lengthNoise}, IV , PrEntity)
2: SPIHTb, pointer ← compress(S, SPIHT , Th) . SPIHT-based compression of S
3: metadata← preparationOfMetadata({contents}, RC, {Sk}, {lengthNoise})
4: CTUp, tail← embedding(S, SPIHTb, pointer, Th,metadata) . To embed metadata with coded S
5: CTU ← symPartialSignalEncryption(CTUp, Sk{0}, IV ) . Partial encryption of coded S
6: CTU ← [CTU,DS([CTU, tail], readSignatureAlg(RC), P rEntity), tail] . To close the CTU
7: return CTU , CTUp(1 : 128) . The first 128 bits of CTUp are the IV to encode the next CTU
8: procedure PreparationOfMetadata({contents}, RC, {Sk}, {lengthNoise})
9: containers← {}
10: for i in 1 to #contents do . Each content will result in a container
11: if isConfidentialContainer(RC, i) then . If the container is confidential
12: containers{i} ← encrypt(contents{i}, readSymEncAlg(RC), IV, Sk{i}) . Sym. encr.
13: randomNoise{i} ← createRandomV ector(lengthNoise{i}) . To hide its position
14: else . If the container is public
15: containers{i} ← contents{i} . Content in plaintext
16: randomNoise{i} ← createRandomV ector(lengthNoise{i})
17: metadata← RC
18: for i in 1 to #containers do . Introduction of random vectors between containers
19: metadata← [metadata, randomNoise{i}, containers{i}] . to hide their locations
20: return metadata
21: procedure Embedding(S, SPIHTb, pointer, Th, metadata)
22: CTUp ← [SPIHTb(1 : pointer),metadata] . See Figure 4.2
23: wS ←WT (S) . Wavelet coefficients for perfect reconstruction of S
24: wCTUp, LIS, LIP, LSP ← decodeWavelet(CTUp(1 : pointer)) . Wavelet coefficients for a
25: pointer2← 0 . distortion of Th when reconstructing S with CTUp(1 : pointer)
26: while distortionWavelet(wS , wCTUp) > Th do . This loop extends CTUp with bits from
27: pointer2← pointer2 + 1 . SPIHTb until the distortion of the S reconstructed from CTUp
28: CTUp ← [SPIHTb(1 : (pointer + pointer2)),metadata] . is below Th
29: wcompensation ← decodeWavelet(CTUp, pointer, end, LIS, LIP, LSP )
30: wCTUp ← wCTUp + wcompensation
31: tail← pointer + pointer2 . Point in CTUp where the bits from the original SPIHTb end
32: return CTUp, tail
33: procedure symPartialSignalEncryption(CTUp, sk, IV ) . It only requires a double ⊕
34: CTU ← CTUp
35: CTU(1 : length(sk))← CTUp(1 : length(sk))⊕ sk ⊕ IV
36: return CTU
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Algorithm 2 Decoding of CTU s to biomedical tests
1: procedure Biodecoding(CTU , PrUser)
2: metadata← readMetadata(CTU) . It reads the tail of CTU and extracts metadata
3: RC ← readRC(metadata) . Extraction of RC, located at the beginning of metadata, see Tab. 4.2
4: if checkDS(RC, readSignatureAlgorithm(RC), readPublicKeyEntity(RC)) then
5: if checkDS(CTU, readSignatureAlgorithm(RC), readPublicKeyEntity(RC)) then
6: {contents}, Sk{0}, IV ← readAuthorizedContents(RC,PrUser) . See Figure 4.2
7: if IsConfidentialSignal(RC) then
8: CTUp ← symPartialSignalEncryption(CTU, Sk{0}, IV ) . To decrypt, Alg. 1: line 33
9: else
10: CTUp ← CTU
11: S ← decompress(CTUp, SPIHT ) . Reconstruction of S with a distortion of Th
12: else
13: Warning caused by invalid signature of CTU
14: else
15: Warning caused by invalid signature of RC
16: return S, {contents} . The information contained in CTU of authorized access to the user
Bounding distortion using SPIHT is a simple task if we use the fact that the Euclidean
norm, which is used to measure the error, is invariant to the wavelet transform (since it is
a unitary transformation). Thus, guaranteeing reconstruction quality can be easily done
by controlling the value of the coded coefficients and calculating some distortion measure
to stop the coding process when the desired distortion level is reached [373, 374]. This is
detailed in Section 4.2.2.
The tolerance to errors (inversion of bit value) of the SPIHT depends on the position
of the wrong bits in the stream and on their types (refinement or significant). Wrong
bits at the beginning of the stream will cause higher damage in the signal reconstruc-
tion since they carry more important information. Nonetheless, while wrong refinement
bits cause a constant error in the signal, even one only wrong significant bit causes the
desynchronization of the remaining decoding, producing a much more significant damage.
4.1.2 Embedding metadata within the signal
The embedding and retrieval of metadata (e.g. additional measurements recorded during
the test, contextual information, security items), formally defined in Algorithm 1: lines
4 and 21-32 and Algorithm 2: line 2, are steganographic procedures to achieve a cer-
tain degree of privacy. These are performed in the SPIHT domain given the remarkable
advantages: high capacity, very low complexity and controllable signal distortion.
Before embedding the metadata, the signal is compressed (Section 4.1.1) guaranteeing
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that the distortion is below a distortion threshold — Th. This compression implies that
the bitframe is truncated, from a given point to the right, which corresponds to small
details of the signal and noise — as the bitframe is ordered by significance. As illustrated
in Figure 4.2 and Algorithm 1: line 22, to produce the plain CTU, the truncated bits
are replaced with metadata, which results embedded within the signal. These bits are
kept for signal reconstruction, providing a common access to the signal regardless whether
the user knows the test coding method (thus, the presence of additional contents) or
just the signal compression algorithm — see Algorithm 2: line 11. Nevertheless, those
metadata bits added after the truncation point are interpreted by the SPIHT decoder
as actual significant and refinement bits. Thus, they will produce wrong decoding from
the truncation point, introducing small levels of random noise in the reconstructed signal
block (Section 4.2.3). This leads to two possible results:
• distortion > Th, the most common case, when the added random noise increased
the distortion of the signal. To bypass this issue, extra SPIHT bits from the origi-
nal, untruncated bitframe bits will be added between the truncation point and the
metadata bits, until distortion ≤ Th — see Algorithm 1: lines 26-30. Those extra
bits introduce certain overhead — see Figure 4.2.
• distortion ≤ Th, when the added random noise was overall close to certain details
in the original signal block. Since the distortion of the signal with the metadata is
lower, it preserves its clinical value without the need of adding extra bits from the
original SPIHT.
It is worth noting that during the embedding there is no need to reconstruct the signal
in the time domain to update the distortion when extending the SPIHT. This is feasible
in the transform domain since the wavelet is a unitary transformation — see Algorithm 1
lines 26 and 29-30, and practical because the wavelet coefficients are calculated only once
— see Algorithm 1: 23-24.
Metadata encoding, protection and access
Organizing and protecting appropriately the metadata to be embedded within plain CTU s
(see Figure 4.2) are basic requirements to guarantee that the corruption of the signal or the
metadata can be detected and that access to the latter is suitably controlled. Although
Cryptographic Message Syntax [151] (implemented by DICOM) provides the means to
digitally sign, digest, authenticate or encrypt any digital content, it presents disadvantages
that the CTU s must avoid: the syntax to protect each piece of data is not separated from
it, control the access of different users is costly and it produces too much overhead.
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The proposed coding is depicted in Figure 4.2, by means of an example, and in Al-
gorithm 1: lines 3 and 8-20. At the end of each Coded Test Unit (CTU ) there is a tail,
composed of two bytes, which points at the beginning of the metadata to allow its retrieval
— see Algorithm 2: line 2. The metadata is composed of:
• a Recovery Container (RC, mandatory in the first CTU ), which includes the syntax
necessary to make the signal and the content of each data container retrievable to
targeted users (or to everybody);
• data containers (1-6, optional), which include periodic measurements and/or context-
related metadata about the test (see Section 4.4); and
• a digital signature (DS, mandatory), which allows the detection of tampering/forgery
in the CTU.
The Recovery Container , depicted in Table 4.2, details the symmetric (tag 3 ) and
asymmetric elements (tag 0-2 ) combined in the protection scheme to obtain an optimal
security-performance tradeoff. Tags 4-5 indicate the position of container 1 to enable
public access (when permitted by the user/patient) and tag 6 contains the Private Access
Table, which regulates private access to the containers.
The data containers, as illustrated in Figure 4.2 and Algorithm 1: line 19, are placed
one after another, with noisy bytes preceding each container to hide their locations within
the CTU — thus, increasing the cost of an attack due to the secrecy of their locations.
In addition to this, confidential containers are encrypted independently with symmetric
cryptography (a secret key, Sk[h], and a initialization vector, IV, are used), which operates
very fast. The recommendations from the (IHE) SDO profile (Section 2.6.3) are followed
for the choice of the cryptographic algorithms. The symmetric ciphers suggested are
listed in Table 4.2: tag 3 — Twofish , Serpent, RC6, MARS or AES, operating in counter
mode (CTR), which makes cryptanalysis more difficult and does not require extra bytes
for padding. The preferred cipher is Twofish (128), expected to remain secure beyond
2030 (according to NIST, see Table 2.6) and the second fastest in generation of keys and
encryption (see Table 2.8). Asymmetric cryptography, which is safer and does not need
previous key arrangements to begin operation, is used to protect the symmetric encryption
elements and also the location (position and length) of the confidential containers (Table
4.2: tag 6). This uses a key pair (PbUser[j], PrUser[j]) for encryption and decryption.
Regarding algorithms, only the widespread RSA (≥ 2048) [360] is recommended, since
its major competitor, elGamal, is not a standard and encrypts more slowly. The access
procedure is as follows:
• For public containers (indicated in Table 4.2: tag 4), they are in plaintext and
their locations are publicly available in Table 4.2: tag 5.
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Table 4.2: Structure and content of a Recovery Container
Tag1 Length1 Value (parameter data)
0 length2
Certificate of the coding entity (PEM encoding):
This is the certificate for signature of the person, software or acquiring device that generates the
Coded Test Unit. It must be X.509 type and three signature algorithms are allowed: ECDSA
≥ 224 (recommended 256) [366], DSA ≥ 2048 [367] and RSA ≥ 2048 [360].
1 1 byte Hash function ID
Value Algorithm
0 RIPEMD-256
1 Whirlpool
2 SHA-256
2 length2
Digital signature, DS(RC, Tags : 0, 1, P rEntity)
This is the encryption of the hash of the RC using the private key of the coding entity (initially
DS = blank). At the user’s side the DS is used to verify the integrity of the RC and authenticate
the coding entity. The length depends on the signature algorithm: DSA or ECDSA.
3 1 byte Symmetric encryption algorithm ID
Value Algorithm
0 Twofish
1 Serpent
2 RC6
3 MARS
4 AES
4 1 bytes
Binary mask of contents(s) — 0-bits for confidential, 1-bits for public.
The leftmost bit corresponds to the signal, the next to the first container and so on. The
rightmost bit indicates if the first container is present in the following CTU s (0) or not (1).
5 (4 + 3) ·
n bytes
Position and length of the n public container(s), see Tag 4.
6 length2
Private Access Table (PAT)
Length1
(bytes) Content
6 Date of coding
(seconds since January 1,
1970, 00:00:00 GMT)
6 PbU1 (first bytes)
1 RBAC profile (n) — see Section 4.4
length encrypt(entry for user 1, Alg, PbU1)
... ...
each entry is
Length1 Content
(bytes)
16 IV , initialization vector
16 Sk[0], secret symmetric key for the signal
4 Position of container 1 (bytes)
3 Length of container 1 (bytes)
16 Sk[1], secret symmetric key for cont. 1
... ...
4 Position of container 6 (bytes)
3 Length of container 6 (bytes)
16 Sk[6], secret symmetric key for cont. 6
1 The fields Tag and Length are represented with 1 and 2 bytes respectively.
2 The length of these fields is specified in Table 4.3.
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• For confidential containers (indicated in Table 4.2: tag 4), their symmetric keys
(Sk[h]), initialization vector (IV, which is common for the signal and all the con-
tainers in a CTU ) and locations make private entries in the Private Access Table
(PAT, Table 4.2: tag 6), encrypted with the public RSA key of the intended user(s).
As shown in Algorithm 2: line 6, each user decodes his/her entry in the PAT using
his/her private key.
It is worth noting that container1 is intended for periodic content(s) that are associated
to each signal block – and thus to all the CTU (s), not only in the first one. The presence
of this container, either continuous or limited to the first CTU , is indicated in Table 4.2:
tag 4.
The Digital Signatures (DS) included in each CTU (Figure 4.2) and in the RC
(Table 4.2: tag 2) are used to check their integrity and authenticity, see Algorithm 2:
lines 4-5. Again, the recommendations from the (IHE) SDO profile (Section 2.6.3) are
followed for the choice of the cryptographic algorithms involved. The DS are calculated
by combining a safe hash function (Table 4.2: tag 1 - RIPEMD 256, Whirlpool or SHA
256) which makes a digest of the RC /CTU, with a public-key algorithm, which encrypts
the digest with the private key of the entity who encodes the test — a person, a program
or the test acquisition device itself. At the user’s side, each DS is verified by calculating
the hash of the received RC /CTU and comparing it with the original hash, decrypted
with the public key of the coding entity (extracted from his/her digital certificate, Table
4.2: tag 0). If they match the RC /CTU is valid, otherwise all CTUs/that CTU are
refused. Regarding algorithms, RSA [360] is allowed but discouraged, since the signatures
are lengthy, DSA [367] is permitted since its signature is very compact (see Section 4.2.3),
and ECDSA [366] is the preferred option since for a similar security level the signature
length is the same as DSA and its key, and consequently its digital certificate, is much
shorter (see Table 4.3).
4.1.3 Partial signal encryption
The partial encryption of the signal is applied to plain CTU s, obtaining the corresponding
CTU s. This process is performed in the compressed domain, which saves a number of
operations with respect to encrypting the original signal block. The reasons why partial
encryption can be easily implemented are two: the SPIHT bitframe is ordered by relevance
and the first changed significant bit produces the desynchronization of the decoding from
that position. Therefore, it is enough to encrypt the first 128 bits of the bitframe, which
include many significant bits, to produce a very high distortion that makes it uninter-
pretable. The signal block can only be reconstructed if the first 128 bits are retrieved,
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either decrypting with the corresponding key or by brute-force searching, with a success
probability of 1 in 2128 ∼ 1039 in the latter case.
Table 4.3: Typical size (KB) of the containers in a Secure Frame
Recovery container (RC ), defined in Table 4.2 Rest of containers
Entity’s cert RC -Tag 0 RC -Tag 2 CTU Database Block Cont. 1
DS length
ECDSA 224 0.6 0.06 0.06 Arrhythmia (ECG) 512 0.053
ECDSA 256 0.6 0.06 0.06 Compression (ECG) 512 0.076
DSA 2048 1.6 0.05 0.05 SCCN (EEG) 512 0.012
DSA 4096 2.6 0.05 0.05 Arrhythmia (ECG) 4096 0.421
RSA 2048 1.1 0.26 0.26 Compression (ECG) 4096 0.606
RSA 4096 1.8 0.51 0.51 SCCN (EEG) 4096 0.098
RC -Tags 1, 3-5 User’s cert RC -Tag 6 Containers 2-6
RSA 1024 (legacy) 0.13·#users
0.007 RSA 2048 0.26·#users 3-10
RSA 4096 0.51·#users
4.2 Experimental evaluation of the coding for biomedical
tests
The methods selected for signal compression (Section 4.1.1) and metadata embedding
(Section 4.1.2) depend on several parameters (e.g. signal distortion threshold, signal block
length, wavelet decomposition level, DS type) which are studied and set up to guarantee
a) user satisfaction: signal fidelity, low runtime costs (to allow real-time operation), ease of
use of the implementation (see Section 4.3) and b) optimal system features: low bandwidth
requirements, low overhead of the security elements and enough embedding capacity to
include data produced in m-Health services.
A variety of electrocardiograms (ECGs), commonly used for the detection and diagnosis
of heart disease, and electroencephalograms (EEGs), relevant in applications such as brain-
computer interfaces and the study of epilepsy and sleep disorders (insomnia, circadian
rhythm disorders, parasomnia, etc) are used to carry out all the parts of this evaluation.
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4.2.1 Evaluation setup
Two well-known ECG databases have been used. The first one is the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT)-Beth Israel Hospital (BIH) Arrhythmia [375]. This ECG
database consists of 48 two-lead ECG registers of 30 min duration. The sampling rate is
360 samples per second with a resolution of 11 bits per sample. Although the database
was originally created as standard test material for the evaluation of arrhythmia detectors,
this database is by far the most used to test and compare ECG compression algorithms.
The second ECG database is MIT-BIH Compression [201]. It is composed of 168 two-lead
ECG records of 20.48 s duration. The sampling rate is 250 samples(s) with a resolution
of 12 bits per sample. This database was created to pose a variety of challenges for ECG
compressors, in particular for lossy compression methods. Despite this fact, it is scarcely
used to test the ECG compression algorithms, being relegated by MIT-BIH Arrhythmia.
Since these ECG databases are composed of two-lead recordings, the entire evaluation was
run on both leads and the results represent the average.
For testing with EEGs, it was chosen the STUDY dataset [376, 377] from the Swartz
Center for Computational Neuroscience (SCCN), composed of 10 recordings from 5 dif-
ferent subjects, with 61 channels per frame, 820 frames per epoch and 220 to 235 epochs.
The sampling rate of these recordings is 200 samples per second and the resolution is 11
bits per sample.
4.2.2 Bounding signal distortion in compression
Fidelity of a compressed signal is understood as the close similarity with respect to the
original. In clinical applications, it is essential to measure the distance between both
signals by means of some distortion measure and setting a quality threshold to regulate
the compression process. Among the most widespread measures of signal distortion are:
• the Root Mean Square error (RMS), defined as
RMS =
√
(x(n)− x˜(n))2
N
, (4.1)
• and the Percentage RMS Distortion (PRD), defined as
PRD =
√∑N
n=1(x(n)− x˜(n))2∑N
n=1(x(n)− x)2
· 100, (4.2)
where x(n) is the original signal, x˜(n) is the reconstructed, x the mean of the original
signal and N its length.
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It can be observed in Equation 4.1 how the amplitude range of the signal affects the
measure: compressed signals constrained to lower amplitudes obtain lower RMS than
those with higher amplitude and the same fidelity. The definition of PRD in Equation
4.2 overcomes this issue because it uses a normalization which is independent from the
amplitude of the signal (and from its DC level). Thus, the choice as the measure of signal
distortion is the PRD, since it allows much fairer comparisons.
Figure 4.3: Signals a) 08730 2 (lead 1) ECG from MIT-BIH Compression (bitrate3000bps),
b) compressed with PRD = 9% (bitrate 202 bps), c) Syn08-s254 EEG from SSCN
(bitrate 2200 bps), d) compressed with PRD = 7% (bitrate 240 bps). Additional pa-
rameters: block length = 512 samples, wavelet decomposition level = 6, SPIHT coding.
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Furthermore, the correlation between the PRD and the mean opinion score (MOS) of
expert cardiologists, obtained through blind and semi blind tests, was studied by Zigel in
[378]. One of the conclusions of that work was that all tested signals with PRD < 9%
were considered as ”good” or ”very good” by the cardiologists. Thus, this value is used
as quality threshold for ECG compression in this coding. Similarly, other works relate
PRD to EEG quality. In [379] it is suggested limiting PRD to 7% to maintain 99.5%
of the signal energy, while in [380] it is proposed rising to 30% since this value allows
a seizure detection rate of 90% to be reached in epilepsy monitoring (using REACT, a
state-of-the-art algorithm). Among these two values, 7% is preferred since EEG records
may be used in applications requiring higher quality than seizure detection. Figure 4.3
shows two signals from these databases, an ECG and an EEG, which are compressed with
the proposed thresholds and retain their main shapes accurately.
4.2.3 Runtime costs and bandwidth requirements
The runtime costs of the processes involved in the coding and decoding of biomedical
tests are estimated in Table 4.5. The overall cost is mainly contributed by the latency of
acquiring a signal block, expressible as:
block length(s) =
block length (#samples)
sampling freq. (#samples(s))
. (4.3)
In fact, in all the configurations presented this delay is much greater than the sum
of delays of the remaining processes (see Table 4.5: subtotal). This enables real-time
operation on the condition of signal blocks as short as possible to maintain the delay at
acceptable levels.
The bandwidth required for the transmission of coded ECG and EEG-based tests, em-
bedding security elements (mandatory) and additional metadata (optional) is evaluated
in Table 4.4. Four observations were made. First, using long signal blocks produces a
decrease in signal bandwidth requirements which stops at 4096 samples/block for ECGs,
in the case of EEGs higher values can improve the compression at the cost of very high
delays (> 20.48 s according to Equation 4.3). Long signal blocks allow more signal cycles
to be included in a single block, lower frequencies obtain higher relevance and this benefits
the sorting of the temporal orientation trees used by the 1D SPIHT, which increases the
efficiency of the compression. Second, the signal bandwidth requirements increase slightly
(≤ 4%) when embedding a big amount of metadata (three last columns in Table 4.4).
Nevertheless this only happens in the first CTU, since the rest do not include contain-
ers 2-6. Third, using long signal blocks dramatically reduces the metadata bandwidth
requirements since, in each CTU, the size of the security elements with respect to the
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size of the coded signal block is lower. Fourth, the CTU compresses the original signal
bandwidth (compression rate > 1) despite of the embedding of security elements and other
metadata. The only exception appears in the first CTU when using short signal blocks
(512 samples/block) and embedding more than 3 KB in containers 2-6.
The size of the contents arranged in Secure Frames and subsequently embedded within
CTU s for the bandwidth evaluation above are depicted in Table 4.3. The chosen certificate
type for DS of the coding entity was ECDSA 256 and it was considered the case of 3 users,
2 with RSA 2048 certificates and 1 with a RSA 1024 (legacy) certificate, when embedding
containers 2-6. For ECGs, the container 1 included the signal delineation and additional
measurements obtained from a stress test (VO2, heart rate, concentration of lactate in
the blood, VCO2 and speed of the treadmill). For EEGs, the container 1 included a like-
lihood index for EEG seizure detection and additional monitoring measurements (NiBP,
Temp, SPO2, CO2 and heart rate). The ECG delineation consisted of the position of
15 fiducial points (wave onsets, peaks and offsets) per cardiac cycle, each point coded
with 2 bytes. EEG seizure detection likelihood was estimated every second and coded
using 1 byte. Each additional measurement was recorded at 1 sample/second and coded
using 1 byte. For containers 2-6 it was estimated that its overall size is around 3-10 KB.
Although they store a variety of medical data, most of it can be described by means of IDs.
Parameter tuning
As regards to the adjustment of parameters, the length of the signal block establishes
a tradeoff between the system overall delay and the bandwidth required for the transmis-
sion —this has been demonstrated above. Thus, two different values are recommended
according to the application.
• 512 samples/block for real-time transmission, which yields acceptable delays (see
Table 4.5: total) and low signal transmission rates (see Table 4.4): MIT-Arrhythmia
(2 s, 409 bps/lead), MIT-Compression (2.7 s, 309 bps/lead), SCCN-EEG (3.3 s, 474
bps/channel).
• 4096 samples/block for offline transmission, which produces longer delays but
more efficient signal transmission: MIT-Arrhythmia (12 s, 373 bps/lead), MIT-
Compression (17 s, 282 bps/lead), SCCN-EEG (22.3 s, 389 bps/channel). Fur-
thermore, the metadata transmission rate is reduced to one eighth with this config-
uration.
The signal compression, described in Section 4.1.1, begins with the wavelet trans-
formation of the signal block. The Coiflet filter with 12 coefficients was chosen for this
transformation, since it obtains higher compression efficiency than others (e.g. Daubechies
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with 20 coefficients) and offers a good tradeoff between the number of operations and the
quality of the reconstructed signal. The wavelet decomposition level was set to 6 because
it was observed that the compression efficiency improves notably until this level but not
in the following.
The protection scheme, described in Section 4.1.2, introduces overhead due to the need
of including a digital signature (DS) in each CTU (see Figure 4.2). Several signature
algorithms provide similar security with different DS length: ECDSA [366] (≥ 224, recom-
mended 256) and DSA [367] (≥ 2048) generate signatures sized in the range [0.05, 0.06]
KB, while RSA [360] (≥ 2048) signatures result much longer (≥ 0.26) KB. To achieve
good security with low overhead, ECDSA 256 is recommended.
Table 4.4: Bitrate required for the transmission of Coded Test Units including metadata
with different elements
Parameters Average compressed signal bitrate —bps/lead—
+ metadata bitrate —bps/lead—
(overall compression ratio)
Database Block PRD No SF DS only Cont. 1 RC, cont. 1, RC, cont. 1, RC, cont. 1,
length & DS cont. 2-6 cont. 2-6 cont. 2-6
(3 KB) & DS (6 KB) & DS (10 KB) & DS
Arrhythmia 512 9 % 409.4 409.7 410.6 422.0 422.5 422.2
—ECG— + 368.9 + 648.6 + 2809 + 4969 + 7849
(9.67) (5.09) (3.74) (1.23) (0.73) (0.48)
Compression 512 9 % 309.2 307.7 308.2 317.1 316.8 317.0
—ECG— + 256.0 + 536.0 + 2036 + 3536 + 5536
(9.70) (5.32) (3.55) (1.27) (0.78) (0.51)
SCCN 512 7 % 474.2 459.3 459.2 473.1 472.7 472.8
—EEG— + 204.8 + 252.8 + 1453 + 2653 + 4253
(4.64) (3.31) (3.09) (1.14) (0.70) (0.47)
Arrhythmia 4096 9 % 372.5 372.7 372.8 387.7 387.6 387.5
—ECG— + 46.1 + 326.1 + 596.1 + 866.1 + 1226
(10.63) (9.46) (5.67) (4.03) (3.16) (2.45)
Compression 4096 9 % 282.0 282.1 282.3 290.5 290.5 290.5
—ECG— + 32.0 + 312.0 + 499.5 + 687.0 + 937.0
(10.64) (9.55) (5.05) (3.80) (3.07) (2.44)
SCCN 4096 7 % 388.6 386.6 386.3 395.2 394.8 394.9
—EEG— + 25.6 + 73.6 + 223.6 + 373.6 + 573.6
(5.66) (5.34) (4.78) (3.56) (2.86) (2.27)
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Table 4.5: Runtime costs involved in the coding and decoding of Coded Test Units
Parameters Delay1 (ms)
Database Block PRD Block length(s), Del./seiz. Compres. Cont.-level DS Tr. DS Decompres. RBAC Subtotal Total
length see Eq. 4.3 detection encryption check access
Arrhythmia (ECG) 512 9 % 1422 13 0.2 360 30 0.2 30 0.1 180 613.2 2035.2
Compression (ECG) 512 9 % 2048 13 0.3 360 30 0.2 30 0.1 180 613.2 2661.2
SCCN (EEG) 512 7 % 2560 156 0.3 360 30 0.4 30 0.1 180 756.4 3316.4
Arrhythmia (ECG) 4096 9 % 11380 37 2.4 360 30 1.3 30 1.2 180 638.3 12018.3
Compression (ECG) 4096 9 % 16380 37 3.2 360 30 1.8 30 1.5 180 638.8 17018.8
SCCN (EEG) 4096 7 % 20480 1248 3.0 360 30 3.1 30 1.4 180 1851.1 22331.1
Abbreviations:
Del./seiz. detection is ECG delineation/ EEG seizure detection,
Compres. is SPIHT compression,
Cont.-level encryption is container -level encryption,
DS is calculating the digital signature of the Coded Test Unit ,
Tr. is transmitting the Coded Test Unit using HSUPA at 5.76 Mbps,
DS check is checking the digital signature,
Decompres. is SPIHT decompression,
RBAC access is decrypting the containers allowed to the intended user.
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4.2.4 Embedding Capacity
The Embedding Capacity (EC) is defined as the amount of metadata that can be embedded
with the proposed coding method when using the same bandwidth as for transmitting the
signal uncompressed. The ECi (per lead/channel) of different ECG and EEG signals
are shown in Table 4.6. In most cases the overall EC (e.g. ≥ 77.7 MB in ambulatory
recordings — 25.9 MB·3 leads — or ≥ 2.15 MB in stress tests — 178.9 KB ·12 leads —)
far exceeds the size that containers 1-6 require to enable m-Health services, estimated in
Table 4.3. The difference is what is saved in transmission and storage, typically ' 70−80%
of the original size.
Table 4.6: Average Embedding Capacity (ECi) of Coded Test Units corresponding to
various ECG and EEG-based tests
Test and duration Signal database Samples/block ECi
resting Arrhythmia 512 66.5% (3.2 KB)
ECG, Arrhythmia 4096 75.6% (3.7 KB)
10 s Compression 512 63.0% (2.3 KB)
Compression 4096 71.3% (2.6 KB)
resting Arrhythmia 512 75.7% (11.0 KB)
ECG, Arrhythmia 4096 84.8% (12.3 KB)
30 s Compression 512 75.1% (8.3 KB)
Compression 4096 83.5% (9.2 KB)
stress Arrhythmia 512 80.1% (232.4 KB)
ECG Arrhythmia 4096 89.2% (258.7 KB)
10 min Compression 512 80.9% (177.8 KB)
Compression 4096 89.2% (196.1 KB)
ambulatory Arrhythmia 512 80.3% (33.6 MB)
ECG, Arrhythmia 4096 89.4% (37.4 MB)
24 h Compression 512 81.2% (25.7 MB)
Compression 4096 89.5% (28.3 MB)
epilepsy detection SCCN-EEG 512 69.7% (336.8 KB)
(EEG), 30 min SCCN-EEG 4096 81.1% (392.2 KB)
polysomnographic SCCN-EEG 512 69.8% (4.4 MB)
study (EEG), 6.5 h SCCN-EEG 4096 81.3% (5.1 MB)
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Figure 4.4: Embedding Capacity (EC) per ECG register (a) and per lead (b) of two coded
ECGs from MIT-Arrhythmia and MIT-Compression and a coded EEG from SSCN-EEG.
ECGs compressed with PRD = 9%, EEG with PRD = 7%, block length = 512 samples,
wavelet decomposition level = 6.
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Each CTU j from a lead/channel i has its own embedding capacity, ECij (depicted in
Figure 4.4-a), resulting from the difference between the sizes of the original signal block
and the corresponding CTU (SPIHT bitframe, SF and tail). The ECi(t) of a lead/channel
i, illustrated in Figure 4.4-b, is the sum of the ECij of the blocks 1 to j transmitted/stored
until t. The size of the RC, embedded in the first CTU, corresponds to the negative offset
in Figure 4.4-b. The embedding capacity of a lead/channel can be approximated as:
ECi(t) = (sampling freq · bit res.− compressed signal bitrate− size(DS)block length) · t− size(RC). (4.4)
To build Table 4.6, this approximation was used. The sampling frequencies of the signals
and their resolutions were consulted in Section 4.2.1, the compressed signal bitrates in
Table 4.4, the size of the DS (considering ECDSA 239) in Table 4.3 and the block length
was calculated with Equation 4.3.
4.3 Proof of concept
The coding-decoding software implementing the processes defined in Algorithms 1-2 and il-
lustrated in Figure 4.2 is openly available at http://sourceforge.net/projects/pfmt/.
It is divided into two modules: a standard 1D SPIHT compressor-decompressor (Section
4.1.1), whose optimal parameters of (real-time/offline) operation were studied in Section
4.2.3; and a GUI to encode and decode plain CTU s (Section 4.1.2) and to perform partial
encryption-decryption of CTUs (Section 4.1.3). As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the design of
the GUI is rather simple and intuitive, to encourage users with little technical knowledge.
It facilitates the coding of additional measurements and contextual information in the
corresponding containers, the assignment of role-based access profiles to intended users
(physicians, researchers, teachers, etc.) and the protection of the resulting CTU s. All the
corresponding operations of encryption, decryption, signature and checking are carried
out by the GUI. However, some interaction is required:
• With the entity that encodes the CTU s, he/she shall:
1. load the signal SPIHT bitframes;
2. load the content of the data container(s);
3. load the certificates of the users and indicate their RBAC profiles (Section 4.4);
4. load his/her digital certificate, if desired change the default hash function and
the encryption algorithm;
5. load his/her password-protected private key;
6. save the resulting CTU s.
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• With the user that accesses the CTU s, he/she shall:
1. load the CTU s;
2. export the private access table to check his/her RBAC profile (if desired);
3. load his/her password-protected private key (only if he/she is allowed to access
some content(s));
4. save the plain CTU (s) and the container(s) that he/she is allowed to access.
Figure 4.5: GUI to code and decode Coded Test Units, depicted in Figure 4.2.
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These interactions with coding entities and users could be minimized by defining sys-
tem configuration profiles. Due to the cryptographic operations involved, it is necessary
that each coding entity and each user possess his/her own digital certificate (and the
coupled password-protected private key). However, this requirement did not decrease the
experience of the consulted physicians, who pointed out that the GUI was easy to handle.
The certificates associated with electronic IDs are valid for this purpose.
4.4 Secure m-Health applications based on the novel coding
Since biomedical tests may be requested for different uses (e.g. diagnosis, research, teach-
ing), the implementation of a RBAC policy defining different access profiles is a smart way
to fulfill the privacy principles of necessity of data processing and purpose binding. In fact,
these policies have gained attention in recent years and currently they are integrated in
several medical standards (e.g. DICOM [144] and HL7 [146]). In addition to this, the
security of this coding (Section 4.4.1) and its potential limitations (Section 4.4.2) shall
also be analyzed.
The cryptosteganographic coding proposed enables the implementation of various m-
Health applications by following three stages:
1. Establishing clearly the contents that each container shall store.
2. Defining m-Health application profiles and the content(s) that they allow to access.
3. Assigning m-Health, RBAC application profile(s) to each consulting user, according
to his/her professional role(s).
The coding entity — person, program or acquisition device — will assign a RBAC
profile to each intended user, according to his/her professional role, to establish the con-
tents of the test that he/she is allowed to access. As shown in Figure 4.2, the proposed
RBAC policy is defined on top of the formerly described container -level encryption, which
already allowed several users to access various contents (placed into separated containers)
of a CTU.
To illustrate with an example, a possible definition for the containers, integrating the
most interesting contents included by major medical standards (DICOM [79], HL7 [77],
SCP-ECG [76] and MFER [78]), may be:
• Container 1. This may include information concerning the acquisition session:
– context-aware data (e.g. type of test: resting ECG, stress ECG, ambulatory
ECG monitoring, intensive care monitoring);
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– environmental parameters (e.g. positioning, humidity, temperature);
– parameters of the signal (e.g. sampling frequency, quantization bits, amplitude
multiplier, applied filters);
– additional data extracted after signal processing (e.g. delineation of fiducial
points in an ECG record, intervals of likely seizure in EEGs);
– periodic measures acquired in intensive care monitoring (e.g. non-invasive
blood pressure —NiBP—, temperature —Temp—, blood oxygen saturation
—SPO2—, carbon dioxide —CO2—, heart rate);
– periodic measures acquired in stress tests (e.g. maximal oxygen consumption
—VO2—, heart rate, concentration of lactate in the blood, carbon dioxide
production —VCO2—, speed of the treadmill/power of the bicycle).
• Container 2. This may include the identification of the patient (e.g. name, surname,
Social Security Number, Personal Health Record identifier), the physician/technician
who acquires the signal, the acquiring and analyzing devices and the institution
(and/or department) that leads the test.
• Container 3. This may include general data (e.g. age, height, weight) and health
status of the patient (e.g. diseases, symptoms, previous diagnoses, observations).
• Container 4. This may include the allergies and current medication of the patient.
• Container 5. This may include sensitive diseases of the patient (e.g. AIDS, venereal
diseases), not included in container 3 for confidentiality reasons.
• Container 6. This may include billing information of the medical test.
As regards to the RBAC profiles, the list below was compiled after consulting medical
experts. It aims at covering the foremost applications of biomedical tests within the m-
Health context:
0. Emergency care/surgery: access to signals, all personal and medical data of the
patient, containers 1-5.
1. Diagnosis (by the physician who interprets the test): access to signals, all personal
and medical data, excluding sensitive diseases not directly related with the current
test, containers 1-4.
2. Research or examination (by another physician caring for the patient): access to
signals and medical data of the patient preserving his/her anonymity, containers 1,
3, 4.
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3. Teaching: access to signals and general health status of the patient to enable corre-
lations, containers 1, 3.
4. Billing: access to signals and information about the costs of the acquisition session,
containers 1, 6.
5. Signals consultation: access to signals and container 1 only.
Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting that the proposed coding can work with differ-
ent number and alternative definitions of containers and RBAC profiles, since it is not
specifically intended for these examples only.
4.4.1 Risk assessment
The coding method proposed, which is described in Section 4.1, involves different elements;
including the corresponding Algorithms (1-2), the original biomedical test — signal(s), pe-
riodic measurements and/or contextual information — and the resulting CTU (s). Several
considerations can be done about the character, either public or private, of these elements.
As regards to the algorithm, Kerckhoff’s principle states that the system shall be secure
even if everything about it, except certain keys, is public knowledge. Therefore, it is pro-
posed in Section 4.1 to make it public from the beginning. At first this may seem nonsense
since the coding is steganographic, but what is hidden are the contents embedded within
the signal, not the algorithm. With respect to the biomedical tests, it is assumed that
the acquiring device(s) will thoroughly remove them after their encoding, since they are
protected only in their coded form — as CTU (s). Thus, the possibility that an attacker
accesses the device and founds copies of biomedical tests — e.g. in the RAM memory of
the device — is excluded. Regarding the CTU s, they cannot be considered as hard to
obtain always since their transmission in the BAN/PAN may be wireless and poorly pro-
tected and because some patients may cooperate in granting access (with their informed
consent) to their biomedical tests (or part of them) for certain m-Health applications —
e.g. teaching, research — under strict RBAC, which increases the number of accesses to
the CTU (s) (and the number of potential opportunities for attackers accordingly).
An attacker with access to some of the aforementioned elements may try to perform
certain attack(s) to interfere with the security of the m-Health applications described in
Section 4.4. Thus, these applications cannot be considered as secure until performing a risk
assessment in-depth, which includes all feasible attacks and the existing countermeasures.
The following risk assessment analyzes attacks depending on the actions intended by the
attacker and the system elements he/she needs access to.
• Unauthorized detection and reading of private biomedical contents from CTU (s). If
142 4.4. Secure m-Health applications based on the novel coding
the first CTU transmitted is captured, the RC can be easily detected at the begin-
ning of the embedded metadata. The RC contains the syntax to read the contents
embedded with the signal, and given its relevance, it is protected with asymmetric
encryption. Breaking this encryption or obtaining one or several private key(s) from
authorized users is considered highly unlikely. Nevertheless, still some attacks can
be attempted without knowing the content of the RC. Regarding the signal, it is
known that the whole, plain CTU is used for its reconstruction through the SPIHT
decoder. Therefore, if the plain CTU is transmitted, anyone can reconstruct the sig-
nal — because the corresponding user/patient permits the access to it. Otherwise,
trying to break a regular, signal-encrypting CTU implies searching in a space of
' 1039 combinations and attempting to reconstruct the signal with each individual
combination — with a very low success probability. As regards to the embedded
contents, those stored in public containers can be read by anyone, since their loca-
tion is known and they are unencrypted. On the contrary, confidential containers
are independently encrypted with symmetric cryptography and their locations are
secret, which increases the search space — and reduces the success probability of a
brute-force attack.
• Generation of forged CTU (s). Anyone can create his/her own CTU (s), since the
algorithm is public. However, attempting to forge the origin of the biomedical test
requires generating a legitimate digital signature from a trusted coding device. To
do so, the attacker would need to break or steal the private key of a trusted device
— which is highly unlikely if appropriately protected.
• Malicious removal of legitimate contents from CTU (s). An attacker may remove
certain parts of a legitimate CTU. If the removed part(s) were located at the begin-
ning of the CTU (corresponding to the most important bits of the bitframe), the
reconstructed signal will be highly distorted. If the removed part(s) were located in
the middle or at the end of the CTU, certain contents embedded with the signal will
disappear. In both cases the failed verification of the digital signature of the CTU
will alert authorized users about the tampering.
• Malicious edition of legitimate CTU (s). This is a combination of the previous types
of attack. It requires knowing the plain biomedical test (thus, breaking the cry-
tosteganographic protection of the CTU ), editing the signal and/or the embedded
content(s) total or partially (as intended by the attacker) and re-encode the CTU.
The last step includes re-encrypting the CTU and replacing the previous signature
with a new valid one, the latter requiring the private key of a trusted coding device
— which is highly unlikely to obtain.
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It can be concluded that the careful combination of cryptography and steganography,
on the basis of an efficient biomedical signal compressor that returns a bitframe ordered
by relevance, are the pillars supporting the security of this novel coding algorithm. The
previous security assessment indicates that the only manner to weaken the security of
this coding is by successfully attacking its manifold cryptographic protection — partial,
symmetric and asymmetric. Therefore, the security of this coding cannot be considered as
lower than the security of a solution based on cryptography only. In fact, the protection
provided by the — symmetric — encryption of the containers is strengthened by hiding
their locations in the CTU (s).
4.4.2 Potential limitations
In short, it can be said that the test coding proposed guarantees that the biomedical signal
is decoded with clinical quality, by means of the standard signal decoder, using as input
the plain, coded signal attaching protected metadata. When the signal is partially en-
crypted (this is decided based on the consent of the user/patient), the information for its
decryption is contained in the metadata, and thus the latter cannot be removed without
losing the possibility of decoding the signal. However, when the signal is not partially
encrypted, the protected metadata (or part of it) can be removed and the signal can still
be decoded with clinical value. This can be seen as a potential limitation of the coding,
since the removal of the metadata is detected (there is no valid signature anymore) but
it does not impede the reconstruction of the signal. It would be desirable that the re-
moval of the protected metadata destroys the clinical content of the signal, guaranteeing
an optimal binding between the signal and the metadata. To enforce this requirement,
it is necessary to interleave the metadata between two (or more) signal coded segments,
in such a manner that if the metadata is removed or the CTU is truncated before the
metadata, the reconstructed signal will not have clinical validity. This admits various cod-
ing alternatives — e.g. replacing refinement bits in selected coded signal segment(s) with
metadata, replacing only certain refinement bits or both significant and refinement bits
— whose performance (foreseen as a higher security level at the cost of higher complexity
and less coding efficiency) would need to be evaluated and compared with the current
approach.
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4.5 Keytagging biomedical image-based tests
The second signal-based security technique developed in this Thesis, called keytagging, is
presented, analyzed and evaluated throughout Sections 4.5-4.8. The procedure proposed
for associating keytags {KT}, to bind the content of some tags {T} to an image Ior, is
formally described in Algorithm 3 and illustrated by means of an example in Figure 4.6;
while the procedure for retrieving {T} from Ior, or from some modified version I˜or, is de-
fined in Algorithm 4. {KeytagType} is an important input parameter of these algorithms,
which establishes the expected robustness of the tags when Ior undergoes common image
modifications in the biomedical context and, according to it, their security applications
(analyzed in Section 4.7). Stable tags are expected to be retrieved with low distortion
even when I˜or has undergone aggressive image modifications which may have caused the
loss of its clinical value, semistable tags are intended to remain undistorted only if I˜or
has undergone mild modifications and preserves the clinical value of Ior, and volatile tags
are intended to be retrieved highly distorted even if the modifications of I˜or are minor.
Both Algorithm 3 and 4 rely on a preprocessing of the image, a selection of appropriate
image features, a compact coding/decoding of the keytags and cryptographic protection
of/access to the keytags. These processes are depicted in detail throughout Sections 4.5.1-
4.5.4, which follow the notation described in Table 4.7. Finally, Section 4.5.5 describes
how keytagging can be integrated within the JPEG2000 compressor.
4.5.1 Preprocessing
The first step of Algorithms 3-4 (line 2) is the segmentation of the region of interest
(ROI) of the image, so that the tags can be associated to the most important parts of
the image. The intention is to prevent the tags from being distorted or removed due to
modifications affecting the RONI, such as biomedical image compression by areas [173],
blackening private data for anonymization or the insertion of visible watermarks. If all the
tag are associated outside the RONI, these modifications would be incapable of distorting
or removing them. In some biomedical image modalities, an algorithm has been designed
to obtain the ROI automatically, as is the case in [381] with the atherosclerotic plaque
ultrasound. In addition to this, several biomedical image acquisition devices currently
deliver the image ROI separated from the blocks of associated data that compose the
RONI (see Figure 2.4). As explained in Section 2.1.4, in the DICOM standard [79]
a calibration configuration was introduced for ultrasound images in which regions are
defined with the same calibration. But since not all acquisition devices have this built-in
capability, the ROI may be roughly segmented by means of some simple method, with
the only conditions that the same method shall be used in both Algorithms 3-4 and
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Table 4.7: Operators and notation of the keytagging algorithm
Notation Meaning
output(s)← f(input(s)) Assignment of value to one or several outputs from a function or operator f()
with one or several inputs.
[ ], d e, ⊕ Operators of concatenation, rounding to the nearest greater integer and binary XOR.
{X} Set of elements of type X, each element i represented as X{i}.
#X Number of elements that compose the set X.
V (i : j : k) Vector derived from a vector V , corresponding to a subset of its elements,
[V (i), V (i+ j), V (i+ 2 · j), ..., V (k)].
M(:) Vector derived from a matrix M , corresponding to the concatenation of its rows,
[M(1, :),M(2, :), ...,M(end, :)].
Ior Original image to be used for keytagging.
I˜or Modified version of Ior (e.g. compressed, filtered, clipped, rotated).
ROI(I), RONI(I) Regions of interest and non-interest of an image I.
MBR Minimum bounding rectangle.
R(I), G(I), B(I) Levels of R, G and B colors in RGB format of an image I.
Ig Grayscale image derived from an image I.
CDF 9/7 or 5/3 Cohen-Daubechies-Feauveau 9/7-tap or 5/3 (also known as LeGall) filters.
Coef, h, w ←WT (I, f , j) Function that returns Coef , the j-th wavelet decomposition calculated with filters f of an
image I; h and w, the height and width of the wavelet decomposition levels from 1 to j.
MWL(I) Maximum wavelet decomposition level of an image I.
LL, LH, LH, HH Coefficients of a wavelet subband obtained with horizontal and vertical low-pass filtering
(LL), horizontal high-pass filtering and vertical low-pass filtering (LH), horizontal low-pass
and vertical high-pass filtering (LH), and horizontal and vertical high-pass filtering (HH).
aWL(I) Wavelet level allowed for an image I to associate certain tag(s).
C Subset of coefficients from aWL.
F Features from C used for the coding of one or several T .
abs(X) Absolute value(s) of X.
LSB(X) Least significant bit(s) of X.
T Tag, binary data string to be associated to an Ior by means of a KT .
T˜ Tag retrieved from a modified image, I˜or.
s out← LFSR(s, t) Linear feedback shift register with initial state s and taps t.
GolombSeq A binary sequence that meets Golomb’s randomness postulates.
(X)∗ A scrambled binary sequence derived from X by means of a reversible transformation.
BM Bi-level map that encodes a tag as positions of certain coefficients of aWL.
KT Keytag, which permits the retrieval of a T from an image.
Sk Secret key used for symmetric encryption-decryption.
PrU Private key to be used by user U for asymmetric decryption of data or for its signature.
PbU Public key of user U , used by any user for asymmetric encryption of data intended for U ,
or to verify any signature issued by U .
DS(D,Alg, PrU) Digital signature of D using the algorithm Alg and the private key of the signatory U .
checkDS(D,Alg, PbU) Verification of the DS of D by using the algorithm Alg public key of the signatory U .
encrypt(Plaintext,Alg,K) Encryption of Plaintext using the algorithm Alg and the key K.
decrypt(Ciphertext, Alg,K) Decryption of Ciphertext using the algorithm Alg and the key K.
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that it shall leave out at least part of the black background and peripheral text of the
image (if any). It is recommended performing the automatic delineation of the minimum
bounding rectangle (MBR) that encloses the biomedical image content (ROI). As a
final step for the preprocessing, color ROIs are transformed into grayscale by calculation
of their luma components according to the standard ITU-R Recommendation BT.601-7
[382] (Algorithms 3-4: line 3). This ensures compliance with both color and grayscale
ROIs, and that further modifications of the color map does not affect the tag(s).
Figure 4.6: Main steps for the association of a stable keytag according to Algorithm 3.
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4.5.2 Selection of suitable image features
The 2-D Discrete Wavelet Transform (see Section 2.2.1, Algorithms 3-4: line 5) decomposes
the image into several scales, located in ordered regions of the transformed image, which
host coefficients concentrating certain frequencies. This enables efficient compression and
also facilitates keytag association because the transform separates stable, semistable and
volatile parts of the image. The main advantage of using wavelets over other transforms
is its variable resolution: the higher frequencies, which correspond to details (volatile
features of the image), are represented with higher spatial resolution than the lower fre-
quencies. To obtain WT (ROIg, f , j), ROIg is initially filtered by rows and columns with
two filters, decimated by two and arranged in four subimages: LL,LH,HL,HH. The
process is iteratively repeated, taking the last LL as input, until reaching the desired j-th
decomposition level. As a result, the lowest frequencies (most important parts, stable fea-
tures) of the image are represented with only a few high-magnitude coefficients, located
in the upper-left corner of WT (ROIg, f , j) —note this in the 5th-level decomposition in
Figure 2.6: upper left corner. The choice of the wavelet family, which sets the filters f , is
relevant for compression but it was empirically found that it does not have a big impact on
the robustness-capacity tradeoff. The only exception to the latter rule was observed when
f are set to those used by a compressor, which improves the robustness to this compressor
for a given capacity. Thus, the choice is using the filters implemented by the widespread
JPEG2000 compressor (see Section 4.5.5), CDF 9/7 for lossy compression and CDF 5/3
for lossless compression, which also saves a number of operations when keytagging is com-
bined with compression (see Section 4.6.5). If the information about the compressor is not
available, f is set to CDF 9/7 since further compression would be more likely performed
with lossy JPEG2000.
In keytagging, the choice of wavelet level, j, is very relevant. High j values permit
obtaining very stable image features from the lowest frequencies. Tags retrieved from
keytags associated to these features endure with little or no distortion high image com-
pression rates and aggressive low-pass image filtering, e.g. averaging masks, Gaussian
and median filters. Therefore, the choice is setting the highest possible value (Algorithms
3-4: line 4), MWL, given by the maximum number of recursive steps of decimation by
2. Furthermore, it has been observed that each time a new decomposition level is cal-
culated, the sum of the energy of the coefficients in the four resulting subbands exceeds
the energy of the coefficients in the mother subband. Thus, calculating the maximum
decomposition level maximizes the number of high magnitude coefficients available for
keytagging. As is shown in Table 4.8, the highest decomposition levels concentrate more
energy,
∑
i,j∈subbandC(i, j)
2
#C(i, j) ∈ subband , from the lowest frequencies. Nonetheless, they have fewer
coefficients, which results in less capacity.
1
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Table 4.8: Average energy and maximum number of coefficients in the wavelet subbands of the images from the keytagging test set
Subband Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9
En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C En. #C
Approximation (LL) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30.43 1
Horizontal detail (HL) 1.08 65,536 1.86 16,384 2.19 4,096 2.80 1,024 3.66 256 5.09 64 6.66 16 9.21 4 10.79 1
Vertical detail (LH) 1.21 65,536 1.96 16,384 2.34 4,096 3.01 1,024 3.62 256 4.67 64 6.43 16 7.59 4 13.23 1
Diagonal detail (HH) 0.42 65,536 1.03 16,384 1.32 4,096 1.59 1,024 2.05 256 2.69 64 3.75 16 4.50 4 4.55 1
Overall 2.71 196,608 4.86 49,152 5.85 12,288 7.40 3,072 9.33 768 12.45 192 16.84 48 21.29 12 58.99 4
Abbreviations:
En. is the energy of average energy of the coefficients in the subband,
#C is the number of coefficients in the subband.
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To balance capacity and a suitable degree of robustness to typical image modifications
in the biomedical context (see Section 4.6.1), it was determined through exhaustive testing
that the optimal subset of wavelet coefficients C for the association of keytags comes from
allowed wavelet levels, aWL ≥ MWL − 6 for stable keytags (Algorithm 5: lines 17, 20),
aWL ≤ MWL − 7 for semistable (Algorithm 5: lines 23-24), and the HH subband of
WL = 1 for volatile keytags (Algorithm 5: lines 27-28). This multiplexing of keytags in
the wavelet domain is represented in Figure 4.6: center. In addition to this, the final aWL
for stable keytags is adjusted to the length of the tag. It was empirically found that setting
aWL to the maximum wavelet level that contains a number of coefficients ≥ 10 · length(T )
(Algorithm 5: lines 18-19) improves the endurance of tags to local operations such as
median filtering, while maintaining the endurance to compression and common image
processing. This occurs thanks to the restriction of preserving only those features coming
from the lowest frequencies of the image, the most robust to low-pass filtering. Finally,
the features F that will be used for keytag coding are extracted. These are the sign bit of
the coefficients in C (the most robust to image changes, Algorithm 5: lines 21, 25) if the
tag is stable/semistable and the LSB if the tag is volatile (Algorithm 5: line 29).
4.5.3 Coding and decoding of keytags
The coding and decoding of keytags produces the same effect as the embedding and
retrieval of zero-watermarks — the association and reading of certain contents to/from the
image without distorting it —, but following a different procedure conceived to achieve a
better robustness-capacity tradeoff with simple operations and guaranteeing high security
and specificity. A keytag basically encodes an input tag T , a binary string, as the positions
of selected binary features F from the subset C. The extraction of C from ROIg depends
on the intended tag type (stable, semistable or volatile), as explained in Section 4.5.2.
The coding proposed below is intended to bound the keytag with the image in a compact
and fast manner. To ensure this bounding, each feature F can encode only one T bit.
Otherwise, it would be known that each time that a certain feature is repeated, it encodes
the same bit value, so a percentage of T bits could be derived from the keytag without
the image. In addition to this, the algorithm encodes unidirectionally since changes of
direction would indicate that two consecutive T bits have opposite values.
To minimize the size of the keytags, T and F are transformed into (T )∗ and (F )∗ by
means of a scrambling process (Algorithm 3: lines 9-10). The intention of this scrambling
is that the mean bit value of (T )∗ and (F )∗ is approximately 0.5, and that any long series of
0s or 1s is broken. To scramble the bits of T and F in a reversible manner (see Algorithm
5: line 42), they are XOR-ed with a sequence meeting Golomb’s randomness postulates
[383], so that the operation can be reversed by a second XOR with the same sequence.
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Golomb’s postulates establish that in this type of random sequences 1) the number of 1s
and 0s is approximately the same; 2) half of the bits in the sequence belong to a series of
length 1 (e.g. ...010..., ...101... ), a quarter of the bits in the sequence belong to a series of
length 2 (e.g. ...0110..., ...1001...), an eight of the bits in the sequence belong to a series
of length 3 (e.g. ...01110..., ...10001...) and so on; and 3) that the out-of-phase correlation
AC(k) has the same value with different values of k. The procedure to obtain a Golomb
sequence consists of running a non-zero input in a linear feedback shift register [344] (see
Algorithm 5: lines 42-46) with taps described by an irreducible polynomial of the finite
field F2 [384]. The polynomial x
17 + x3 + 1 (see Algorithm 3: line 6) was chosen since it
obtains a high periodicity of 217 − 1, much larger than the size of any T to be used in the
evaluation (see Section 4.6), and truncate the resulting Golomb sequence to the length of
T/F .
As a result of scrambling, there is a probability of 0.5 of encoding a (Ti)
∗ bit with the
first available feature in (F )∗ (when (Ti)∗ = (Fj)∗), a probability of (1− 0.5) · 0.5 = 0.52
of encoding it with the second available feature (if (Ti)
∗ 6= (Fj)∗, (Ti)∗ = (Fj+1)∗), a
probability of (1 − 0.5)2 · 0.5 = 0.53 of encoding it with the third available feature (if
(Ti)
∗ 6= (Fj)∗, (Ti)∗ 6= (Fj+1)∗, (Ti)∗ = (Fj+2)∗) and so on. According to this, the
sum of the series
∑∞
k=1(0.5)
k · k gives the average number of features from (F )∗ required
to encode a (T )∗ bit, 2. To guarantee high robustness, the function buildBinaryMap
(Algorithm 3: line 11) keeps only those features of F coming from theN highest-magnitude
coefficients in abs(C) for the coding (see Algorithm 5: lines 31-40). N is the minimum
number of features from (F )∗ required for the coding of any (T )∗ of a certain length.
It has already been demonstrated that the average number of features required is 2 ·
length(T ), so setting N = (2 + 6σ(length(T ))) · length(T ) ensures that the number of
tags which can not be completely coded is < 1 for every 5 · 108. To set reliable values for
the standard deviation, σ(length(T )), 106 random (F )∗ and (T )∗ were created for each
length corresponding to the powers of 2 ranging from 64 to 8192 bits, and the coding
was carried out. To generate realistic random binary sequences T and F , individual
pseudo-random float sequences {X} with uniform distribution probability Pr(X) ∈ [0, 1]
were created, and transformed into binary sequences with random bias by doing Y =
((−1)(X{1}<0.5) · 0.5 · X{2} + X) > 0.5. The results from the coding test showed that
the mean value of N was exactly 2 · (length(T )) and that the σ for those tag lengths
was [0.1853, 0.1218, 0.0865, 0.0629, 0.0423, 0.0292, 0.0214, 0.0150]. If a given length(T ) is
among two of these studied values (e.g. 2048 and 4096), the σ of the lower of these two
values is used. Next, buildBinaryMap creates a bi-level map BM of the same size as
C and initializes all its elements to be white (see Algorithm 3: line 24). This function
encodes in BM the (T )∗ bits as features (Fj)∗: the first element moving forward along
(F )∗ from the last encoding element j− 1 whose feature value matches the (Ti)∗ bit value
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to be encoded is marked as a black pixel in the same position in BM (see Algorithm 3: 25-
38 and Figure 4.6: bottom). This process is repeated until all (T )∗ bits have been coded.
Finally, for a compact arithmetic coding of BM , the standard JBIG2 [385] is applied in
lossless mode (Algorithm 3: line 12). It uses a context-dependent algorithm called the
QM coder. The result is the keytag KT , which will be used to reverse this process and
retrieve (T )∗, by overlapping (F )∗ and BM , and obtain T (Algorithm 4: line 15).
4.5.4 Cryptographic protection of keytags
Since the keytagging algorithms are intended to become public, they shall include cryp-
tographic protection for the keytags. In the first place, the tag issuer shall digitally sign
his/her keytags with his/her private key for signature (PrIssuer, see Algorithm 3: line 13),
so that any user can verify their origin and integrity with its paired public key (PbIssuer,
see Algorithm 4: line 10). In addition to this, confidential keytags shall be encrypted with
random keys (Sk{i}, see Algorithm 3: lines 14-15), which will be grouped and encrypted
with the public key of each intended user (PbUser{i}, see Algorithm 3: lines 16-21). In
this way, only authorized users can retrieve their symmetric keys with their private keys
(PrUser{i}, see Algorithm 4: lines 7) and decrypt their authorized keytags (Algorithm
4: line 9). According to the recommendations of the (IHE) SDO profile (Section 2.6.3),
these are the choice for the following:
• Digital signature of a keytag KT : The standardized Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm 256 [366], which performs signature-verification in 3.92 − 6.56 Mcycles.
PbIssuer-PrIssuer shall be renewed every 1-3 years. As part of the checking of a
digital signature, it is required to verify that the digital certificate of the signatory
has not expired or been revoked, by means of Check Revocation Lists or by using
the Online Certificate Status Protocol [386].
• Symmetric encryption of a keytag KT : Twofish [356], whose encryption/decryption
speed is 29.4 cycles/byte. Its key size is set to 128 bits and its block size is also 128
bits, so padding bits will be added if the data to be encrypted is not a multiple of
this block size. A symmetric key shall be created to encrypt each keytag.
• Asymmetric encryption of authorized users’ access keys SkU : RSA2048 [360], which
performs encryption-decryption in 0.29− 11.22Mcycles (per block). The block size
of RSA2048 is 2048 bits, so there will be overhead if the data to be encrypted is
not a multiple of this block size, and its performance for encryption-decryption is
0.29 − 11.22 Mcycles per block. Asymmetric encryption keys, PbUsers-PrUsers,
shall be renewed every 1-2 years
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Algorithm 3 Keytag association
1: procedure keytagging(Ior, f , {T}, {keytagType}, PrIssuer, {authorizedTags}, {PbUser})
2: ROI(Ior)← segmentation(Ior,MBR) . To segment the ROI
3: ROIg ← 0.299 ·R(ROI(Ior)) + 0.587 ·G(ROI(Ior)) + 0.114 ·B(ROI(Ior)) . ROI to grayscale
4: MWL(ROIg)← dlog2(min(#rows(ROIg),#columns(ROIg)))e . Max. wavelet decomp. level
5: Coef, h, w ←WT (ROIg, f ,MWL(ROIg)) . Wavelet transformation of ROIg
6: GolombSeq ← LFSR([1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0], [17, 3]) . See Algorithm 5
7: pointers← [1, 1, 1]
8: for i in 1 to #T do . This loop associates one keytag in each iteration
9: (F )∗ ← extractFeatures(Coef, h, w, 1, keytagType{i}, length(T{i}),MWL(ROIg), GolombSeq)
10: (T{i})∗ ← scramble(T{i}, GolombSeq) . See Algorithm 5
11: BM, pointers← buildBinaryMap((F )∗, (T{i})∗, pointers, keytagType{i})
12: KT{i} ← compress(BM,JBIG2)
13: KT{i} ← [KT{i}, DS(KT{i}, ECDSA256, P rIssuer)] . Adding a signature to each keytag
14: Sk{i} ← createRandomKey(Twofish128)
15: KT{i} ← encrypt(KT{i}, Twofish128, Sk{i}) . Symmetric encryption of each keytag
16: for i in 1 to #PbUsers do . This loop prepares the cryptographic material
17: SkU ← [ ] . to allow users to retrieve their authorized keytags
18: for j in 1 to #T do
19: if (authorizedTags{i, j}) then . authorizedTags sets which users
20: SkU ← [SkU, Sk{j}] . have access to each keytag
21: KeysUser{i} ← encrypt(SkU,RSA2048, P bUser{i}) . Only an authorized user can decrypt
. his/her entry with his/her PrUser
22: return {KT}, {KeysUser}
23: procedure buildBinaryMap((F )∗, (T{i})∗, pointers, keytagType) . To build the binary map
. that encodes (T{i})∗ as elements in (F )∗
24: BM ← zeros((F )∗) . Initialized as a matrix of zeros with the same size as (F )∗
25: if keytagType = Stable then
26: p← 1
27: else if keytagType = Semistable then
28: p← 2
29: else . keytagType is V olatile
30: p← 3
31: index← pointers(p) . To continue encoding from the first available position
32: for v in 1 to length((T{i})∗) do
33: r, s← obtainIndices((F )∗, index) . See Algorithm 5
34: while (T{i})∗(v) 6= (F )∗(r, s) do . To move forward along (F )∗ from the last
35: index← index+ 1 . encoding element until their values match
36: r, s← obtainIndices((F )∗, index)
37: BM(r, s)← 1 . To record the position where the element v in (T{i})∗
38: index← index+ 1 . matches the first available element in (F )∗
39: indices← pointers
40: indices(p)← index . To update the pointer used
41: return BM , indices
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Algorithm 4 Tag retrieval
1: procedure tagRetrieval(Ior, f , {KT}, {keytagType}, PbIssuer, KeysUser, PrUser)
2: ROI(Ior)← segmentation(Ior,MBR) . To segment the ROI
3: ROIg ← 0.299 ·R(ROI(Ior)) + 0.587 ·G(ROI(Ior)) + 0.114 ·B(ROI(Ior)) . ROI to grayscale
4: MWL(ROIg)← dlog2(min(#rows(ROIg),#columns(ROIg)))e . Max. wavelet decomp. level
5: Coef, h, w ←WT (ROIg, f ,MWL(ROIg)) . Wavelet transformation of ROIg
6: GolombSeq ← LFSR([1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0], [17, 3]) . See Algorithm 5
7: {Sk} ← decrypt(KeysUser,RSA2048, P rUser) . To obtain the keys of the user’s keytags
8: for i in 1 to #KT do . This loop retrieves a tag in each iteration
9: KT{i} ← decrypt(KT{i}, Twofish128, Sk{i}) . To decrypt the keytag
10: if checkDS(KT{i}, ECDSA256, P bIssuer) then . To verify its digital signature
11: KT{i} ← removeDS(KT{i}) . To remove the signature after verification
12: BM ← uncompress(KT{i}, JBIG2) . To obtain the binary map that encodes a tag
13: lengthT ← sum(BM) . The length of the tag is the number of 1s in BM
14: (F )∗ ← extractFeatures(Coef, h, w, 0, keytagType{i}, lengthT,MWL(ROIg), GolombSeq)
15: T{i} ← extractTag((F )∗, BM,GolombSeq)
16: else . The tag is not retrieved if the
17: Warning caused by invalid signature . signature of its keytag is invalid
18: return {T}
19: procedure extractTag((F )∗, BM , GolombSeq) . To extract a tag from (F )∗ by means of BM
20: (T )∗ ← [ ]
21: for r in 1 to #rows(BM) do
22: for s in 1 to #columns(BM) do
23: if BM(r, s) then . To move along BM and find the 1s, which spot
24: (T )∗ ← [(T )∗, (F )∗(r, s)] . the positions in (F )∗ that encode the bits of (T )∗
25: T ← scramble((T )∗, GolombSeq) . To retrieve the original tag, T
26: return T
Algorithm 5 Auxiliary procedures used in keytag association and tag retrieval (I)
1: procedure LFSR(s,t) . To calculate the output of running a LFSR with initial state s and taps t
2: n← length(s)
3: m← length(t)
4: c(1, :)← s . C stores in its rows all the states of the LFSR
5: for k in 1 to 2n − 2 do
6: b(1)← s(t(1))⊕ s(t(2)) . b is used to calculate the
7: if m > 2 then . feedback for the next state
8: for i in 1 to m− 2 do
9: b(i+ 1)← s(t(i+ 2))⊕ b(i)
10: s(2 : n)← s(1 : n− 1) . Shifting the bits of the state one position
11: s(1)← b(m− 1) . The first element in the state is the feedback
12: c(k + 1, :)← s . from the previous
13: s outS ← c(:, n) . The output is the concatenation of the outputs of each state
14: return s out
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Algorithm 5 Auxiliary procedures used in keytag association and tag retrieval (II)
15: procedure extractFeatures(Coef , h, w, filter, keytagType, lengthT , MWL, GolombSeq)
16: if (keytagType = Stable) then
17: aWL←MWL− 6 . Selecting coefficients from top levels, such their number of
18: while h(aWL+ 1) · w(aWL+ 1) ≥ 10 · lengthT do . coefficients exceeds 10 · lengthT
19: aWL← aWL+ 1 . The maximum number of coefficients to be
20: C ← Coef(1 : h(aWL), 1 : w(aWL)) . selected are those from levels ≥MWL− 6
21: F ← (C ≥ 0) . and the features of interest are their signs
22: else if (keytagType = Semistable) then
23: aWL←MWL− 7 . Selecting coefficients from levels ≤MWL− 7
24: C(1 : h(aWL+ 1), 1 : w(aWL+ 1))← 0 . by setting coefficients from levels ≥MWL− 6 to 0,
25: F ← (C ≥ 0) . the features of interest are their signs
26: else . keytagType is V olatile
27: aWL← 1 . Selecting coefficients from
28: C ← Coef(h(aWL+ 1) + 1 : end,w(aWL+ 1) + 1 : end) . the HH subband of level 1,
29: F ← LSB(C) . the features of interest are their LSBs
30: (F )∗ ← scramble(F,GolombSeq)
31: if filter then . Removing the features from the 2 + 6 · σ(lengthT ) lowest magnitude coefficients
32: σs = [0.1853, 0.1218, 0.0865, 0.0629, 0.0423, 0.0292, 0.0214, 0.0150]
33: lengths = [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192]
34: for i in 1 to length(σs) do . This loop sets the value of σ
35: if lengthT ≤ lengths(i) then . according to the value of lengthT
36: σ ← σs(i)
37: sorted values, sorted indices← sort(abs(C(:)), descending) . Obtaining the indices of
38: indicesToDelete← sorted indices(d(2 + 6 · σ) · lengthT e : end) . the lowest magnitude
39: rows IndicesToDelete, cols IndicesToDelete← obtainIndices(indicesToDelete, C) . coefs,
40: (F )∗(rows IndicesToDelete, cols IndicesToDelete)← 2 . which are removed by setting them
41: return (F )∗ . to 2, a value not existing in T (composed of 0s and 1s)
42: procedure scramble(M ,GolombSeq) . To scramble/descramble a binary vector
43: (M)∗ ←M . or matrix M by adding GolombSeq
44: for i in 1 to #rows(M) do
45: (M)∗(i, :)←M(i, :)⊕GolombSeq(1 + (i− 1) ·#columns(M) : i ·#columns(M))
46: return (M)∗
47: procedure obtainIndices(M , pointers) . To translate unidimensional pointers into
48: r ← dpointers/#columns(M)e . bidimensional indices for a matrix M
49: s← 1 +module(pointers− 1,#columns(M))
50: return r, s . r are de indices for rows, s are the indices for columns
51: procedure zeros(M) . To initialize a vector/matrix of zeros
52: zerosM ←M . of the same size as M
53: zerosM(1 : end, 1 : end)← 0
54: return zerosM
55: procedure sum(M) . To sum all the elements in a matrix/vector M
56: S ← 0
57: for i in 1 to #rows(M) do
58: for j in 1 to #columns(M) do
59: S ← S +M(i, j)
60: return S
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4.5.5 Support for JPEG2000 compression
Both the JPEG2000 compression standard, depicted in Section 2.2.3, and the keytagging
process share the use of wavelets (Section 2.2.1), with the same filters, for a representation
of the image adjusted to the properties of the human vision system. As a result, JPEG2000
compression causes no or very little distortion to the retrieved stable and semistable tags,
as is demonstrated in Section 4.6.4. In addition to this, if the keytags association is
integrated in the compression process, most of the runtime cost of the former is covered
by the latter (see Section 4.6.5). In the case of volatile tags, the compression would destroy
them, as this process is a modification of the original image. Otherwise, if it is desired
that this initial compression is not detected, the volatile keytags shall be associated after
the whole JPEG2000 encoding is completed and the first encoded wavelet decomposition
level — where volatile keytags are associated — is available. Finally, it is worth noting
that the JPEG2000 formats JP2 and JPX allow the embedding of metadata, which can
be used to conveniently store the keytags.
The processes of the JPEG2000 encoder and decoder are illustrated in Figure 2.9.
To ensure full compliance of compression with keytagging, the initial color transformation
must be the irreversible ICT and the further tiling of the image must be set to its size. The
last steps of the compression (tier 1 and 2 encoding) are independent from the keytagging.
These are performing context modeling and bit-plane arithmetic coding, arranging the
coded data in layers corresponding to quality levels and performing post-compression rate
allocation.
4.6 Experimental evaluation of keytagging
The features of this algorithm that need to be experimentally evaluated are its robustness-
capacity tradeoff when the image undergoes different image modifications, its specificity
when the original image is replaced, its compatibility with JPEG2000 compression, its
average runtime cost for different parameter configurations and its scalability when the
image size is increased. Complementarily, Section 4.7 analyzes the security foundations of
the keytagging method.
4.6.1 Evaluation setup
The image test set is composed of 64 images, sized 512×512px2, corresponding to different
medical modalities (see Figure 4.7) and parts of the body:
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• 18 computed tomography (CT) images, gathered from [387]: 6 chest (Artifix), 6
dental area (Incisix) and 6 pelvis (Pelvix) images.
• 18 magnetic resonance images (MRI), gathered from [387]: 6 brain (Brainix), 6 knee
(Knix) and 6 thoracic and lumbar area (MRIX) images.
• 12 positron emission tomography (PET)-CT images from a whole body scan, gath-
ered from [387] (PETCETIX).
• 16 ultrasound images (US): 4 mode B echocardiograms provided by Lozano Blesa
Hospital in Zaragoza, 4 mode M, 4 Doppler color, 4 pulsed and continuous wave
Doppler.
The image test set is processed with typical modifications in the biomedical context,
which are indexed for reference in Figure 4.8 and Tables 4.9-4.14:
• 1-10. Compression: JPEG with quality factors 75%, 50%, 25%, 15% and 5% (Figure
4.8: 5), JPEG2000 with compression ratios 4:1, 8:1, 16:1, 32:1 and 64:1 (Figure 4.8:
10).
• 11-18. Common image processing: β correction −0.3, −0.5 (Figure 4.8: 12), +0.4
and +0.7 (Figure 4.8: 14), contrast stretching 2% and 10% (Figure 4.8: 16), color
inversion (Figure 4.8: 17) and local histogram equalization (Figure 4.8: 18).
• 19-27. Local operations: edge sharpening (Figure 4.8: 19), median filtering 5 × 5
and 7×7 (Figure 4.8: 21), averaging mask 5×5 and 7×7 (Figure 4.8: 23), Gaussian
filtering 7×7 and 11×11, and motion blur with 7 and 9 pixels displacement (Figure
4.8: 27).
• 28-33. Geometric transformations: clipping the ROI, rotating 90◦, 180◦ and 270◦,
horizontal and vertical flipping (Figure 4.8: 33).
• 34. Insertion of visible annotations (Figure 4.8: 34).
• 35. Blackening private data parts for anonymization.
and attempting to distort the tag or part of it, by means of a watermark-based attack:
• 36-40. Modification of l = 64 (Figure 4.8: 34), l = 128, l = 256, l = 512, l = 1024
and l = 2048 sign bits from the highest-level wavelet coefficients of the image.
The robustness of keytagging to those modifications is evaluated by measuring the
distortion of the retrieved tags T˜ with respect to the original T associated to Ior, by
means of the Normalized Hamming Distance [388]:
NHD =
T˜ ⊕ T
length(T )
, (4.5)
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(a) Computed tomography (b) Magnetic resonance
(c) Positron emission tomography (d) Ultrasound
Figure 4.7: Sample images from the keytagging test set, belonging to different acquisition
modalities.
158 4.6. Experimental evaluation of keytagging
Figure 4.8: ROI of a 512 × 512 px2 PET-CT image, original (0) and resulting from the
application of JPEG QF=5% and JPEG2000 CR 64:1 compression (5,10), β correction
−0.5 and +0.7 (12,14), 10% contrast stretching (16), color inversion (17), local histogram
equalization (18), edge sharpening (19), median filter 7×7 (21), image averaging 7×7 (23),
motion blur 9 (27), vertical flipping (33), insertion of annotations (34) and watermark-
based attack with l=128 (36).
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where T and T˜ are binary vectors and ⊕ is the XOR logical operator. Those T˜ that
endure the image modifications end up very similar to T and obtain NHD ≈ 0, while
those T˜ which are very dissimilar to T obtain NHD ≈ 0.5, e.g. when retrieved from very
degraded versions of Ior. The Normalized Hamming Distance is very useful to determine
how much redundancy needs to be added to overcome the distortion of T˜ by means of
some redundant coding.
Simulation setup 1: The image modifications described above are applied to the test
set. A fixed-length random tag T is associated to each image, by means of keytags KT ,
retrieving T˜ from the corresponding modified image I˜or. The resulting NHD is calculated,
and the process of keytag association-tag retrieval is repeated for different tag lengths and
for the three types of keytags: stable, semistable and volatile. The results are depicted
in Tables 4.9-4.12, which also shows how much distortion is caused to ROIg (the area of
Ior used for the association of keytags) by each modification (which results in a ˜ROIg),
measured with two different indices, the classic Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio and the mean
Structural SIMilarity index:
PSNR(I, I˜) = 20 · log10( max(I(:))√
1
#rows(I) ·#cols(I) ·
∑#rows(I)
i=1
∑#cols(I)
j=1 ||I(i, j)− I˜(i, j)||2
), (4.6)
MSSIM(I, I˜) =
1
M
∑M
j=1
(2 · µIjµI˜j + (0.01 · L)2) · (2 ·
∑N
i=1wi · (Ii − µI)(I˜i − µI˜) + (0.03 · L)2)
(µ2Ij + µ
2
I˜j
+ (0.01 · L)2) · (∑Ni=1wi · ((Ii − µI)2 + (I˜i − µI˜)2) + (0.03 · L)2) , (4.7)
where L is the dynamic range of the pixel values (255 for 8-bit grayscale images), wi
correspond to an 11 × 11 circular-symmetric Gaussian weighting function with standard
deviation 1.5 samples (normalized so that
∑N
i=1wi = 1), µI =
∑N
i=1wi · Ii, M is the
number of local windows in the image and N the number of pixels in the local window.
Further details about this index may be consulted in [389] and the implementation of the
MSSIM algorithm used in this work is available online at [390].
The PSNR is a simple mathematical measure that directly compares the value of
the pixels from the two images. Although it is very popular, the correlation between
this measure and the visual perception of quality is not tight enough in many cases. The
MSSIM assumes that the human vision system is highly adapted for extracting structural
information from images. Thus, it basically compares local patterns of pixel intensities
that have been normalized for luminance and contrast.
Simulation setup 2: This follows the process of setup 1 but considers each image as a
modified version of the rest. This setup is intended to evaluate the degree of distortion of
tags retrieved from images that are different from the original ones. Since some images of
the test set come from the same patient and acquisition session, some pairs of ROIg are
quite similar: five have PSNR > 20 dB and MSSIM > 0.67, and may obtain low NHD
values.
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Table 4.9: Average distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when the keytagging image test set (unshaded cells) and
its interpolated counterpart (lightly shaded cells when calculating aWL according to Algorithm 3, shaded cells when maintaining the aWL
of the original test set) undergo common modifications in the biomedical context (see Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.6)
Image Image quality Distortion of Distortion of Distortion of
size —PSNR(dB), stable tags semistable tags volatile tags
—px2— MSSIM— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
``````````````````#. Operation
Length(T )
- - 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048/BCH 4096/BCH 8192/BCH 16384/BCH 64 128 256
Compression
1. JPEG QF=75% 512× 512 37.7, 0.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 1.2/0.3 4.2/10.6 11.8/19.8 48.4 48.4 49.4
JPEG QF=30% 1024× 1024 38.9, 0.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4/0 2.4/4.5 6.5/13.8 50.8 50 49.8
JPEG QF=30% 1024× 1024 38.9, 0.98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3/0 1/0 2.7/7.9 8.2/14.9 15.9/23.5 50.8 50 49.8
2. JPEG QF=50% 512× 512 35.2, 0.97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3/0 1.2/0 3.9/7.7 8.7/16.6 18.5/26.1 48.4 49.2 49.8
JPEG QF=20% 1024× 1024 37.0, 0.97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 1.2/0.4 4.5/10.9 11.1/18.8 49.2 50.2 50.1
JPEG QF=20% 1024× 1024 37.0, 0.97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 1/0 2.5/4.4 6.3/13.1 13.6/22 21.3/29.6 49.2 50.2 50.1
3. JPEG QF=25% 512× 512 33.2, 0.95 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.6/0 1.4/0 4/7.8 8.8/17.2 17.2/26.3 26.3/33.5 50 49.6 50.8
JPEG QF=15% 1024× 1024 35.3, 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.6/0 2.5/7.9 8.5/14.9 14.9/22.3 50 49.2 49.9
JPEG QF=15% 1024× 1024 35.3, 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4/0 1.4/0 4.2/9.1 10.1/17.2 18.5/26.2 25.8/32.6 50 49.2 49.9
4. JPEG QF=15% 512× 512 31.4, 0.92 0 0 0 0 1.9 0 0.8/0 1.4/0 4.7/7.4 9.7/15.3 17/25 26.6/33.8 34/38.6 49.2 50.8 49.6
JPEG QF=10% 1024× 1024 33.2, 0.92 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.5/0 2.2/4.4 6.7/13.7 14.2/23.4 23.9/31.5 50.8 49.8 49.8
JPEG QF=10% 1024× 1024 33.2, 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.4/0 1.4/0 3.9/8.2 8.7/15.2 15.9/23.7 23.8/31.3 32.2/37.5 50.8 49.8 49.8
5. JPEG QF=5% 512× 512 26.7, 0.80 0 0 0.7/0 4.5/5.9 13.6 3.5/10.8 7.2/10.2 12.6/16.6 18.8/23.9 27/32.6 34.3/39.2 40.1/43.9 44.5/45.8 46.9 50 49.8
JPEG QF=5% 1024× 1024 28.9, 0.74 0 0 0 0/2.6 6.3 0 0.4/0 1.4/0 4.3/10.4 10.5/17.4 18.6/26.4 26.9/34 35/39.4 50.8 50.8 49.7
JPEG QF=5% 1024× 1024 28.9, 0.74 0 0 0 0.9/0 3.8 3.1/9.1 4.5/10 8/15.6 14/20.9 20.6/27.6 27.6/33.3 34.1/39.3 40.2/43.5 50.8 50.8 49.7
6. JPEG2000 CR 4:1 512× 512 50.5, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51.6 50 50
JPEG2000 CR 16:1 1024× 1024 50.2, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 50
JPEG2000 CR 16:1 1024× 1024 50.2, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3/0 50 50 50
7. JPEG2000 CR 8:1 512× 512 47.6, 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7/7.9 50 49.2 50.2
JPEG2000 CR 32:1 1024× 1024 47.3, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7/0.4 50 49.2 50.2
JPEG2000 CR 32:1 1024× 1024 47.3, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3/0 2.7/9.7 50 49.2 50.2
8. JPEG2000 CR 16:1 512× 512 42.7, 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 1.7/7.2 8.7/16.1 51.6 49.2 50.4
JPEG2000 CR 64:1 1024× 1024 42.0, 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 1.6/4.3 6.4/13.7 50 49 50.4
JPEG2000 CR 64:1 1024× 1024 42.0, 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 1.6/1.3 5.2/12 12.2/20 50 49 50.4
9. JPEG2000 CR 32:1 512× 512 37.9, 0.96 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.9/1.2 5.1/11.9 12.3/21.8 21.3/29.7 49.2 48.4 48.8
JPEG2000 CR 128:1 1024× 1024 37.8, 0.96 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.9/0.4 4.6/11.9 11.4/21.4 21.3/29.8 50 49.8 50.2
JPEG2000 CR 128:1 1024× 1024 37.8, 0.96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7/0 2.5/8.1 7/14.7 12.5/22.4 20.1/30.4 28.1/36.4 50 49.8 50.2
10. JPEG2000 CR 64:1 512× 512 33.6, 0.92 0 0 0 0.2/0 3.3 0 0 0.4/0 2.8/7 7.8/16.5 16.4/25.9 27.5/34.1 35.2/39.6 51.6 50 50
JPEG2000 CR 256:1 1024× 1024 33.7, 0.91 0 0 0 0.1/0 3.4 0 0 0.3/0 2.4/5.8 7.8/15 16.5/25.3 26.4/33.7 34.4/39.2 50 49.6 49.7
JPEG2000 CR 256:1 1024× 1024 33.7, 0.91 0 0 0 0.2/0 2.3 2.3/7 4.5/7.2 7.3/11 13.1/18.5 19.7/27.6 27/35.5 33.6/40.4 39.8/43.8 50 49.6 49.7
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Table 4.10: Average distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when the keytagging image test set (unshaded cells) and
its interpolated counterpart (lightly shaded cells when calculating aWL according to Algorithm 3, shaded cells when maintaining the aWL
of the original test set) undergo common image processing in the biomedical context (see Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.6)
Image Image quality Distortion of Distortion of Distortion of
size —PSNR(dB), stable tags semistable tags volatile tags
—px2— MSSIM— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
``````````````````#. Operation
Length(T )
- - 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048/BCH 4096/BCH 8192/BCH 16384/BCH 64 128 256
Common image processing
11. β correction −0.3 512× 512 20.7, 0.85 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.7/0 50 49.6 49.8
β correction −0.3 1024× 1024 21.1, 0.80 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.6/0 48.8 49.6 48.6
β correction −0.3 1024× 1024 21.1, 0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.4/0 0.8/0 48.8 49.6 48.6
12. β correction −0.5 512× 512 16.1, 0.60 0 0.4/0 0.2/0 0.8/0 2 0 0 0.1/0 0.2/0 0.5/0 1.1/0 2.1/0.7 4.6/8.8 50 50 49.6
β correction −0.5 1024× 1024 16.3, 0.50 0 0.2/0 0.2/0 0.7/0 2.1 0 0 0.1/0 0.3/0 0.7/0 1.3/0 2.9/0.6 5/5.3 50 50.8 49.8
β correction −0.5 1024× 1024 16.3, 0.50 0 0.4/0 0.2/0 0.7/0 1 0 0.8 1.1/0 1.3/0 1.8/0 3/0.3 4.3/5.7 7.1/10.4 50 50.8 49.8
13. β correction +0.4 512× 512 17.1, 0.74 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2/0 0.2/0 0.3/0 50 49.2 49
β correction +0.4 1024× 1024 17.1, 0.71 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.3/0 0.4/0 47.7 48 48.7
β correction +0.4 1024× 1024 17.1, 0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.3/0 0.4/0 0.5/0 47.7 48 48.7
14. β correction +0.7 512× 512 10.7, 0.49 0 0 0.1/0 0.5/0 1 0 0 0.2/0 0.6/0 0.8/0 1/0 1.4/0 1.6/0 51.6 49.6 50.4
β correction +0.7 1024× 1024 10.7, 0.45 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 1.1 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 1/0 1.2/0 1.7/0 2.2/0 49.2 50.4 50.1
β correction +0.7 1024× 1024 10.7, 0.45 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 0.5 0 0.8/0 1/0 1.4/0 1.7/0 1.9/0 2.3/0 2.8/0 49.2 50.4 50.1
15. Contrast stretching 2% 512× 512 18.1, 0.87 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.3/0 0.6/0 0.9/0 1/0 50 49.2 49.2
Contrast stretching 2% 1024× 1024 18.1, 0.72 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2 0 0 0.2/0 0.2/0 0.7/0 1/0 1.3/0 1.5/0 49.6 49.4 49
Contrast stretching 2% 1024× 1024 18.1, 0.72 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2 1.6/0 0.4/0 0.5/0 0.8/0 1.7/0 1.9/0 1.9/0 1.9/0 49.6 49.4 49
16. Contrast stretching 10% 512× 512 16.6, 0.83 0 0 0 0.3/0 0.5 0 0 0.1/0 0.3/0 1.5/0 1.7/0 1.8/0 1.9/0 47.7 50 50
Contrast stretching 10% 1024× 1024 16.2, 0.66 0 0 0.2/0 0.2/0 0.7 0 0 0.3/0 1.1/0 1.5/0 2.2/0 2.7/0 3/0 50 50 49.8
Contrast stretching 10% 1024× 1024 16.2, 0.66 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 0.5 1.6/0 1.4/0 1.5/0 3.5/0 2.9/0 3.4/0 3.5/0 3.7/0 50 50 49.8
17. Invert colors Any size 2.7, -0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18. Local hist. equal. 512× 512 21.3, 0.86 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.3/0 0.5/0 0.7/0 50 50 50
Local hist. equal. 1024× 1024 21,2, 0.81 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.4 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.1/0 0.4/0 0.8/0 1.1/0 49.6 50.2 49.4
Local hist. equal. 1024× 1024 21,2, 0.81 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.1 0 0 0.2/0 0.2/0 0.6/0 1/0 1.5/0 1.7/0 49.6 50.2 49.4
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Table 4.11: Average distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when the keytagging image test set (unshaded cells) and
its interpolated counterpart (lightly shaded cells when calculating aWL according to Algorithm 3, shaded cells when maintaining the aWL
of the original test set) undergo local operations (see Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.6)
Image Image quality Distortion of Distortion of Distortion of
size —PSNR(dB), stable tags semistable tags volatile tags
—px2— MSSIM— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
``````````````````#. Operation
Length(T )
- - 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048/BCH 4096/BCH 8192/BCH 16384/BCH 64 128 256
Local operations
19. Edge sharpening 512× 512 24.4, 0.89 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.2/0 0.4/0 0.6/0 1.2/0 48.4 48.8 48.8
Edge sharpening 1024× 1024 25.4, 0.89 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.5 0 0.6/0 0.5/0 0.8/0 0.8/0 1.1/0 1.7/0 2.4/0.1 49.2 49.4 49.7
Edge sharpening 1024× 1024 25.4, 0.89 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.3 1.6/0 2.3/0 2.8/0 2.6/0 2.7/0 2.8/0 3.5/0.6 4.6/2.7 49.2 49.4 49.7
20. Median filter 5× 5 512× 512 27.8, 0.92 0 0 0 0.2/0 1 5.5 5.7/6.8 9.1/11 13.1/16.3 20.4/22 27.3/28.5 31.8/33.4 35.8/37.7 50 49.2 50
Median filter 11× 11 1024× 1024 27.8, 0.92 0 0 0 0.4/0 1.6 4.3/6.6 5.9/7.8 10.6/13.6 15.6/17.7 23.3/25.3 29.9/31.6 35.7/36.3 39.1/39.9 48.4 50.4 49.8
Median filter 11× 11 1024× 1024 27.8, 0.92 0 0 0 0.4/1 5.7 41/43.8 40.4/42.7 40.5/43.9 41.2/44.8 42/47.3 44.7/48.5 46.6/49.2 47.2/47.9 48.4 50.4 49.8
21. Median filter 7× 7 512× 512 25.5, 0.87 0 0 0.8/0 1.9/0 4.8 23.4/23.2 25/24.5 21.6/28.3 27/32.5 32/37.2 36.3/40.5 39.4/42.4 41.5/44.3 50.8 50 50
Median filter 14× 14 1024× 1024 25.4, 0.88 0 0 1/0 2.1/0 4.8 22.3/22.8 21.3/23.8 23.1/27.8 25.7/32.2 32.6/36.6 37.2/40.4 40.3/43.6 43.7/45.2 50 50 49.8
Median filter 14× 14 1024× 1024 25.4, 0.88 0 0 1/0 2.3/9.1 13.4 46.1/45.2 46.1/48.2 45.9/47.6 45.6/47 47.2/47.9 47.1/48 47.8/47.4 47.7/49.2 50 50 49.8
22. Image averaging 5× 5 512× 512 26.2, 0.91 0 0 0 0.2/0 1 16.8/17.4 29.1/22.3 32.8/28.1 36.7/36.6 40.7/37.9 45.5/44.4 49.2/45.9 50/46.9 49.2 49.6 50.4
Image averaging 11× 11 1024× 1024 26.3, 0.90 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 1.8 12.1/18.9 18.6/19.7 25.1/27.2 32/35.7 40.6/41.5 47.9/46.9 51.7/49.3 51.7/49.9 50.8 50.4 49.6
Image averaging 11× 11 1024× 1024 26.3, 0.90 0 0 0.1/0 0.6/6.1 11.5 77.3/77.5 74.8/77.9 72/73.9 69/70.1 64.7/65 63/62.9 61.2/58.8 56.6/57.4 50.8 50.4 49.6
23. Image averaging 7× 7 512× 512 23.8, 0.85 0 0 1.3/0 2.6/0.3 5.5 53.9/49.6 49.4/51.9 50.9/53.5 50.3/54.9 54.7/55.7 54.8/55.1 54.1/54.4 54/53.1 48.4 48.8 50.2
Image averaging 13× 13 1024× 1024 25.1, 0.87 0 0 0.6/0 1.7/0 4.1 35.9/35.7 35.4/36.5 39.3/41.7 44.6/49.5 50.5/54.1 52/54.9 55.5/55.2 54.4/53.4 50.4 50.6 50.6
Image averaging 13× 13 1024× 1024 25.1, 0.87 0 0 0.8/0 1.9/12.5 19.7 81.3/76.4 80.5/77.1 77.6/74.4 73.2/70.2 67.3/67.7 63.1/65.7 60.9/61.2 58.1/54.9 50.4 50.6 50.6
24. Gaussian filtering 7× 7 512× 512 25.7, 0.90 0 0 0.2/0 0.5/0 1.7 3.1/3.3 4.5/5.5 7.3/10.9 12.4/17.6 20.5/22 25.5/29.3 31.4/33.4 36.3/38.1 50 50 49.6
Gaussian filtering 14× 14 1024× 1024 26.2, 0.90 0 0 0 0.3/0 1.3 0 0.8/0 2.3/1 4.9/6.1 8.9/10.2 12.2/16.8 17/21.1 23.8/26.4 50.8 50.4 50.6
Gaussian filtering 14× 14 1024× 1024 26.2, 0.90 0 0 0 0.4/0 2.9 3.5/4.3 3.9/6.9 7.6/11.1 12.4/15.8 16.8/22.1 20.8/26.1 26.6/32 32.5/35.5 50.8 50.4 50.6
25. Gaussian filtering 11× 11 512× 512 24.4, 0.89 0 0 0.4/0 1.1/0 2.9 4.7/6.1 6.3/6.8 9.6/12 14.3/20.7 23.8/26 29.2/30.7 33.4/35.5 38.1/39.2 51.6 50.4 50.2
Gaussian filtering 17× 17 1024× 1024 25.1, 0.87 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.9 0.8/0 2/0 4/3.6 6.7/6.9 10.4/11.7 14.3/17.7 19.3/22.8 25/27.7 50.8 50 49.4
Gaussian filtering 17× 17 1024× 1024 25.1, 0.87 0 0 0 0.2/0 2.9 5.5/7.9 7.8/9.5 10.2/13.5 14.3/17.9 19.2/24.7 23.5/28.3 27.6/33.2 32.9/36.8 50.8 50 49.4
26. Motion blur 7 512× 512 27.7, 0.92 0 0 0.4/0 0.8/0 1.7 24.6/19.5 20.3/20.3 21.4/21.1 22.2/22.9 23.7/24.3 27.6/29 30.2/31.2 32.9/32.8 51.6 50.8 50
Motion blur 15 1024× 1024 27.3, 0.92 0 0 0.4/0 1.2/0 2.7 25.8/25.2 23/24.6 23.1/22.1 23.1/22.1 23/24.3 24.5/26.2 27.3/29 30.1/30.3 49.2 49.6 49.4
Motion blur 15 1024× 1024 27.3, 0.92 0 0 0.6/0 1.5/0.6 11.4 25.8/24.6 24.8/21.8 21.3/20.8 22/23.2 24.2/24.6 25.5/26.9 28.8/28.3 28.9/29 49.2 49.6 49.4
27. Motion blur 9 512× 512 26.0, 0.88 0 0 2.1/0 3.6/0.2 6.3 33.2/32.2 31.6/30.5 27.1/28.4 29.5/28.6 29.6/29.9 32.5/33.6 35/36.1 36.3/35.7 51.6 50.8 50.4
Motion blur 17 1024× 1024 26.7, 0.89 0 0 1.2/0 2.5/0 4.8 30.9/28.3 27.9/27 27.1/26.5 26.1/25.9 25.1/26.6 26.5/29 29.7/30.2 31.8/32.5 51.2 50 50.3
Motion blur 17 1024× 1024 26.7, 0.89 0 0 1.4/0 2.9/1.5 15.7 18.8/18 17.8/18.9 20.3/20.4 21.2/22.6 23.1/25.7 25.4/27.7 28.1/29.7 30.5/31.1 51.2 50 50.3
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Table 4.12: Average distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when the keytagging image test set (unshaded cells) and
its interpolated counterpart (lightly shaded cells when calculating aWL according to Algorithm 3, shaded cells when maintaining the aWL of
the original test set) undergo geometrical transformations, insertion of annotations and watermark-based attacks (see Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.6)
Image Image quality Distortion of Distortion of Distortion of
size —PSNR(dB), stable tags semistable tags volatile tags
—px2— MSSIM— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
``````````````````#. Operation
Length(T )
- - 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048 128/BCH 256/BCH 512/BCH 1024/BCH 2048/BCH 4096/BCH 8192/BCH 16384/BCH 64 128 256
Geometrical transformations
28. Clipping the ROI Any size Inf, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29. Rotating 90◦ Any size 12.2, 0.26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30. Rotating 180◦ Any size 12.6, 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31. Rotating 270◦ Any size 12.2, 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32. Horizontal flipping Any size 14.8, 0.41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33. Vertical flipping Any size 12.9, 0.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34. Inserting annotations 512× 512 28.7, 0.94 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2/0 0.5 0.7 0.9
Inserting annotations 1024× 1024 28.4, 0.94 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2/0 0.7 0.9 1.0
Inserting annotations 1024× 1024 28.4, 0.94 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1/0 0.2/0 0.7 0.9 1.0
35. Darken private data Any size Inf, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Watermark-based attack
36. l = 128 512× 512 13.0, 0.29 51.5/24.1 24.3/24.2 24.2/18.7 19.0/19.2 19.7 10.2/8.8 9.0/11.2 13.6/14.4 16.2/20.7 20.4/19.8 20.7/20.4 20.9/18.6 20.2/20.5 48.4 47.7 48.5
l = 128 1024× 1024 12.2, 0.27 48.2/25.3 23.3/23.7 24.1/17.6 19.4/19.0 20.3 12.1/10.4 9.9/13.1 13.2/15.6 16.7/19.3 19.9/20.2 21.1/20.5 21.3/21.5 21.5/20.9 53.4 54.2 53.8
l = 128 1024× 1024 12.2, 0.27 50.5/23.6 23.3/23.1 22.2/19.7 20.0/18.2 19.7 14.3/14.5 14.9/15.6 16.7/17.9 18.3/19.8 20.4/20 20.7/20.1 20.9/21.3 20.5/19.7 53.4 54.2 53.8
37. l = 256 512× 512 12.7, 0.28 40.8/36.1 54.7/35.8 36.4/25.4 25.3/24.0 24.4 8.2/8.8 9.2 10.8/11 14.8/17.8 18.8/19.2 19.6/19.3 20.4/20.1 21.4/20.7 47.7 46.9 47.4
l = 256 1024× 1024 12, 0.26 40.6/36.4 52.4/34.8 38.4/27.4 26.3/22.0 23.9 8.9/9.2 9.6/10.3 11/12.4 14.5/15.5 18.5/19.1 19.3/19.4 19.9/19.2 20.2/21.6 49.7 49.9 50.3
l = 256 1024× 1024 12, 0.26 42.8/38.0 53.9/36.8 37.5/26.4 25.7/23.2 23.8 8.2/8.4 9.2/9.5 10.8/13.3 14.8/16.6 18.8/19.2 19.6/20.1 20.4/20 20.9/21.1 49.7 49.9 50.3
38. l = 512 512× 512 12.3, 0.22 51.2/56.3 51.3/55.4 55.6/27.2 27.0/26.9 27.3 10.2/10.4 10.7/11.1 12.7/13 15.4/16.9 17.6/18.9 19.8/20.3 20.8/20.5 21.4/20.9 47.7 47.7 47.8
l = 512 1024× 1024 11.9, 0.23 49.3/54.3 51.5/54.4 53.6/26.1 25.0/24.2 22.3 9.7/10.1 10.4/11.3 12.1/13.1 14.8/16.7 17.1/17.9 18/19.8 20.2/20.3 20.1/20.6 51.3 51.5 51.1
l = 512 1024× 1024 11.9, 0.23 51.2/56.3 51.3/55.4 55.6/27.2 27.0/26.9 27.4 9.1/9.2 9.9/10.8 11.8/12.5 14.9/15.2 16.6/18.8 18.9/19.5 20.3/20.6 20.5/19.8 51.3 51.5 51.1
39. l = 1024 512× 512 12.5, 0.26 43.9/40.8 53.6/41.6 41.5/56.6 57.8/46.3 46.4 11.7/12.1 12.5/13.3 15.4/15.5 16.1/18.6 17.3 19.3/20.3 21.2/21.8 22.6/21.6 50 49.2 50.1
l = 1024 1024× 1024 12.7, 0.28 45.2/41.3 54.3/42 42.7/55.3 58.3/47.5 46.8 12.2/12.8 13.2/14.9 15.5/15.1 16.2/16.8 17/17.7 18.9/20.3 21/20.9 21.3/21.7 49.8 50.2 50
l = 1024 1024× 1024 12.7, 0.28 44.5/41 53.9/41.9 42.2/56.9 58.1/46.7 46.6 11.5/12 12.2/13.1 14.9/15.2 15.8/17.1 16.9/18.5 19.2/20.2 21.3/21.1 20.7/20.3 49.8 50.2 50
40. l = 2048 512× 512 12.3, 0.23 52.1/56.4 53.1/56.6 56.6/57.7 57.5/58.0 58.6 11.3/11.9 12.5/12.4 13.6/16.2 16.7/17.6 18.5/19.8 20.3/21.5 21.9/21 22.3/21.6 48.4 49.2 49.3
l = 2048 1024× 1024 12.3, 0.24 53.3/55.9 54.2/55.2 56/54.4 54.9/54.4 55.6 11.7/11.9 12.8/13.3 14.1/15.9 16.8/18.2 18.3/18.4 20.2/20.8 21.5/22.1 22.1/19.8 50.4 50.2 49.8
l = 2048 1024× 1024 12.3, 0.24 51.7/54.4 52.7/55.5 54.1/55.2 57.1/55.9 56.8 11.9/12.7 13.1/13.9 14.2/16.6 17.3/18 18.8/19.7 20.4/21.7 22.1/21 21.7/22.2 50.4 50.2 49.8
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4.6.2 Robustness-capacity
In the case of stable and semistable tags, there is a tradeoff between their lengths and their
robustness to image modifications. Naturally, this occurs because the keytag association
algorithm sorts and selects image features according to their degree of robustness, in de-
scending order. Nonetheless, not all the modifications have the same impact on the image.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the effect of several modifications from Section 4.6.1 on a biomedical
image, and Tables 4.9-4.12: column 2 (unshaded cells) shows the average PSNR and
MSSIM of the image test set after each modification. JPEG2000 compression is one of
the most typical modifications. It maintains the image clinical value with compression
factors around 16:1, obtaining PSNR ' 42 dB and MSSIM ' 0.99. Higher compression
ratios may cause unacceptable distortion, so they are not recommended. Common image
processing techniques can help to find a better representation of the image. β correction
changes the brightness and can be reversed; contrast stretching, local histogram equaliza-
tion and color inversion help to enhance the details of the image, and the latter can be
totally reversed. In the case of local operations, edge sharpening helps to enhance certain
details, so it only modifies volatile parts of the image. The rest of the local operations
modify both the semistable and volatile parts of the image, high and some middle fre-
quencies, leaving only the stable parts intact. There are also several image modifications
that neither affect the image quality nor distort its associated tags. These are clipping
the ROI, since there are no keytags associated outside this region; geometrical changes,
which are detected and reversed by means of a resynchronization step depicted in Section
4.7.2; inserting annotations, usually in the borders of the ROI or outside; and darkening
private data, which is most often located outside the ROI. Finally, it was observed that
modifying the sign of the most significant coefficients in the highest decomposition level
is the most effective manner to willfully destroy stable tags, but at the cost of completely
destroying the image as well, since the PSNR becomes ≤ 13.
The results in Tables 4.9-4.12 (unshaded cells cells, left side of slashes), demonstrate
that the overall robustness of stable tags to any tested image modification is high up to
capacities of 512-1024 bits, with an average NHD < 1%, decreasing for aggressive image
compression and filtering at 2048 bits. It is worth mentioning that the local operations
(except edge sharpening) are the most challenging modifications, since they affect many
subbands. In fact, the motion blur modification yields an average NHD = 3.6% in
stable tags of 1024 bits. Since the number of coefficients available from level 3 (aWL for
512 × 512 px2 images) to the top is 16,384, and only one feature can be extracted from
each coefficient, associating tags longer than 2048 bits will make the overall robustness
decrease sharply. BCH(511,259,30) coding [391] was successfully tested with stable tags
to improve their robustness. Each tag is divided into blocks of 259 bits and encoded as
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511-bit redundant blocks. Although it is then possible to correct up to 30 bits per block,
the length of the associated keytag is almost double that of the keytag associated to the
tag without BCH coding, which reduces its overall robustness. As can be seen in Tables
4.9-4.12 (unshaded cells, right side of slashes), the balance is positive and the NHD is
reduced to 0 or almost 0 in most cases. Nonetheless, BCH can not be applied to all images
for capacities of ≥ 2048 bits, which turn into ≥ 4096 bits after this coding, since some
clipped ROIs do not have enough coefficients for the keytag association. Therefore, BCH
coding-decoding will be applied to all stable tags with length ≤ 1204 bits, the coding as
a previous step to Algorithm 3 and the decoding as a final step after Algorithm 4.
Semistable tags show good robustness to mild image compression and common image
processing, e.g. NHD = 0.2% with L = 4096 for JPEG2000 compression 16:1, NHD = 0%
with L = 8192 for 8 : 1. As was also expected, their robustness to modifications that re-
move details (e.g. image averaging 7 × 7) is very low, while for edge sharpening, which
enhances them, it is very high (NHD = 0.6% for L = 8192). It is also observed that
BCH coding is pertinent for capacities up to 4096 bits, since it reduces the NHD of per-
missible modifications, which do not affect the clinical value of the image (JPEG2000 CR
16:1, common image processing and edges sharpening). Therefore, semistable tags with
length ≤ 4096 bits will implement BCH coding. The NHD of permissible modifications
is ≤ 2.1% for capacities of 8192 bits (to be implemented without BCH coding), which is
tolerable. Nonetheless, it is not recommended exceeding this capacity since the distortion
of permissible modifications increases a lot, e.g. NHD = 8.7% for JPEG2000 CR 16:1
with tag length of 16384 bits. Finally, volatile tags present very low robustness, with
NHD ≈ 50%, to any irreversible modification affecting the image ROI even when the tag
length is very short.
4.6.3 Specificity
Specificity is a relevant feature of keytagging, since it measures how much information
can be retrieved with a keytag when the image it is associated to is replaced with another
image (not derived from the former). The distortion of the tags retrieved from non-original
images shall be considerably high for two reasons: to avoid that someone can read the tag
content without the original image (thus, affecting its privacy) and to avoid that someone
can establish a relation between certain keytag an another image not associated to it
(thus, affecting its security). The results of the specificity evaluation, using simulation
setup 2 (see Section 4.6.1), are represented in Table 4.13. It can be seen that the average
values of distortion for any keytag type and length are close to the ideal NHD, 50%,
which guarantees perfect destruction of the tag content. Nevertheless, it is also observed
that the shorter the keytag, the highest the likelihood of retrieving some tag with lower
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distortion. In particular, the minimum NHD measured when retrieving the tag content
with a very similar image was 12.5% and 15.6% for 128-bit stable and semistable keytags.
Although these values far exceed those obtained when evaluating robustness (retrieving
the tags from images derived from the original), NHD = 0% for 128-bit stable keytags and
semistable keytags, they shall be taken into account when designing certain keytag-based
security measures (see Sections 4.7.3 and 4.7.5).
4.6.4 Effect of JPEG2000 compression
As explained in Section 4.5.5, the keytagging algorithm has similarities with the JPEG2000
compressor. For this reason, the robustness of stable and semistable tags to JPEG2000
compression is high, as the results in Table 4.9 demonstrate. Nonetheless, to claim high
compatibility with this compressor, the robustness to the image modifications tested in
the table must also be evaluated in compressed versions of the original images. Since
biomedical images are expected to be compressed with ratios around 16, it was tested
tested with ratios of 8, 16 and 32. The new results, which are compared with those from the
uncompressed images, are depicted in Table 4.14. Positive values imply that the results of
the compressed test set are worse, since the NHD increases, while negative values indicate
better results for the opposite reason. Thus, it is observed that the effect of keytagging
compressed images instead of the original ones is null on the distortion of stable tags if
their length is ≤ 512 bits. For 1024 bits, only two filters suffer a slight change, and for 2048
bits the NHD increases by an average of 0.2%, which is not significant. Semistable tags
maintain very similar robustness to common processing, with the exception of β correction
−0.5 for a high capacity (8192 bits), which becomes significantly worse. Regarding local
operations, there is an important change in the results of semistable tags, but their overall
robustness to these operations is still low or very low, as intended. Volatile keytags
maintain minimum robustness to any modification, with NHD ' 50%. Geometrical
modifications and darkening private data remain with NHD = 0 for stable and semistable
tags, and inserting annotations on the compressed images produces no or very slight
change. Thus, it can be concluded that keytagging JPEG2000 compressed images instead
of the original images obtains very similar results, which permits implementing the same
applications with the same operating parameters (see Section 4.7).
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Table 4.13: Distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when retrieved from an image different from the one they were
associated to (see Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.3)
Distortion of Distortion of Distortion of
stable tags semistable tags volatile tags
—NHD (%)— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXMeasure
Length(T )
128 256 512 1024 2048 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 16384 64 128 256
Mean — without BCH coding 48.8 49.2 49.7 49.8 49.9 49.6 49.9 50 50.1 50 50 50 50 50 49.9 50
— with BCH coding 48.8 49.3 49.7 49.8 - 49.6 50 50 50.1 50 50 50 50 - - -
Standard deviation — without BCH coding 4.5 3.7 2.6 1.9 1.3 4 2.8 2 1.3 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 5 3.5 2.5
— with BCH coding 5 3.6 2.6 1.9 - 3.9 2.8 2 1.3 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 - - -
Minimum — without BCH coding 13.3 18.8 24.2 30.6 36.7 15.6 23.6 37.9 40.7 44.7 46.1 47 47.4 31.2 38.3 40.4
— with BCH coding 12.5 19.1 25.2 30.6 - 15.9 23.6 37.8 42.1 44 46.3 47.1 47.4 - - -
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Table 4.14: Effect of JPEG2000 compression —with compression ratios of 8, 16, 32— on the distortion of stable and semistable tags when
the image test set undergoes other common modifications in the biomedical context. See also the original distortion in Tables 4.10-4.12.
Image size Additive distortion Additive distortion
—px2— —NHD (%)— —NHD (%)—
of JPEG2000 compression of JPEG2000 compression
with CR = 8, 16, 32 in with CR = 8, 16, 32 in
stable tags semistable tags
``````````````````#. Operation
Length(T )
- 1024-BCH 2048 128-BCH 256-BCH 512-BCH 1024-BCH 2048-BCH 4096-BCH 8192
Common image processing
11. β correction −0.3 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.4
12. β correction −0.5 512× 512 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.6 2.8 2.7 3.2
13. β correction +0.4 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
14. β correction +0.7 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 0.8
15. Contrast stretching 2% 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.4
16. Contrast stretching 10% 512× 512 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.8
17. Invert colors 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18. Local hist. equal. 512× 512 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2
Local operations
19. Edge sharpening 512× 512 0 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2
20. Median filter 5× 5 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.4 -0.5 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -1 -1.2 -1.1 -2.4 -1.4 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2 -2.4 -3.4 -2.2 -2.2 -4 -2 -2.6 -3.2
21. Median filter 7× 7 512× 512 0 0 0 0 -0.1 -0.4 -1.1 -0.9 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.5 0.5 -1.4 0.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -1.6 0.8 0.3 -0.6
22. Image averaging 5× 5 512× 512 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 -0.8 -1.9 -2.4 -1.8 -1.6 -1.1 -2.4 -3.5 -2.8 -2.4 -2.5 -3.4 -4.6 -2.4 -5 -2.9 -3.9 -4.4
23. Image averaging 7× 7 512× 512 0.3 0 −0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 -1.2 -2.7 -0.5 -2.9 -1.9 -2.5 -1.1 -3.9 -3.3 -3.5 -3.3 -4.9 -2.4 -3.4 -2.6 -2.7 -4.8 -4.8 -2.7 -3.3 -3
24. Gaussian filtering 7× 7 512× 512 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.3 5.4 3.7 6.5 4.2 6.3 4.2 6.3 4.4 5.4 5 4.3 4.6 3.7 5.7 5.6 5.1
25. Gaussian filtering 11× 11 512× 512 0 0 0 0.3 0.4 0.2 3.1 1.8 2.8 2 3.1 1.8 4.3 2.2 4.1 1.7 4.3 1.6 4.6 3.9 4.6 3.1 4.8 2.7 3.9 2.8 2.8
26. Motion blur 7 512× 512 0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 0.5 -1 -0.4 0.1 0 -1.8 -1.9 -1.1
27. Motion blur 9 512× 512 0 0 -0.1 0 0 -0.2 0.1 0.5 0 0.9 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 1 0.2 0.2 0 -0.1 0.4 -0.3
34. Inserting annotations 512× 512 0 0 0 -0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2
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4.6.5 Average runtime cost
Most of the processes comprising Algorithm 3-4 are of linear complexity, as can be inferred
from their description throughout Sections 4.5.1-4.5.4. Table 4.15 shows the runtime cost
of these processes when executed in a Matlab R© R2014a implementation running on an
Intel Core i5 Quad Core at 2.9 GHz with OS X Yosemite. The slowest process is the tag
BCH coding, taking 158 − 187 ms, which can be performed offline and is recommended
for stable tags with length ≤ 1024 bits and for semistable tags with length ≤ 4096 bits,
and the decoding, which needs to be performed online but takes only 15 − 24 ms. The
segmentation and the color reduction of the image have a negligible cost, while the wavelet
transformation is the second slowest process. Most of its runtime cost is concentrated on
calculating the first 3-4 decomposition levels and is highly dependent on the size of the
original image. When the size of the image is increased by two in both rows and columns,
the runtime cost increases approximately by four. The coding of a keytag has linear
complexity and low runtime costs, e.g. 0.1 ms for 128-bit tags and 7.1 ms for 8192-bit
tags; and its decoding has a very low fixed cost of 0.3 ms. Regarding cryptographic
processes, the digital signature of a keytag and its verification have a low fixed cost, 2.6
and 7.2 ms. The cost of encrypting a keytag depends linearly on the length of the tag
and its runtime cost is very low, 0.2 ms for a 8192-bit tag. The costs of encrypting and
decrypting a package of up to 16 access keys to keytags intended for a user are 0.45 and
5.3ms.
According to the data in Table 4.15, the overall delays for associating several keytags
(in this example 4 128-bit stable, 3 2048-bit semistable and 1 256-bit volatile) to an
512× 512 px2 image (operations 1a-3a) and retrieving the corresponding tags (operations
1r, 4r-6r) are < 55 ms and < 115 ms respectively. If keytagging is integrated within
the JPEG2000 compressor, these overall delays drop to ≤ 30, 90 ms for any image size,
since this compressor performs the wavelet transformation. Finally, when some tags are
private, it is necessary to encrypt and decrypt (operations 4a and 3r) the keytags and the
corresponding access keys (operations 5a and 2r) of each user. These operations add an
extra delay of < 0.5 ·#users ms in the keytag association and 5.5ms in the tag retrieval
procedure.
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Table 4.15: Average runtime cost (in ms, unshaded cells) of the processes for keytag association and tag retrieval depending on different
parameter values (shaded cells)
Operation: Parameter(s) Value 1 Value 2 Value 3 Value 4 Value 5 Value 6 Value 7 Value 8 Value 9 Value 10 Value 11
Keytag association process
0a. BCH coding of a tag length(T ) 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 - - - - -
157.9 162.0 188.1 185.3 185.7 187.2
1a. Segmentation, color reduction and wavelet transformation of Ior,
PPPPPPPPPPPImage size
WL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Algorithm 3: lines 2-5 512× 512 px2 19.9 21.4 23.9 25.3 25.4 25.4 25.6 25.6 25.7
1024× 1024 px2 87.6 95.9 105.0 110.4 110.4 110.6 110.8 110.9 110.8 111.1
2048× 2048 px2 359.7 421.7 455.2 479.0 479.3 478.1 478.4 478.5 478.4 478.7 478.7
2a. Coding of a keytag, Algorithm 3: lines 6-7, 9-12 length(T ) 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 - - -
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.9 3.6 7.1
3a. Signature of a keytag, Algorithm 3: line 13 2.6
4a. Encryption of a keytag, Algorithm 3: lines 14-15 length(T ) 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 - - -
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
5a. Encryption of a user’s access keys, Algorithm 3: lines 17-21 0.45
Tag retrieval process
1r. Segmentation, color reduction and wavelet transformation of Ior,
PPPPPPPPPPPImage size
WL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Algorithm 4: lines 2-5 512× 512 px2 19.9 21.4 23.9 25.3 25.4 25.4 25.6 25.6 25.7
1024× 1024 px2 87.6 95.9 105.0 110.4 110.3 110.6 110.8 110.9 110.8 111.1
2048× 2048 px2 359.7 421.7 455.2 479.0 479.3 478.1 478.4 478.5 478.4 478.7 478.7
2r. Decryption of a user’s access keys, Algorithm 4: line 7 5.3
3r. Decryption of a keytag, Algorithm 4: line 9 length(T ) 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 - - -
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
4r. Verification of keytag signature, Algorithm 4: line 10 7.2
5r. Decoding of a keytag, Algorithm 4, lines 6, 11-15 0.3
6r. BCH decoding of a tag length(T ) 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 - - - - -
15.3 15.8 15.9 16.7 19 23.8
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4.6.6 Scalability
The scalability of any technique for protecting biomedical images is an important feature
since the tendency is to increase their resolution for better image processing and visual-
ization. The shaded cells in Tables 4.9-4.12 depict the robustness-capacity trade-off in a
second image test set. This corresponds to the original data set introduced in Section 4.6.1
after bicubic interpolation by a factor of two in both rows and columns, which has been
processed with the same modifications as the former but tuning the parameters so that
the image distortion caused is closely similar in PSNR and MSSIM . Otherwise, if the
parameter values for the image modifications are maintained and the images are enlarged,
the distortion caused is usually lower (especially when the image undergoes compression
and local operations) and the robustness-capacity tradeoff would improve only because
the image is less degraded.
Two different parameter configurations have been tested, using the aWL in Algorithm
5: extractFeatures (the lightly shaded cells in Tables 4.9-4.12) and reusing the same
aWL as for the original test set, comprised by 512 × 512 px2 images (the shaded cells in
Tables 4.9-4.12). When associating stable keytags and performing image compression and
common image modifications, it can be seen that both options obtain results similar to
those for 512 × 512 px2 images up to tag lengths of 1024 bits. The second option gives
better results, but these are still not good enough to allow capacities higher than 1024 bits.
When associating stable keytags and performing local image operations, the first option
obtains much better results than the second, since the tag is associated to lower frequencies
of the image which better endure these types of image modifications. These results are
very similar to those obtained with 512× 512 px2 images. Regarding semistable keytags,
the first option also obtains results that are closer to those obtained with 512 × 512 px2
images. The configuration for volatile keytags has been maintained by selecting coefficients
from the HH subband in the first decomposition level, to guarantee very low robustness.
Regarding the rest of the image modifications, the results are equal or very similar for both
options. As a general conclusion, the parameters proposed in Algorithms 3-4 guarantee
the scalability of keytagging with respect to the robustness-capacity trade-off, which is
maintained for different image sizes.
Regarding the runtime cost of keytagging, increasing the size of the image increases
the cost of performing its wavelet transformation (operations 1a and 4r in Table 4.15) by
an n2 factor. For instance, calculating the MWL of a 512× 512 px2 image takes 25.7ms,
while for a 1024 × 1024 px2 image it takes 111.1 ms and for a 2048 × 2048 px2 image it
takes 478.7ms. As a result, the overall delays for associating keytags and retrieving tags
presented in Section 4.6.5 (' 55, 115 ms) increase to ' 140, 200 ms for 1024 × 1024 px2
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images and to ' 510, 570ms for 2048×2048px2. Therefore, it is recommended combining
keytagging with JPEG2000 compression in order to guarantee the scalability of keytagging,
since it reduces these delays to ' 30, 90ms for any image size.
4.7 Protection of biomedical images by means of keytagging
The integration of keytagging to strengthen the protection of images transmitted within
m-Health architectures is analyzed in Section 4.7.1. In addition to this, the operating pa-
rameters of keytagging are adjusted in order to implement the security measures proposed
in Section 1.3.2. The use of specific keytags for image resynchronization, authentication
and traceability, copyright protection, private captioning, integrity control and location of
tampered areas is summarized in Table 4.16, and described in detail throughout Sections
4.7.2-4.7.7. Furthermore, the security of the keytagging method, including all the security
measures that it can implement, is comprehensively assessed in Section 4.7.8. Finally, the
potential limitations of keytagging are analyzed in Section 4.7.9.
Figure 4.9: Integration of keytagging in m-Health architectures.
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4.7.1 Integration of keytagging in m-Health architectures
The keytagging method is aimed for supplementing the security in the transmission of
images within cooperative m-Health architectures, which at a technical level are typically
supported by standards like DICOM (see Section 2.6.4). As portrayed in Figure 4.9, the
integration of keytagging for the sharing of information among different users in these
architectures poses three constraints:
• Although the keytagging algorithm guarantees that keytags are protected and ver-
ified (by means of cryptography, Section 4.5.4), the integration of keytagging in
m-Health architectures requires the implementation of a reliable authorization mech-
anism to control which specific entities (e.g. the device that acquired the image the
keytag is associated to, a physician in charge of supervising the image, the holder
of the image copyright, etc.) are entitled to add, remove or consult keytags of an
image.
• The m-Health architecture shall also implement a mechanism to record which keytags
are added, removed or consulted, in order to guarantee the auditability of these
events and the accountability of the entities involved.
• The capacity of the different types of keytags to transmit information among different
users is conditioned by the perceptual and clinical distortion that their instances of
the image —associated to the keytags— may undergo. This property is used for the
implementation of the keytag-based security measures described throughout Sections
4.7.2-4.7.7.
4.7.2 Image resynchronization
The biomedical image may be subject to geometrical transformations, which in this context
may be 90/180/270◦ rotation, vertical or horizontal flipping. Recovering the original
image position is essential to retrieve its tags correctly, since otherwise they would be
desynchronized. To accomplish this task, a reference synchronization tag is associated
to the image. This is a 128-bit public stable tag, which is retrieved six times, from the
received position and from each of the geometrical transformations (by rotating/mirroring
each subband in Coef just after line 5 in Algorithm 4). The retrieved tag most similar to
the original reference corresponds to the transformation that recovers the original image
position. If it is observed that a retrieved tag is more dissimilar than the most similar
tag, e.g. 127 wrong bits in the former and 80 correct bits in the latter, this means that
the original position corresponds to the former, whose colors have been inverted. In that
case, the values of Coef need to be inverted (just after line 5 in Algorithm 4).
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Table 4.16: Recommended parameters to implement various keytag-based security measures (see Section 4.7)
Security Keytag aWL, allowed Tag Tag length Tag BCH Th, tag detection Keytag Issuer of
measure type wavelet level(s) content (bits) coding threshold (bits) encryption DS keytag
Image Stable ≥MWL(ROIg)− 6 Reference 128 Yes Most similar/ No Image acquisition
resynchronization dissimilar tag device or image issuer
Authentication Stable ≥MWL(ROIg)− 6 Reference 128 Yes 126 No Image acquisition
and device or image issuer,
traceability and each entity that
processes the image
Pursuing illegal Stable ≥MWL(ROIg)− 6 ID of image 128 Yes 126 No Holder of
image copies copyright holder image copyright
Image purchase Stable ≥MWL(ROIg)− 6 ID of image 128 Yes 126 Yes Holder of
buyer image copyright
Private captioning Semistable ≤MWL(ROIg)− 7 Text/codes ≥ 256 No - Yes User authorized
with RBAC ≤ 8192 (RBAC) to update test data
Integrity control Volatile 1 (HH subband) Reference 64 No - No Image acquisition
device or image issuer
Location of Volatile 1 (HH subband) Reference ≥ 512 No - No Image acquisition
tampered areas device or image issuer
Chapter 4. Enhancement of the security of biomedical tests through their associated
signals 175
4.7.3 Image authentication and traceability
Authentication refers to the capacity to determine if an image is either derived from
another, including perfect copies in this category, or if it is unrelated. To implement
image authentication, a reference public stable tag is associated to the original image. It
is then retrieved from the image to be authenticated. Only if the reference and retrieved
tags are very similar or equal is the image positively authenticated. The authentication
ability of keytagging is adjusted by means of two operating parameters: the length of the
reference tag and the detection threshold, Th. Assuming that decoding each tag bit has a
probability of success of ' 0.5 when it is done from a wrong image, the probability of false
positives Pfp in authentication can be approximated by means of the following binomial
distribution:
Pfp =
n=length(T )∑
i=Th
(0.5)n · n!
i!(n− i)! (4.8)
The image is positively authenticated only if the number of correctly decoded tag bits
exceeds the threshold,
∑length(T )
i=1 (T˜i = Ti) ≥ Th. On the one hand, the probability of
false positives Pfp in image authentication is expected to be similar to that required in
applications of biometric recognition, ≤ 10−6. Thus, avoiding images that were not key-
tagged for authentication from obtaining false positives requires setting a high Th. On
the other hand, too high values of Th (low permitted NHD) will increase the probability
of false negatives (non-authenticated images that were actually associated with the au-
thentication tag). As can be seen in Tables 4.9-4.12, the robustness of stable tags with
BCH coding is total (NHD = 0%) for tag lengths up to 512 bits, which ensures no false
negatives. However, a shorter tag is enough to ensure that the likelihood of false posi-
tives, Pfp, is very low. Using length(T ) = 128 and Th = 126 (NHD = 1.6%) makes
Pfp = 2.5 · 10−35. The minimum NHD in simulation setup 2 (see Section 4.6.1) was
obtained when associating-retrieving a reference 128-bit tag using the two most similar
images in the test set (PSNR = 23dB), two close slices from a PET-CT. ThatNHD value,
the closest to causing a false positive, was 17.2%, still far greater than Th (= 1.6%). To
sum up, these operating parameters ensure the perfect authentication of the whole test
set.
Traceability policies intend to facilitate the tracking of entities that process or simply
forward the biomedical image test. This can be easily accomplished if each entity validates
the digital signature(s) of the authentication keytag, authenticates the image and adds its
own digital signature to the authentication keytag if the previous verifications are positive.
Otherwise, the image is reported as replaced or heavily tampered with and requested from
the last entity that validated it.
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4.7.4 Copyright protection
Copyright protection may be implemented by means of a specific double authentication
mechanism (see Section 4.7.3), involving the image copyright holder and each image buyer,
in the following manner:
• The copyright holder is identified by means of a public ID (e.g. Rubio@eHealthZ14),
which he/she associates to the image by means of a 128-bit stable tag. Besides, this
tag has a secondary purpose: enabling the automatic search for illegal copies of the
image in internet sites and databases. An internet bot may use the keytag to retrieve
tags from the images in targeted sites and compare them with the copyright holder
ID. If some image is positively authenticated, it is an illegal copy.
• Each buyer is identified by means of an ID, which the copyright holder associates
to the image with a 128-bit private stable tag. In this manner, any buyer can prove
that he/she holds a legal copy, even if he/she has made substantial modifications to
it.
4.7.5 Private captioning with RBAC
The association of private information with the image, only retrievable by authorized users
if the image preserves its clinical value, may be easily carried out by means of semistable
private tags. Nonetheless, the results in Tables 4.9-4.12 suggest that the overall size of
these captions should not exceed 8192 bits. Therefore, it is recommended compressing
them as much as possible, e.g. by replacing text with codes. Nevertheless, it is also
recommended that the overall tag length is not too short, to guarantee a good specificity.
As pointed out in Table 4.13, a minimum length of 256-bit ensures that the minimum
distortion (NHD) of tags retrieved from very similar images (but not derived from the
original) is high, > 23%. Therefore, short tags shall add padding bits until their length is
≥ 256 bits.
Cryptographic-based RBAC may be applied to improve private captioning (see Algo-
rithms 3: lines 14-21 and Algorithm 2: lines 7-9). For each tag, its associated keytag
is symmetrically encrypted with a specific symmetric key, Sk, and all the symmetric
keys corresponding to tags intended for a user are encrypted with his/her public key,
PbUser{i}. Thus, each user decrypts his/her symmetric keys {Sk} with his/her private
key, PrUser{i}, and then decrypts his/her keytags with these symmetric keys. All this
can be easily managed by encapsulating the keytags with CMS. There are two reasons
to implement RBAC in this manner, instead of by associating a different keytag for each
user. First, because all the users retrieve the same tag content, even when the image is
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modified. Otherwise the users may retrieve tag contents with different degrees of distor-
tion. Second, because associating several keytags with the same content would reduce the
overall capacity.
4.7.6 Integrity control and location of tampered areas
The detection and location of modifications affecting the image may be efficiently per-
formed by means of public volatile tags. Tables 4.9-4.12 shows that these tags suffer high
distortion even when the image modifications are mild, which implies very low robustness.
Given these results, the following configurations are proposed:
• For integrity control, it is sufficient to use 64-bit reference tags, since they have an
average NHD ' 50%. Thus, approximately 32 bits are wrongly detected when the
image ROI undergoes non-geometrical modifications (geometrical modifications are
reversed by means of resynchronization, see Section 4.7.2). The exception to this,
NHD slightly > 0, occurs when the image is partially annotated in the ROI, since
only a few pixels in isolated regions change.
• For the location of tampered areas, the position in BM of wrongly detected tag
bits is marked in the corresponding positions of the image. The even distribution
of tampered pixels, detected after a common image modification, is shown in Figure
4.10: center. Logically, longer reference tags are able to achieve finer granularity in
the delimitation of modified image areas, which is especially important in the case
of detecting annotations in the image ROI. Considering that usually only ' 2%
pixels have been annotated and half (1%) change the value of the features used the
for coding of these keytags (the LSB of certain wavelet coefficients), a 512-bit tag is
able to locate approximately 5 tampered areas in the ROI, as shown in Figure 4.10:
right.
It is worth noting that implementing location of tampered areas already ensures in-
tegrity control, but not conversely.
4.7.7 Simultaneous implementation
This section analyzes whether all the previous security measures can be implemented simul-
taneously in the images from the test set, by analyzing the results of robustness-capacity
in Tables 4.9-4.12 and the keytagging parameters in Table 4.16. According to these re-
sults, the security measures based on public stable tags can reach an overall capacity of
512 bits with NHD = 0, and they only require 384 bits. Regarding semistable tags, their
capacity shall be adjusted to ≤ 8192 bits in order to maintain an adequate robustness in
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Figure 4.10: Location of tampered areas on the ROI of a 512 × 512 px2 original image
(left), on its JPEG QF = 15% compressed version (center, tag length = 128 bits) and on
an annotated version (right, tag length = 512 bits).
private captioning. With respect to volatile tags, there are no capacity restrictions. Thus,
all these security measures can be implemented simultaneously. Furthermore, in this case,
it is recommended that the tags for image resynchronization, authentication-traceability
and location of tampered areas-integrity control associate the same reference. This would
require extending the reference used for location of tampered areas, e.g. by repeating
several times the shorter reference used to implement the other security measures. In
this manner, the reference does not need to be transmitted since comparisons may be
established among the tags retrieved. Consequently, the keytagging-based security system
would be able to operate in a blind manner.
An overview of the overall keytagging system is introduced below by means of the fol-
lowing use case. A patient’s biomedical image is acquired by means of a CT scanner, whose
software generates a 128-bit reference and runs the keytagging algorithm to associate it
by means of three keytags. Two of these keytags are stable, intended for resynchroniza-
tion and authentication, and the third is volatile (resulting from the concatenation of the
reference 8 times), intended for the location of tampered areas. The keytags are attached
with the image file and recorded in the audit trail system of the m-Health architecture
to which the CT scan is connected. The access control system of the architecture estab-
lishes that this image can be edited by two specialists of the patient and consulted by
his general practitioner. Each time that one of them accesses the image, the visualization
software runs the keytagging algorithm to validate the keytags associated and read their
content. Next, the reference introduced after the acquisition is used to authenticate and
resynchronize the image (if necessary), and also to pinpoint tampered areas (if any). The
specialists can introduce text regarding the diagnosis of the patient or his/her treatment,
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which the visualization software will associate by running the keytagging algorithm to add
semistable keytags. These keytags will be attached in the image file and recorded in the
audit trail system. The three users can consult the image, perform modifications on it and,
using the visualization software, consult the keytags. In spite of possible modifications,
the visualization software will still be able to authenticate and resynchronize the image, to
display the content of the semistable keytags (if the image has not lost its clinical value)
and to pinpoint the modified areas. Finally, the specialists (but not the practitioner) can
use the visualization software to order the removal of their own semistable keytags from
the image file, being this event recorded in the audit trail system.
4.7.8 Risk assessment
The keytagging method, described in Section 4.5, involves different elements; namely, the
keytagging algorithm itself, the keytagged image, the keytag(s) associated to it and the
content of the corresponding tag(s). Several considerations can be done about the char-
acter, either public or private, of these elements. In the first place, Kerckhoff’s principle
states that the system shall be secure even if everything about it, except certain keys, is
public knowledge. Hence, considering that the enemy will eventually discover the keytag-
ging algorithm [392], it is proposed in Section 4.5.4 to make it public from the beginning.
Similarly, medical keytagged images cannot be considered as impossible to obtain under
any circumstance. In fact, certain situations may facilitate attackers to obtain an image
copy. Some patients may give their informed consent to the use of their biomedical im-
ages for certain purposes —e.g. teaching, research— after anonymization, which increases
the number of accesses to the image (and the number of potential opportunities for at-
tacker accordingly); and even strictly confidential images may be a reasonably target for
attackers if at a certain time they are handled (e.g. filtered, annotated) out of a protected
standardized format (e.g. as JPX instead of DICOM files). Regarding keytags and their
associated tag contents, they can be either public or private depending on the security
measures that they implement (see Table 4.16). The former are available to anyone for
consultation, while the latter are considered as the most difficult elements to be obtained
(in clear) by an attacker.
With the purpose of weakening the security of the system, an attacker with access to
some of its elements may try to perform certain attack(s) to interfere with the security
measures described throughout Sections 4.7.2-4.7.6. Therefore, performing a comprehen-
sive risk assessment, comprising all feasible attacks and the existing countermeasures, is
essential for the prevention of potential security breaches. The following risk assessment,
based on reference publications on watermarking security [393, 394, 395] and tailored to
the specifics of keytagging, analyzes attacks depending on the keytag-based measures af-
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fected, the actions intended by the attacker and the system elements he/she needs access
to. The following attacks may potentially affect the privacy in image purchase and in
image captioning (see Sections 4.7.4-4.7.5):
• Unauthorized detection and reading of private keytags. It is impossible to detect
keytags if the attacker only knows the image: no information can be extracted from
the image alone since keytagging does not modify it in any manner. As regards to
reading the whole content of private tag(s) associated to an image, the algorithm
requires both the image and the plain keytag(s) associated. With respect to the
former, the attacker may try to use another image if he/she does not have the
original, but the specificity of keytags guarantees that the content retrieved will be
highly distorted, as demonstrated in Section 4.6.3. Regarding the latter, keytag(s)
is/are protected with adequate encryption (see Section 4.5.4), which makes obtaining
its/their plain version(s) very unlikely. There is also another possible attack, which
—generally speaking— requires even more knowledge about the system and only
permits reading part of certain tag(s) content. To explain this attack, it is worth
reminding that while public keytags shall be associated to different features of the
image to avoid eavesdropping, different independent users may associate private
keytags to certain repeated image features. Therefore, if an attacker knows one or
several plain private keytags with its/their associated tags, he/she would be able
to read those tag bits from other keytags associated to the same image features.
Nevertheless, this requires the attacker being able to break the encryption of the
keytags from different users (to obtain the plain versions) and to know the tag
content of at least a private keytag, which is highly unlikely.
And these attacks may potentially affect all the security measures described throughout
Sections 4.7.2-4.7.6:
• Writing of forged keytags. The attempt to copy a legitimate keytag in another
image will not succeed since the keytagging algorithm guarantees that keytags are
dependent on the image. This high specificity guarantees that the tag content read
will be highly distorted, as proved in Section 4.6.3. Alternatively, any attacker
can decide to associate his/her own keytag(s) to any image, since the keytagging
algorithm is intended to become public. Nevertheless, the attacker cannot add the
required digital signature of a trusted entity to the keytags, unless he/she has broken
or stolen the private key of a trusted entity —which is highly unlikely.
• Malicious removal of legitimate keytags. There are three possibilities: attacking
the keytag, the image it is associated to or the association. As regards to keytags,
although they may be attacked, its integrity and provenance can be evaluated any
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time by means of its digital signature, which is a mandatory element (see Table
4.16). As explained before, to forge the digital signature of the signatory entity,
so that the attack cannot be detected, the attacker needs to break/steal his/her
private key. Regarding attacks on the image, their effects on the robustness of
the different types of keytags have been evaluated in Section 4.6.2. In fact, the
different measures described throughout Section 4.7.2-4.7.6 are designed based on
the intended robustness of keytags —e.g. authentication is based on stable keytags,
which can be detected even when the image undergoes important modifications;
tamper detection is based on volatile keytags, which get highly distorted even if the
modification(s) on the image are minor. Therefore, the effect of the modifications
of the image have already been taken into account in the design of the security
measures. Alternatively, the keytagging algorithm can be exploited to change the
value of image features used to encode the keytags. In point of fact, this attack can
destroy the tag content when the plain keytag is known (e.g. if it is public), but
at the cost of destroying the image as well (see Section 4.6.2). Regarding collusion
attacks (popular in watermarking), which combine different keytagged versions of an
image to produce another image with distorted keytags, they would be pointless since
any keytagged version of an image is exactly like the original. Finally, the attacker
may attempt to make the tag reader think that certain keytags are associated to a
different image, with the intention of confusing him/her. To detect this attack, it has
been proposed associating a reference tag with two independent stable keytags (one
for image resynchronization and another for image authentication and traceability,
see Section 4.7.7). In this manner, the tag content of these keytags only match when
retrieved from the original image (or from an image derived from it, e.g. compressed
or filtered).
• Malicious edition of legitimate keytags. This is a combination of the previous types
of attack. Therefore, it requires knowing the plain keytag (breaking its encryption
if it is private), editing the content of the keytag total or partially (as intended by
the attacker), replacing the previous signature with a new valid one (which requires
the private key of the original keytag signatory) and, if the keytag is private, re-
encrypting the keytag with the same cryptographic key used for its decryption.
The careful design of the keytagging algorithm, its combination with adequate crypto-
graphic elements and the choice of the parameters to enforce the different security measures
(mainly the robustness of the keytags) are the foundations of the keytagging method. From
this security assessment, it can be concluded that the only manner to weaken the security
of this system is by attacking the cryptographic protection of the keytags. Hence, the
security of keytagging cannot be considered as lower than the security of cryptography.
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On the contrary, the former requires an additional element for the retrieval of the content
associated: the image.
4.7.9 Potential limitations
With respect to the algorithm, the main limitation for its integration in m-Health appli-
cations is the length of the keytags, which ranges from ≈ 4 · length(tag) to 7 · length(tag),
depending on the size of the image and on the type of keytag. In addition, the results
of robustness-capacity presented are the average of the image test set; however, it was
observed that images with higher energy obtained better results. Thus, defining an index
relating the energy of the image with its robustness-capacity for different image modifica-
tions would be helpful for fine-tuning the capacity of the keytags and also to decide which
image(s) shall be chosen for keytagging in short video modalities composed of a series of
images. It is also worth noting that this technique is complemented by cryptography, and
thus the validity of the encryption and signature algorithms involved shall be permanently
revised.
As regards to the applications of keytagging, the main limitation of this technique is
that it can not mark each individual signal in a different manner — what fingerprinting
does — since this technique does not modify the images. Nonetheless, this would be of
interest to locate the source in leakages of tests. To bypass this issue partially, in cases of
leakages keytagging can be used locate copies of leaked tests and demand and verify the
proofs of ownership provided by the parties involved.
4.8 Conclusions
The main objective of this Chapter was to define novel, cost-efficient, signal-based methods
for the protection of biomedical tests. This objective has been divided into two: the
development of a embedding-based coding for biomedical tests and of a technique, called
keytagging, for the association of information to biomedical signals (particularized for
images). The main conclusions relating to these specific objectives are listed below:
• The proposed coding for 1D biomedical signals meets all the requirements proposed
in Section 1.2.2: information associated to the biomedical signal, signal compres-
sion, security and privacy, role-based access control and low complexity encoding
and short access time. The information of the test is embedded within the coded
biomedical signal, resulting in one or several Coded Test Unit(s) (CTU s). Within a
CTU, the information is so tightly associated to the signal that the whole CTU is
used to reconstruct the signal in the time domain. The compression ratio achieved by
Chapter 4. Enhancement of the security of biomedical tests through their associated
signals 183
the coding is quite high, typically ranging from ' 3 in real-time transmission to ' 5
in offline operation for ECG and EEG-based tests, despite of the preservation of the
clinical value of the signal and of the embedding of additional, protected metadata.
From another angle, this coding permits embedding large amounts of additional in-
formation within the signal (e.g. ' 3 KB in resting ECGs, ' 200 KB in stress tests,
' 30 MB in ambulatory ECGs, ' 350 KB in epilepsy detection tests, ' 4.7 MB in
polysomnographic studies) without exceeding the size of the original, uncompressed
signal alone. In addition, the risk assessment demonstrates that this coding provides
appropriate levels of security and privacy, by combining the robustness of encryp-
tion — partial for the signal and symmetric-asymmetric for the metadata — and
the secrecy contributed by steganography. Furthermore, a role-based access control
policy, enabled by means of a efficient syntax, regulates the privacy of the contents
stored in CTU (s) and permits the simultaneous implementation of various secure
m-Health applications (e.g. emergency care/surgery, diagnosis, research, teaching,
etc.). Finally, the coding/decoding system uses simple operations, which allows real-
time operation (with overall delays of ' 2− 3.3 s), and it can be easily handled by
systems and users through an intuitive interface that is provided.
• Keytagging, the method proposed to associate information to biomedical signals
(specified for images) has demonstrated that its features makes it a better candidate
for this task than previous proposals in the state of the art, based on watermarking
(Section 1.3.2), for a number of reasons. First and foremost, its comprehensive risk
assessment, which takes into consideration all the elements of the keytagging algo-
rithm and the possible attacks, has demonstrated that the level of security of this
technique is appropriate and better than cryptography alone. Furthermore, there
is a proposal which details the keytagging parameters that enable the — individual
or simultaneous— implementation of a variety of security applications, including
private captioning with role-based access control, integrity control and location of
tampered areas, authentication, traceability and copyright protection of the image.
Second, keytagging does not modify the image since — unlike in non-zero water-
marking techniques — keytags are encoded as a function of certain image features
and the data to be associated, so the image clinical value is not affected during or af-
ter this process. Third, unlike in zero-watermarking techniques, the coding method
is optimized towards the selection of the most robust image features — not just very
robust image features —, in order to maximize the robustness-capacity tradeoff. The
experimental evaluation, carried out with 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024 pixel images,
shows that the robustness of stable tags to modifications that are typical in the
biomedical context is perfect (NHD = 0) up to 512 bits and still very high (only
three modifications produce NHD > 0) for 1024 bits. Semistable tags obtain good
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robustness to JPEG2000 CR 16:1 image compression and contrast and brightness
change (NHD = 0% for tag length of 4096 bits), and bad, as intended, to local
operations that distort the details of the image (average NHD > 15% for tag length
≥ 512 bits). Volatile tags achieve very little robustness to any modification of the
image, even when associating very short tags (NHD > 45% for length ≥ 64 bits).
Fourth, the operations involved in the algorithm for the selection of image features
are simple, and as a result, the runtime costs are low: associating a set of keytags
and retrieving the corresponding tags for the simultaneous implementation of the
aforementioned security measures takes only ' 55, 115ms for 512× 512 px2 images;
' 140, 200 ms for 1024 × 1024 px2 images and ' 510, 570 for 2048 × 2048 px2 im-
ages. In addition, the scalability of keytagging has been evidenced when this method
is combined with JPEG2000 compression, since its robustness-capacity tradeoff is
maintained while the keytag association-tag retrieval delays are reduced to only
' 30, 90ms for any image size.
To sum up, both techniques help to build different parts of a secure and cost-efficient
m-Health architecture. In the case of the biomedical test coding, most of its features (high
signal compression with clinical quality, real-time operation, embedding within the signal,
security with reduced overhead) are not currently supported by well-established signal
standards (e.g. DICOM waveform 30, SCP-ECG), which makes it a promising option for
the BAN/PAN part of the m-Health architecture, which is highly constrained in costs.
With respect to keytagging, it has been explained how this method can be seamlessly
integrated within DICOM to facilitate the deployment of efficient cooperation among
different authorized users, so that they can update DICOM files with new information
and share it without sacrificing any security measure. Therefore, this technique may be
integrated in the traditional PACS of the architecture, but also in the PAN/BAN for
applications such as teledermatology.
“There is no real ending.
It’s just the place where you stop the story.”
Frank Herbert
“Our virtues and our failings are inseparable, like force and
matter. When they separate, man is no more.”
Nikola Tesla
5
Conclusions
This last Chapter lays out the conclusions of the Thesis and future work derived. The
research objectives presented in Chapter 1 have been discussed throughout the Thesis.
The most challenging key factors in the design of a secure and cost-efficient m-Health
architecture have been addressed. These include proposing an overall design enabling m-
Health services with different security and interoperability requirements, the enhancement
of standard protocols for the exchange of biomedical information and the development
of novel methods for the protection of biomedical tests. This Chapter is organized as
follows. Section 5.1 specifies how the objectives of the Thesis have been achieved chapter
by chapter. Section 5.2 enumerates and details the contributions of this work and the
results accomplished. Finally, future work is described in Section 5.3.
5.1 Research objectives achieved
Chapter 1 describes the m-Health scenario, the benefits that it can provide to the stake-
holders involved in the healthcare system and its main issues, emphasizing those related
with security. Section 1.2 describes the core components of the m-Health architecture and
Section 1.3 presents an overview of current security trends in m-Health, their challenges
and some clues about what can be improved. The objectives of this Thesis are established
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in Section 1.4; being the main aim to investigate and develop a secure and cost-efficient
architecture enabling an enhanced exchange of biomedical information in m-Health sce-
narios — focusing on biomedical tests. All the detailed objectives listed in Chapter 1 are
addressed throughout the remaining chapters.
• Reviews on the state of the art in general aspects regarding security in m-Health:
major biomedical standards, biomedical signal coding methods, transport technolo-
gies and legal regulations have been carried out in Chapter 2. This has lead to a
thorough risk assessment of the m-Health architecture and the raising of the guide-
lines for strengthening its security.
• The enhancement of the security of major biomedical standard protocols (ISO/IEEE
11073 PHD and SCP-ECG) according to the previous guidelines, which maximize
their interoperability and cost-efficiency, has been addressed in Chapter 3.
• The design and evaluation of novel biomedical test protection methods based on
their associated signals (embedding and keytagging), which enable advanced security
features for strengthening the m-Health architecture with reduced costs, is addressed
in Chapter 4.
The detailed conclusions and objectives achieved in each chapter are depicted in Sec-
tions 3.6 and 4.8.
5.2 Contributions and accomplished results
The bold contribution of this Thesis is the proposal of a strengthened m-Health architec-
ture along with the tools to implement it in an efficient and inexpensive manner. The work
involved in reaching this wide objective results in the achievement of the detail objectives
established in Section 1.4. They are presented below, subdivided into the main topics of
this research. First of all, as regards to the contributions on the design of a secure
and cost-efficient m-Health architecture:
1. Preparation of a detailed risk assessment of the m-Health architecture (Section 2.5).
This identifies the entities that may participate in the acquisition, transmission and
storage of biomedical information of users (e.g. PHDs, CDs, alert systems, PACS)
and the different threats that may cause loss, corruption or theft of this information,
endangering the health and the privacy of the users. The attacks associated to
these threats, e.g. devices hacking, replay attacks, user impersonation, main-in-the-
middle attack, etc., and its likelihood of success depending on different parameters
(e.g. length of a certain key, frequency of renewal) are determined.
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2. Analysis of common demands of major legal regulations regarding the m-Health con-
text (Section 2.4). The health IT directives of regulations such as the HIPAA and
the GDPR are summarized in those requirements regarding the addressing of infor-
mation security (confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, auditability,
authenticity, non-repudiation and privacy) in order to minimize the risks associated
to m-Health architecture and framework.
3. Proposal of a well-depicted, cost-efficient, global security proposal for the m-Health
architecture (Section 2.6.1). This defines a layered interoperability model for m-
Health applications demanding different requirements of security and integration
with medical systems. For instance, the processing of simple real-time measurements
(e.g. for daily blood pressure visualization) in a concentrator device requires only
low security and no further integration, while the reliable interpretation of biomed-
ical measurements and signals acquired at home — with personal health devices
— in medical systems (e.g. clinical decision support systems) for clinical disease
management requires high security and integration capabilities. This model takes
into account the economical dimension and defines real use cases where some costs
are saved, e.g. it is not essential to demand a user authenticator (e.g. based on
bar codes or RFID tokens) in personal health devices that are not to be shared by
different users.
4. Translation of the previous global security proposal into specific security and inte-
gration measures (Sections 2.6.2, 2.6.3 and 2.6.5). A careful analysis of the most
suitable IHE profiles (e.g. ATNA, CT, DEC, ACM, WCM, XDS, etc.) to implement
the security and integration measures demanded by each of the layers. Since IHE
is not particularly aimed for Personal Area Networks, a new IHE profile needed —
named SDO — to be defined to cover reliable communications between personal
health devices and concentrator devices. The features of this profile (cryptographic
algorithms, crypto periods, key lengths, etc.), their relations with the security lay-
ers and with already-existing IHE profiles (e.g. as a supplement of DEC, ACM or
WCM) are specified.
5. Security assessment of the m-Health architecture after its enhancement (Sections
3.2.1, 3.4.1, 4.4.1 and 4.7.8). This includes comprehensive evaluations of how the new
features included in 4) and integrated/materialized in 6, 9, 13 and 16) are effective
on the prevention of the threats affecting the m-Health architecture, exposed in 1),
depending on the security layer 3) implemented. This evaluations help to picture
how security (and costs) grows with each layer.
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Second, concerning standardized protocols:
6. Design of a cost-efficient security extension for ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD (Section
3.1). This relies on the adaptation of the layered proposal in 4) to its models of
data information, service and communication — where the bottom layer corresponds
precisely to the current version of the standard.
7. Appraisal and discussion of the implications and impact of the former extension
(Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). This evaluates the number of attributes added
to the data information model and the number of new states and frames added
to the Finite States Machine that represents the service and communication models
depending on the layer implemented. It also measures the extra delays and overhead
produced by the implementation of each layer in representative cases, such as the
transmission of a discrete measurement, a continuous signal or a block with the
maximum size allowed by the standard. Finally, it calculates the minimum hardware
that guarantees real-time transmission of a 3-lead electrocardiogram implementing
the top layer of the enhanced version of ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD and reasons about
the limitations of this extension.
8. Analysis of the implications of the ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD extension for IHE (Section
2.6.5). The seamless IHE-based extension of ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD suggests mild
modifications or the extension of certain IHE profiles, such as the addition of new
alarms to ACM.
9. Design of a robust and simple security extension for SCP-ECG (Section 3.3). This
extension coordinates with that in 6) for the secure exchange of ECG data and
proposes an enhanced file format, based on the features of the new IHE profile
proposed in 4) and adapted to the scope and structure of SCP-ECG.
10. Implementation of the former extension and evaluation (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). This
analyzes the impact of the extension on the SCP-ECG file format, presents a proof-
of-concept that carries out the security enhancement of regular SCP-ECG files and
the secure access to their contents, and also measures the overhead of the protected
SCP-ECG files (in absolute value and comparing with the size of representative
SCP-ECG files) and the delays in the processes of protection and access.
11. Definition of appropriate means to allow the integration of novel biomedical signal
protection methods in DICOM (Section 2.6.4). Specifically, a method for the pro-
tection of biomedical signals that may embed periodic measurements, contextual
information and/or security elements and a method for the protection of biomedical
images by means of keytagging.
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Third, as regards to techniques for the protection of biomedical tests:
12. Reviews on the state of the art about methods that permit embedding large amounts
of hidden data on signals (Sections 1.3.2 and 2.2.4). This includes an overview of
the main features of these techniques, examples of contents that may be embedded
within signals, a thorough classification of embedding alternatives and an analysis
of the main drawbacks of these techniques in the m-Health context.
13. Design of an optimal coding for biomedical signals, periodic measurements and con-
textual information that facilitates the development of secure and efficient m-Health
services (Sections 1.2.2 and 4.1). This coding guarantees high signal compression
— to preserve its clinical value — while reducing bandwidth and storage require-
ments; tight and secure embedding of measurements and of any other data of interest
within the coded signals; role-based access control on the embedded data to enhance
its privacy and also efficient, partial signal encryption.
14. Development, optimization and evaluation of the former coding (Section 4.2). The
evaluation and parameters adjustment is twofold: from the user viewpoint, which
demands preserving the clinical quality of the signal, adequate availability of the
data and ease of use of the implementation; and from the technical viewpoint, which
requires low bandwidth requirements, low overhead of the security elements and
enough embedding capacity to include data produced in m-Health services. Two
real scenarios are considered: ECG-based tests and EEG-based tests.
15. Reviews on the state of the art about Medical Image Watermarking methods (Sec-
tions 1.3.2 and 2.2.4). This includes an overview of the main features and constraints
of these techniques, of security measures that may be implemented based on water-
marking, a comprehensive classification of watermarking alternatives and watermark
types, and a discussion about the main advantages and disadvantages of these tech-
niques in the m-Health context.
16. Design of a novel technique for the protection of biomedical images in m-Health archi-
tectures (Section 4.5). This technique follows a new research direction derived from
non-zero watermarking. Its design guarantees the clinical quality of the biomedi-
cal image without the need for assessment, high security against eavesdropping and
manipulation, robustness against attacks which are typical in medical imaging and
efficiency in the association of information to the image and in its access. Moreover,
this novel technique can alleviate the cumbersome process for sharing biomedical
information associated to the images with security.
17. Proposal of optimal parameter configurations to associate information in a robust,
semifragile and fragile manner and evaluate the robustness, specificity and scalability
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of this technique (Section 4.6). The image test set includes images from different
acquisition modalities, computed tomographies, magnetic resonances, positron emis-
sion tomographies and ultrasounds. The robustness and the specificity are measured
by means of the PRD. Furthermore, two aspects of the scalability of this algorithm
are also tested, the complexity of its main routines (how the delays grow) and how
the capacity (to host information) may vary when increasing the size of the image
to be keytagged.
18. Proposal of security keytagging-based applications (Section 4.7). Optimal configura-
tions (type of keytag, length, content, detection thresholds, etc.) to implement de-
tection and location of tampered areas in images, private captioning with role-based
access control, image authentication and traceability control, copyright protection
and image resynchronization.
The most challenging issues have been addressed, and the results obtained indicate the
validity, comprehensiveness and cost-efficiency of the solutions reached.
• The simple model proposed for enhancing the security and interoperability of m-
Health architectures consists of three layers directly related with the m-Health do-
mains — health and fitness, independent living and clinical disease management,
which in turn are subdivided into two sublayers to address economic constraints —
e.g. avoid the use of user authenticators in PHDs that are not shared by several
users. The newly proposed IHE Secure Device Observation profile facilitates reliable
and secure communications from the PCD to the concentrating gateway in imple-
mentations of the DEC, ACM and WCM profiles and also improves interoperability
with the extended ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD and SCP-ECG.
• The layered, IHE-based extension of ISO/IEEE 11073 PHD introduces a series of
countermeasures that put barriers to the threats (user impersonation, data theft, in-
jection of commands, replay attacks) detected in the risk assessment of the hot spots
of the traditional m-Health architecture. Furthermore, this extension can be consid-
ered cost-efficient. It adds no attributes to t DIM; four new frames have been added
to the service model, and another four have been extended with new sub-frames
(most of them common to all layers); and only one new sub-state, ‘Authenticating’,
has been added in the communication model. As regards to the hardware require-
ments of the enhanced X73PHD architecture, a personal health device with a simple
9 MHz processor (assuming a throughput of 1 MIPS/MHz) can implement the top
layer and transmit a 3-lead ECG in real-time to a concentrator device with a one-
core processor at 1 GHz (also assuming the same throughput). With respect to
its surrounding framework, the personal health device and the concentrator device
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demand an initial configuration (carried out by the administrator), tokens for identi-
fication/authentication of users are needed when they share devices, and several IHE
profiles need to be implemented by the concentrator device to enable its integration
with healthcare systems (PHRs, EHRs, alert managers and CDSS). In summary, it
can be considered that all the defining features of X73PHD have been maintained
and enhanced with low or moderate costs.
• The security extension of the SCP-ECG file format has been devised to minimize
the threats of unauthorized reading of confidential file contents, generation of (trust-
worthy) forged files and malicious removal or edition of legitimate files. The new
security-enhanced format adds a new section (Section 12) with selected security ele-
ments and syntax in order to store the rest of file contents safely and proper access
to be granted (or denied) to users for different purposes: interpretation of the test,
consultation, clinical research or teaching. The access privileges are scaled by means
of role-based profiles supported by cryptographic elements (encryption, digital cer-
tificates and signatures). The overhead introduced in the protected SCP-ECG is
typically 2 − 13% with respect to the size of a regular file, and there is a 2 − 10%
of extra delay to protect a newly generated SCP-ECG file and a ≤ 5 % extra delay
to access it for interpretation. Regarding the users of the standard, they can main-
tain their regular SCP-ECG devices and software since an intuitive tool to protect
SCP-ECG files and access the protected counterparts is provided. Taking all this
into consideration, it can be said that a good level of security and availability is
technically feasible with low or moderate costs.
• The proposed generic coding for biomedical signals, periodic measurements and
contextual information has been conceived to minimize its most relevant threats:
unauthorized detection and reading of confidential contents, generation of (trust-
worthy) forged coded tests and malicious removal or edition of legitimate coded
tests. Furthermore, the access to the coded tests is regulated in such manner that
they may be used for different, secure m-Health applications simultaneously, e.g.
emergency care/surgery, diagnosis, research or examination, teaching, etc. As re-
gards to performance, this new coding has been tuned and evaluated with resting,
stress and ambulatory/Holter ECGs and with EEG-based tests for epilepsy detec-
tion and polysomnographic studies. The results obtained demonstrate the objective
clinical quality of the coded tests, the ability of the coding-access system to operate
in real-time (overall delays of 2 s for ECGs and 3.3 s for EEGs) and the its easy han-
dling by PACS and users. Furthermore, this coding permits the embedding of large
amounts of additional information within the signal (e.g. ' 3 KB in resting ECGs,
' 200 KB in stress tests, ' 30 MB in ambulatory ECGs, ' 360 KB in epilepsy
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detection tests and ' 4.7 MB in polysomnographic studies), detecting corruption of
the signal or the information and implementing different access levels for a variety
of professional roles. The compression ratios achieved by the coding are quite high,
ranging from ' 3 in real-time transmission to ' 5 in offline operation, despite of
the embedding of security elements and metadata to enable various secure m-Health
applications.
• Keytagging has been assessed as a secure technique against its major threats: unau-
thorized detection and reading of private keytags — no tag bit associated to an image
can be derived from the corresponding keytag(s) alone or by using an unrelated image
—, writing of forget keytags and malicious removal or edition of legitimate keytags.
On these robust basis, a variety of complementary keytagging-based security ap-
plications have been proposed, namely: detection and location of tampered areas
in images, private captioning, image authentication and traceability control, copy-
right protection and image resynchronization. With respect to the cost-efficiency of
this technique, the results obtained in terms of robustness-capacity and simplicity
are remarkable. Tested with 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024 pixel images, the robust-
ness of stable tags to modifications that are typical in the medical context is total
(NHD = 0) up to 512 bits and still very high (only three modifications produce
NHD > 0) for 1024 bits. Semistable tags obtain good robustness to JPEG2000
CR 16:1 image compression and contrast and brightness change (NHD = 0% for
tag length of 4096 bits), and bad, as intended, to local operations that distort the
details of the image (average NHD > 15% for tag length ≥ 512 bits). Volatile tags
achieve very little robustness to any modification of the image, even when associat-
ing very short tags (NHD > 45% for length ≥ 64 bits). Regarding runtime costs,
the simultaneous implementation of all the keytagging-based security applications
consumes ' 55+ 115ms for 512×512px2 images; ' 140+ 200ms for 1024×1024px2
images and ' 510+ 570 for 2048×2048px2 images. It has also been shown how this
method can be combined with JPEG2000 compression, maintaining its robustness
while reducing the keytag delays to only ' 30 + 90 ms for any image size, which
demonstrates the scalability of keytagging.
5.3 Future work
Although the objectives established in Section 1.4 have been fulfilled and very good results
have been obtained, there is still room for improvement with well-oriented research. It is
worth noting that some of these proposals may be considered at a pretty early research
stage, while some others rely on evolving researches and standards. Thus, both additional,
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exhaustive experimentation based on the configurations proposed in this Thesis and the
translation or adaptation of external, novel advancements in related researches can foster
relevant breakthroughs. Furthermore, certain security methods proposed may be consid-
ered as domain-agnostic tools which have been particularized to the specifics of certain
biomedical tests, so they could be extended to other test modalities — existing or arising
in the future — and also to other, totally different fields, such as military intelligence and
secure distribution of commercial multimedia. The following list points out some interest-
ing investigation directions that may be fruitful. First, as regards to the security of the
global m-Health architecture:
• The periodic update and extension of the layer-based model to include new IHE
profiles is requisite to maintain its validity and increase its reach. For instance, the
inclusion of the Mobile access to Health Documents (MHD) and the Internet User
Authorization (IUA) profile — although not essential — would result interesting for
healthcare systems that prefer the simplified HTTP RESTful technology.
• A technical, detailed description of the proposed Secure Device Observation (SDO)
profile would be relevant towards its hypothetical integration in IHE. It is worth
noting that this profile is aimed at guaranteeing secure acquisition of biomedical
information from users to host systems, involving personal health devices as in-
termediaries. This Thesis already includes an adaptation of SDO to ISO/IEEE
11073-20601 and SCP-ECG. However, it could also be adapted to other biomedical
protocols used in Personal and Body Area Networks (e.g. simple protocols associated
to open-source platforms, future m-IoT protocols) to enhance their security.
• The modeling and integration of social networks in the IHE guidelines, given that
it has been reported in the literature that these tools have the potential to improve
user engagement in m-Health services. Nonetheless, this work would research on
which roles they could play, such as sources of biomedical information (like personal
health devices), communicators of alerts and/or subscribed biomedical information,
dedicated personal/electronic health records, etc. Therefore, they may act as entities
but also as channels to carry out communication transactions.
• A serious proposal for the integration of m-IoT and social media in a secure and
standard-based framework would probably be a milestone towards the construction
of larger m-Health ecosystems. It may promote the manufacturing and selling of
inexpensive, tiny, wearable and ready-to-use sensors (e.g. to measure body tem-
perature, pulse rate, sweating); the direct and secure transmission of the acquired
biomedical measurements and signals to the social media account(s) of the user —
so that he/she is on control of his/her own personal data — by means of mobile
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broadband technology (e.g. 3G, 4G); and the development of new smart m-Health
services (e.g. running as Facebook apps, familiar to hundreds of millions of people)
that analyze, store and/or share the biomedical information (or part of it) accord-
ing to the user preferences. The use of biomedical standard-based means (at least
their syntax) in this framework would allow that this data may also be integrated
in traditional healthcare systems — e.g. electronic health record, clinical decision
support systems.
• The definition of mechanisms for the integration of advanced, signal-based protec-
tion methods (e.g. keytagging) in the IHE guidelines, so that they can supplement
existing security profiles — such as ATNA, which are entirely based on cryptography.
Second, concerning standardized protocols whose security has been enhanced:
• The evaluation of how the extensions of SCP-ECG and ISO/IEEE 11073 presented
in this Thesis fit into the new m-IoT paradigm, to deploy frameworks where the per-
sonal health devices are internet-ready and the concentrator devices are cloud ser-
vices. More specifically, it would be necessary to study which protocol(s) (e.g. CoAP
[396], MQTT [397]) would best replace traditional transport (typically performed by
means of USB, Bluetooth or Zigbee in traditional ISO/IEEE 11073 frameworks) and
if some attributes, models or procedures of these standards would require modifica-
tions. Furthermore, given the limited energy availability of internet-ready personal
health devices, the implementation of the extended standards in open-source plat-
forms would help to assess their suitability for m-IoT.
Third, with respect to the techniques for the protection of biomedical tests
which have been developed:
• The 1D embedding algorithm, which has been tested with ECGs and EEGs, could
be extended to biomedical signals of higher dimension (e.g. 2D: MRIs, CTs, 3D:
echocardiograms), since the coding relies on the widespread, generalizable and pub-
lic SPIHT algorithm. This extension would only require changing to the adequate
SPIHT modality (2D or 3D), adjusting empirically the optimal compression param-
eters and establishing the distortion threshold that permits maintaining the clinical
quality of each new type of signal. Furthermore, is is worth noting that as SPIHT be-
comes more efficient when increasing the dimension (it achieves higher compression
ratios for a similar signal quality), the embedding capacity will grow considerably.
• The embedding-based coding for biomedical tests provides a common access to the
signal to all users — regardless even if they ignore the presence of embedded con-
tents — since the whole Coded Test Unit is introduced into the SPIHT decoder.
Although this is a noteworthy feature, still an attacker can remove bits from the end
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of a Coded Test Unit (corresponding to embedded contents) and the signal would
remain readable and preserving its clinical value — in any case this removal is always
detected at the decoder. To strengthen, even more, the binding between the signal
and the embedded content, this coding shall be enhanced to guarantee the automatic
destruction of the clinical content of the signal when the embedded content (or part
of it) is removed. Foundations of compressed sensing may be applied to achieve
the embedding of metadata in critical parts of the Coded Test Unit with tolerable
distortion.
• The embedding-based coding requires the protection of the content to be embedded
into the signal. Robust cryptographic elements — encryption and digital signatures
— have been proposed and successfully tested for this task. However, the protection
may also be based on keytags, which would reinforce the association between the
signal and the content — the keytagging procedure would precede the embedding.
• As regards to the keytagging algorithm, the main advance would be the development
of an enhanced keytag coding method in order to reduce the overhead, which is the
main drawback of this technique with respect to watermarking and cryptography.
The second major improvement would be avoiding the need for BCH coding in stable
and semistable tags and raising the capacity of semistable tags. To achieve this, it
looks promising to research into the combined use of both most significant and sign
bits of high magnitude coefficients as stable features, and also on the use of new
transforms that may perform better than wavelets (e.g. wave atoms). In third
place, it would be interesting to find predictors of the specific keytagging capacity
of each individual image. The results obtained in the Thesis are the average of the
proposed image test set. However, it was observed that certain modalities obtained a
better robustness-capacity tradeoff — particularly, those high higher energy content.
• The extension of the keytagging algorithm to work with color images. There are
certain biomedical modalities where the modifications of the color result in a mod-
ification of the diagnosis — e.g. color Doppler mode of echocardiograms, and thus
shall be detected. In addition to this, working with the three color components
(instead of with only the grayscale version of the image) will certainly improve the
robustness-capacity tradeoff.
• The application of the keytagging algorithm to DICOM formats that store short
videos as a series of frames. A simple operation of combination of the frames into
a virtual image that would be keytagged may be enough to protect all the frames
at once against attacks such as the removal, reordering or undue modification of
frames. Furthermore, the frames may also be used individually or in small groups
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to associate large contents — in a coordinated way, organized and indexed by parts.
• The extension of the keytagging algorithm to work on video, guaranteeing good
integration with modern, widespread video codecs (e.g. H.265/HEVC) would be the
perfect supplement for the current proposal, focused on images and fully compliant
with JPEG2000 — and to some extent with JPEG.
• The study of security needs in other fields — apart from the medical — requiring
not distorting the signals involved, such is the case of the military or high quality
multimedia (based on lossless codecs), may result in new keytagging applications.
This would certainly help to widen the popularity and utility of this technique.
• An interesting novel investigation may also be the reversal of the inputs of key-
tagging, in order to encode a certain secret message as a combination of public,
unaltered images — involving very few side data. The research associated would
include developing two critical parts: an engine that efficiently searches for images
with features fitting a part of the secret message and the secure protocol to estab-
lishes the parameters of the transmission of the message(s) (e.g. number of bits
coded by each image, channels where the images are shared).
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